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Foreword
The 1979 New Electric Utility Management and Control Systems
Conference held May 30- June 1 was the first such conference devoted to
the potential of Homeostatic Control as a mechanism to provide greater
economic and physical efficiency in future electic supply and demand.
The papers contained herein provide the background to the concepts of
Homeostatic Control. Chapters II, III, IV and V open with a concept
paper followed by a summary of the discussion evolved from the conference
participants. Thus, these proceedings provide an initial critical review
of the Homeostatic Control concepts.
These proceedings are divided into six chapters, followed by a set of
appendices. The subjects covered are as follows:
Chapter 1 contains a discussion of the purpose of the conference and
its organization. It also conatins a preprint of "Homeostatic Utility
Control," presented at the IEEE PAS 1979 Summer Power Meeting, which
provides a self-contained description of the major aspects of Homeostatic
Control.
Chapter 2 contains discussions on the economic principles involved in
the pricing of electricity and how these principles may be reflected in
time varying buy and buy-back spot prices.
Chapter 3 contains discussions on utility-customer information flows
and on how customers can respond to various types of pricing and control
mechanisms.
Chapter 4 contains discussions of the problems of regulatory
commissions and agencies in setting rates and the effects new control
concepts may have on these issues.
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Chapter 5 contains a review of some of the problems associated with
the operation of electric power systems and discussions on how such
quality of supply issues can affect economically based buy and buy-back
spot prices and can lead to a need for an interruptible spot price. The
homeostatic Frequency Adaptive Power Energy Rescheduler (FAPER) concept
which allows customers to actively participate in system control without
affecting their own needs is discussed.
Chapter 6 provides an edited version of the proceedings of the
Critical Issues Panel which summarizes the discussion during the four
conference presentations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Summary
1.1 Purpose of the Conference
The purpose of this conference is to explore issues related to
operation and rate making for electric power systems. Rapid changes in
costs, environmental concerns, and generation and conservation
technologies provide an impetus to find new approaches for addressing
these issues.
The major focus of the conference will be on the relationship
between radically new, technologically motivated approaches, and the
regulatory process, which influences those approaches that are actually
adopted. An MIT group has developed a new technological approach, called
Homeostatic Control for electric power systems operation and
rate-making. Homeostatic Control concepts will provide the vehicle for
exploring the relationship between new engineering and economic
technologies and the regulatory process.
Homeostasis is a term used in biology relating to an "equilibrium or
a tendency toward equilibrium between associated but independent elements
of an organism..." When the term homeostatic control is used in this
conference, the overall electric power system is viewed as the "organism"
whose "associated but independent elements" consist of the utility and
all of the customers. The main feature that differentiates Homeostatic
Control from other approaches to power system operations and rate-making
is the exploitation of advances in communications and computer technology
which allow nearly instantaneous information flows to occur between the
utility and the customers. This continuous information flow allows for
the maintenance of an improved equilibrium between producer costs and
user demand. This equilibruim is based on concerns for equity and
economic efficiency in concert with a stable, functioning power system.
Homeostatic Control is a radical departure from present-day practices
because price becomes an integral part of power systems control. It is a
new perspective for rate-making policy in which there is an opportunity
for prices to reflect the current costs as determined by whatever
economic theory is adopted or policy objectives are desired.
The Homeostatic Control concept has the potential for enormous
economic and social impact. Its implementation could result in better
economic efficiency; a less vulnerable and more reliable power system,
and enhanced opportunities for new technologies and alternative energy
systems to compete on the basis of their actual merits. Although many
aspects and ramifications of Homeostatic Control have not yet been fully
explored, the MIT group has come to the point where it believes
Homeostatic Control provides the basis for a control and pricing
structure which meets the future needs of the nation.
There are many open technical economic and engineering questions
which must be answered before a new concept such as Homeostatic Control
can be implemented. Furthermore, Homeostatic Control need not be the
only possible new approach to operation and rate-making for electric
power systems. However, whether one is dealing with homeostatic control
or some other approach, a critical factor lies in the regulatory
process. Any new technology which is based on radical change in
utility-customer relationships can be implemented only if it is
coordinated through an evolving regulatory process.
Thus, even though the conference must be concerned with technical
economic and engineering issues, it is expected that the interaction
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between what is technologically possible and what is acceptable in the
regulatory process will be a major focus.
The conference is organized as follows: After dinner on Wednesday
night, an admitted favorably biased description of the advantages of
Homeostatic Control was made. The Thursday discussions used aspects of
the Homeostatic Control concept as starting points for discussion on
major issues in four areas; pricing/rate-making, customer response,
regulation, and power system operation. Discussion in each areas starte
with an MIT-prepared presentation detailing the issues as we see them,
followed by two commentators who will make brief presentations on their
own perspectives, ending with open discussion. Friday morning started
with presentations on issues that Thursday's discussion showed to be
unresolved or especially critical.
The conference concluded with discussion on possible future
directions.
The proposals of the MIT group for immediate future action related
to the Homeostatic Control concept are as follows:
1. Research on system-wide effects on economics/costs and
control/stability/security.
2. Continued development of hardware.
3. Limited scale, carefully monitored test implementation.
4. Continued consideration of utility, customer, and regulatory
adaptations necessary for implementation.
A paper which provides more details on the overall Homeostatic
Control concept follows.
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1.2 Significant Conclusions
o The Homeostatic Control system would be most useful in applications
in the industrial and large commercial sectors but could, over time,
become a viable alternative for smaller consumers such as residences.
o There are no insurmountable regulatory barriers to the adoption of
Homeostatic Control,
o The intent of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PL 95-617)
with regard to pricing, cogeneration and small generators is accurately
reflected in the Homeostatic Control concepts, particularly in spot
pricing.
o The FAPER (Frequency Adaptive Power Energy Rescheduler) and possible
a VAPER (Voltage) are likely to be able to play a significant role in
increasing overall electric utility system reliability.
o Further detailed analyses of the benefits to, and responsiveness of,
consumers and utilities to the Homeostatic Control concepts should focus
on the spot pricing system including timing and on the potential
application areas for the FAPER.
o The next major stage in the development of Homeostatic Control
should be an experiment utilizing the concepts and involving all of the
significant actors, a utility, a consumer, preferably an industry or
large commercial customer with a large and flexible load and,
significantly, a state Public Utility Commission.
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Abstract - Distribution Automation and Control (DAC)
.systems have potentially major effects on costs, social
impacts, and even on the nature of the power system itself,
especially as dispersed storage, generation, and customer
interaction become more prevalent. However, at the
present time, it is not clear which particular modes of
control will best exploit the capabilities of DAC.
Homeostatic Utility Control is an overall concept which
tries to maintain an internal equilibrium between supply and
'demand. Equilibrating forces are obtained over longer time
scales (5 minutes and up) by economic principles through an
Energy Marketplace using time-varying spot prices. Faster
supply-demand balancing is obtained by employing
"governor-type" action on certain types of loads using a
Frequency Adaptive Power Energy Rescheduler (FAPER) to
assist or even replace conventional turbine-governed
systems and spinning reserve. Conventional metering is
replaced by a Marketing Interface to Customer (MIC) which,
in addition to measuring power usage, multiplies that usage
by posted price and records total cost. Customers retain the
freedom to select their consumption patterns. Homeostatic
control is a new, untried concept. It is discussed in this
paper because its great potential makes it a vehicle for
interesting discussions of where the future may actually
evolve.
INTRODUCTION
Rationale
Today's regulated electric utility system was built and
,is operated under a "supply follows demand" philosophy. The
customer has the right to demand any amount of energy, and
pays a constant, prespecified, infrequently updated, price.
The philosophy of "supply follows demand" may be criticized
for a variety of reasons:
* The need for rapid load following and large spinning
reserve margins causes inefficient use of fuel;
* The large ratio between peak and average load
implies that extra utility system capacity and
distribution systems must exist to supply peak
demand;
* The fixed nature of electricity prices discourages
some forms of energy conservation and customer
generation;
* The isolation of customers from the problems of the
supply system makes it vulnerable to both
short-term (New York City-type blackouts) and
long-term (coal strike or oil embargo) emergencies;
To be presented at the IEEE Power
Engineering Society 1979 Summer
Meeting, Vancouver, B.C., July 1979.
Also accepted for publication in the
IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus
and Systems. Submitted January 31,
1979.
* Finally, government regulation plays a rixed role;
customers are isolated from changes in real cost
while utilities are isolated from the effects of
competition.
This paper introduces a basic philosophy in which the supply
(generation) and demand (load) respond to each other in a
coooerative fashion and are in a state- of continuous
equilibrium. Homeostasis is a biological term referring to
the "existence of a state of equilibrium...between the
interdependent elements of an organism." It is appropriate
to apply this concept to an electric power system in which
the supply systems and demanrd systems work together to
provide a natural state of continuous equilibrium to the
benefit of both the utilities and their customers. A set of
interrelated physical and economic forces maintains the
balance between electric supply and customer load.
Energy costs, including costs for electric power, have
risen sharply in the recent past and may be expected to
continue to rise in the future. This increase in costs makes
conservation of energy more important and makes it
increasingly important that the allocation of energy costs
fall precisely on the user of that energy.
Variation of load levels on electric utility systems
impose real costs. For equity and economic efficiency, the
price of electric energy should reflect the variation in costs
brought about by fluctuations in system load. The price
should, therefore, be relatively higher when system load is
high, and relatively lower when system load is low.
Time-of-day rates attempt to adjust price to load level,
based on the fact that, historically, load has been higher at
some times of the day and year than at others. Such rates
cannot, however, account for actual operating conditions or
for load as it may be affected by, for instance, weather
variability.
A second approach to reductions of the costs of uneven
demand has been the use of direct utility-consumer
communications to implement a "load follows supply"
concept. Under such a system, carried to the extreme, the
customer's demand would be controlled through interruption
of power to specific uses. This has the advantage that it
would allow the utility to run at constant output. Capital
could be used to the optimum extent, and the system's
vulnerability to equipment failures, oil embargoes, coal
strikes, and weather would be reduced to a minimum. Any
contingency of supply would be matched by a reduction of
load. While such a system might be efficient and produce
electric power at minimum cost, it is unlikely that it would
be politically or socially acceptable.
The concept of Homeostatic Utility Control utilizes the
economic response to price on the part of suppliers and
consumers combined with the revolutionary developments
occurring in the fields of communication and computation to
develop an efficient, internally-correcting control scheme.
The basic communication systems .for such a scheme are
being designed or are undergoing testing today. These coen
new possibilities in the control and operation of electric
power systems, which are further enhanced by advancement
in computation hardware. Large-scale integration is making
*On leave from the University of New South
Wales, New South Wales, Australia.
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FIGURE 1: The Energy Marketplace
s6phisticated computational ability available in small,
economical packages. These developments will make it
possible to communicate between customer and supplier and
to control electric power systems in highly sophisticated
ways.
The philosophy of Homeostatic Utility Control can offer
a set of advantages of both "supply follows demand" and
"demand follows supply" while avoiding the majority of their
major pitfalls. It offers a continuous accommodation of the
utility and customer to achieve stability and to minimize
costs through a price-guided process involving independent
choices by all parties.
Basic Structure
Homeostatic Utility Control requires three distinct
functional developments or adaptations for its successful
implementation. The first is a short-term mechanism which
can operate to balance the supply and demand in a time
frame less than five to ten minutes. Within current Utility
Generation systems this function is generally fulfilled by
governor and AGC action in central power plants which
cause supply to follow demand. An alternative, lower-cost
approach which causes demand to follow supply is based on a
Frequency Adaptive Power Energy Rescheduler (FAPER). A
FAPER is a frequency-responsive switching device which
will control significant energy (as opposed to power)
consuming loads. An example of such a load would be an
electric melt pot in a processing plant or, at a residential
scale, an electric heating or hot water system. The basic
principle of the FAPER is rescheduling uses of electricity in
which the demand is for an average rather than an
instantaneous condition. The FAPER will turn the device
off. and back on as a function of the utility's ability to
provide energy.
The second concept required for Homeostatic Utility
Control is that of a mechanism by which consumers can pay
a price for electricity which reflects, over time, the true
current cost of the energy whichl they are receiving. This
Energy Marketplace, in Figure 1, contains three classes of
actors: first, the Customer who purchases power from the
Marketplace or sells excess generation to it,- second, the
Utility Generation which is a supplier of electricity to the
Marketplace, and, third, the utility Marketing System which
acts as a broker for the electricity. The Marketing System
is responsible for transmission and distribution and billing
and metering transactions required both to distribute the
electrical energy and to record the time and quantity of
energy suppiied ard consumed; it is also a repository for
information concerning the cost of generation and the
willingness of the consumer to buy electricity at a given
price. As will be discussed in greater detail in the sections
which follow, the Marketplace operates under a set of "spot
prices" for the energy which reflect both the capital and
operating costs during any given period of time. The spot
price becomes, therefore, the currency which both
establishes the level of demand on the part of the sum of the
customers and guarantees the supplier a fair return on the
energy generated during the time period.
The third concept in Homeostatic Utility Control is the
requirement for a device or set of devices which can provide
the communication and recording functions critical to the
operation of a system with high variability in the critical
variables such as cost and price. The Marketing Interface to
Customer (MIC) capable of maintaining and billing against
variable spot prices as well as acting to credit a consumer
with significant "storage" through FAPERs installed in his
system. A MIC varies in complexity as a function of
application and expected energy usage from large systems
for industry to relatively simpler systems which could be
installed in an individual residence.
It is important to conclude this general discussion of
Homeostatic Utility Control with one negative caveat. The
system has never been tried, and detailed analysis is just
getting started. As of the time of writing, plans are to
carry on beyond discussing concepts with utilities and with
academic colleagues to the construction of FAPERs and
MICs and to the completion of some detailed engineering
and economic analyses.
THE FREQUENCY ADAPTIVE POWER
ENERGY RESCHEDULER
A FAPER is activated by changes in the frequency of
the electric powery system above and below the standard 60
Hz. The FAPER provides a new type of low-cost,
short-term, lossless storage adaptable to the power system.
FAPERs operate on loads which require energy rather than
6
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power.* FAPERs have no long-term impact upon the
amount of energy used, but they do shift the ctual period of
consumption to times of relative availability on the part of
the utility.
As an example consider the operation :f an industrial
melt' pot with a FAPER. If the melt t mperature lies
outside of the maximum and minimum allot able range, the
heating system is turned on and off accordin ly, independent
of frequency. However, if the temperatu, 3 is within the
allowable range, the heating system operat on is influenced
by the measured frequency. If the frequenc' is below 60 Hz,
the heating system operation tends to b turned off; if
frequency is above 60 Hz, the heating sy! :em tends to be
turned on. When supply (mechanical power out of turbines)
is less than demand (electric power to cu tomers), system
frequency decreases and vice versa. i hus, decreasing
demand when frequency is low is a stabilizing action.
The power frequency response characteristic, discussed
in detail by Appendix A, can be adjusted to perform
different functions such as:
* Governor Function: Demand is responsive to small
frequency changes associated with random load
variations (less than one minute).
* Spinning Reserve Function: Demand is responsive to
large frequency changes associated with loss of
generation, tie lines, etc. (1 to 10 minutes)
A FAPER uses only locally available measurements, i.e.
frequency and in the example of heating systems,
temperature, so the basic FAPER concept does not
intrinsically require any utility-consumer communication.
However, such communication systems make it conceptually
possible to adjust the power frequency response
characteristics, g(t)] and frequency reference, to changing
system conditions. The advantages of this extra level of
sophistication are unexplored at the present time.
FAPERs contain:
* frequency measurement;
* temperature or other process measurement;
* control logic;
* output actuation, and
* power supply.
Consider a customer (industrial, commercial or residential)
with various, independent energy usage-type devices to be
placed under FAPER control. Three possible approaches are:
* Stand Alone: Each FAPER is located at an
individual device with its own sensors, logics,
actuators, and power supply;
D Common Supply: One power supply and frequency
meter serve all the individual logics located at the
devices;
* Common Logic: One computer makes the decisions
for all the devices at a site.
The capital cost per device is dependent on which approach
is used. Installation costs for retrofitting FAPERs on
existing devices would probably be prohibitive, except for
large devices, such as those found in industry, and possibly
electric home heating. However, FAPER installation costs
on new devices should be minimal after the technology is
established.
Installation of FAPERs can be viewed as giving the
power system short-term energy storage which can be used
to provide "governor action" and "spinning reserve." This
energy storage can be assumed to be lossless compared, for
e*,ample, to pumped hydro. Its speed of response is
*It is possible to define "energy-type usage
devices" as being characterized by (1) a need for a.
certain amount of energy over a period of time in
order to fulfill their functions and (2) indifference
as to the exact time at which the energy is
furnished. Examples include space conditioning,
water heating, refrigeration, pumping, ovens,
melting, and grinding. Similar "power-type usage
devices'! ate characterized by needing power at a
speci fic time. Examples include lights,
computers, TV, and many motors used in industrial
processes.
determined by the FAPER's electronics. The only costs are
those of buildinq and installing the FAPERs.
A r ugh feel for some of the factors involved can be
obtained as follows:
De f ne:
x: apacity of device under FAPER control, i.e., power
ised when device is on (kW).
T: ength of time device is on during normal cycle.
Then
xT: vlaximum stored energy (kWh).
On the average, only some percentage of this "stored
energy' can be considered to be available at any instant for
control because of the device's normal cycle and the
probability the device itself is in a turned-off mode (e.g.,
home heating in the summer).
Define:
p: Probability device is in active mode (e.g., it is
winter for a home heating device) 0<pl
Then, taking into account the randonmess of the cycling, a
crude approximation yields
x : Amount of stored energy available for
control on the average at any instant of
time (kWh)
De fine:
c: Capital, installation cost of FAPER ($)
capital cost of controllable storage
(kWh)
Then
K-= 2
xTp
(1)
(2)
Many possible sets of reasonable guesses for numerical
values are available depending on the device. For electric
home heating, one set of numbers is:
x= 50 kW
T = 0.2 hour (12 minutes)
p = 0.25 (3-month heating season)
c = $10
which yields
K = $8/kWh.
If enough FAPERs were in operation, it would be
possible (conceptually at least) to remove the existing
central power station governors and the central dispatch
AGC system. A slower (5-minute) central-dispatch control
signal would be sent to the power plants based on economics
and the need to remove time and energy errors. With such a
system, tie-line interchange would be maintained and
balanced on a longer time scale based on
estimated/computed flows as well as direct measurements.
This "smoothing out" of the central power station behavior
has economic value in terms of improved heat rates and less
"wear and tear" on the plants.
The value of a FAPER's ability to provide spinning
reserve can be determined by evaluating the costs of
conventional spinning reserve for the utility of concern.
FAPERs provide a distributed type of control action.
Intuitively, it is better to control a large, complex,
distributed system using many small, distributed control
actions on them than to apply large control forces at a few
points (like power plants). Thus, FAPERs have the potential
of improving the overall power system's dynamic
characteristics and hence influencing the transient stability,
dynamic stability, and long-term (slow-speed) dynamic
control problems. -
ENERGY MARKETPLACE
While the primary purpose of the FAPER is to smooth
out short-term supply-demand inequalities, the Energy
Marketplace concept strives to improve the economic
operation of the system. The key to the Energy Maketplace
approach is the setting of electric energy "spot prices,"
which vary as frequently as every five minutes, depending on
overall system demand, plant outages, solar generation, wind
generation, fuel costs, and other factors.* They can also
*The terms "Energy Marketplace" and "spot price
are taken from reference [1] .
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change with respect to geographic location in the srvice
area .because of differences in spatial con Jitions such as
T&D losses, line loading, ard localized wather patterns.
The spot prices provide an economic stabili ing mechanism
that tends to keep the overall supply-der ard system in
equilibrium: as consumption goes up, so di es price, which
tends to reduce consumption while incre ing production.
This smooths out the unanticipated demanc variations over
time.
The spot price for a customer to buy power from the
system would ordinarily be different fror, the spot price
paid by the system buying back power frorr a customer. The
difference in the buying and buying-back ot prices reflect
transmission capital costs and losses and billing and
metering costs. Allocation of utility gneration capital
costs presents difficulties. To facilitate a discussion of the
issues and potential approaches for updating the spot prices,
this presentation decomposes the utility system into three
component "actors," as was first shown in Figure 1:
* The Utility Marketing System which is the part of
the electric utility responsible for the transmission
and distribution of power, control of Utility
Generation, computation and communication of the
spot prices to the consumers, and billing.
a The Utility Generation, which supplies power to the
Marketing System from the individual utility-owned
generation and storage plants to the Marketing
System.
* The Customers, who can individually buy power from
the Maketing System or sell excess self-generated
power to it. Each customer is responsible for the
scheduling of his own usage and generation at the
set spot prices; this can be accomplished through
any means ranging from intuition to the employment
of a computer-based scheduler that takes account of
current and anticipated spot prices.
The separation of the utility into separate Utility
Generation and Marketing System components is made solely
as a vehicle for the exposition of the Energy Marketplace
concept.
The establishment of an Energy Marketplace and the
selection of a procedure for calculating the spot prices is a
significant change from the current process where every
price modification must be approved by the regulatory
process. It is a generalization of the approach taken for fuel
adjustment clauses: the adjustments are not a subject to
review, but the procedure for calculating them is reviewed.
The two important issues in the determination of a
procedure for setting the spot prices are, first, the
allocation of costs and profits among the actors and, second,
how the customers can react to the pricing system by
modifying their usage and generation patterns. The
following subsection discusses potential approaches for
selecting the spot-pricing formulae. The second subsection
describes methods for the consumer to react to the
spot-pricing information.
Spot-Pricing Formulae
There are many possible approaches to the setting of
spot prices. At one extreme, prices could be set so that load
and generation just balance without regard to the profits or
losses received by any party. At the other extreme, the
utility and the customers alike could be monitored and
controlled so that no party receives what would be
considered an unfair return. Politically and economically
acceptable approaches, however, must mix these two
extremes - with necessarily more complicated pricing
procedu res.
The selected formulae for determining spot prices must
reflect the typical range of often conflicting goals involved
with utility pricing and system dispatching. The
specification of the goals themselves can be as controversial
as the personal philosophies of "social good" or "fairness."
Several potential goals that have arisen in discussions are:
* The Marketing System should minimize operating
costs.
* To prevent monopolistic pricing and guarantee a fair
'ate of return on capital, regulation may be
:ecessary.
* the present and future reliability and availability of
power should be ensured.
* Demand levels and patterns should be influenced to
take on desirable characteristics.
Appendix B elaborates on these points and outlines some of
the spot-pricing formulae that could be implemented.
In practice, it is expected that no single set of
spot-pricing formulae will be universally agreed upon as
being best. Fortunately, the Homeostatic Utility Control
concept is such that the choice of spot-pricing formulae can
be adapted to fit the particular needs and philosophy of the
area being served by the utility.
Utilit and Customer Scheduling of Generation and Usage
The utility and the customers independently determine
their patterns for generation and usage of electricity subject
to the spot prices. Spot prices are not predetermined since
they depend on random events such as demand fluctuations,
weather conditions, plant outages, and numerous other
factors. Usually it will be possible, however, to predict
future spot prices with sufficient accuracy so that both the
customers and the utility are able to schedule their
generation and usage in an orderly fashion.
The Marketing System, the branch of the utility
responsible for systems management, uses sophisticated,
general-purpose, digital computers with extensive operator
interaction for economic dispatch, unit commitment,
maintenance scheduling, and fuel management for the
Utility Generation. The Marketing System also forecasts
customer purchases and sales since these affect the control
of the Utility Generation; this modeling is done
probabilistically because the customers are independently
selecting their strategies according to their anticipations
concerning future spot prices.
Customers are completely free to choose independently
how and when they intend to buy, use, generate, or sell
power. Each customer scheduler has available the current
values of the spot prices as communicated from the
Marketing System. A customer scheduler could also have
models of the customer's needs for power, both real and
perceived, as well as forecasts of future spot prices and
weather.
The simplest type of customer scheduler would exist at
the small commercial establishment or residential level.
These would be simply spot-price readouts with the actual
scheduling being done by human judgment. Usually such
human decision making would ignore five-minute variations
in spot price. However, a warning device could alert
customers to unexpected events that have occurred or when
spot prices have risen above some prespecified level.
The next level of complexity of customer schedulers are
"special-purpose energy computers." These are small,
essentially preprogrammed microor minicomputers which
accept a certain class of inputs specifying the customer's
choice of life-style and priorities. The computer
reschedules, as appropriate, various devices and provides the
customer with various types of information and suggestions.
The most sophisticated customer scheduler is the
general-purpose computer which is programmed specifically
f or the explicit needs of the customer. They would be
installed in many of the larger commercial installations and
almost all industrial installations. They would allow
extensive automatic control features as well as
sophisticated input-output devices for human interaction.
Usually spot prices will be quite predictable; however,
fluctuations and uncertainties in price may be unacceptable
to some customers. Such customers could obtain long-term
contracts from the Marketing System in which the rate is
prespecified; for example, they could be set for one year in
advance, as in today's rates. These long-term contracts
would include prespecified time-of-day or seasonal
variations. Such long-term contracts with prespecified rates
are viewed as "insurance policies," and the customer would
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expect to pay more on the average for the insurance
associated with a long-term contract. These long-term
contracts would have limits on the amount of energy and
demand covered by the insurance. These are similar to the
options and futures contracts offered in corn nodity markets
- except they would probably be bundled in monthly or
annual packages.
THE MARKETPLACE INTERFACf TO
THE CUSTOMER (MIC)
A critical hardware element required :o complete the
Homeostatic Utility Control is the subf ,stem which is
situated at the interface between the Mark ting System and
the Customer. The MIC serves several p irposes. It is a
usage-recording monitor, replacing the wa thour meter. It
also serves as an information transfer point, passing the
posted spot price on to the customer, while relaying usage
back to the Marketing System. The MIC may serve other
functions, such as detecting changes in system frequency
and passing information on differential frequency to the
customer. It also detects responsiveness of load to changes
in frequency.
The MIC is at the end of the Marketing System's
information path, and represents the point beyond which the
utility has neither direct control nor access to information.
In the simplest manifestation the MIC would have two
functions. One would be to relay the spot price to the
customer. The other would be to integrate cost, the product
of price received from the Marketing System, and load,
measured by a part of the MIC. Then the result would be:
tl
b(tl) =fr(t) x(t) dt (3)
0
where b(tl) is the cost to the customer incurred over the
time interval 0<t<tl; r(t) is the spot price at time t; and
x(t) is the load at time t.
The spot price r(t) will have one of two values. If load
x(t) is positive, r(t) will be the customer's buying price. On
the other hand, if x(t) is negative, the customer is
generating power and r(t) will be the system's buying-back
price.
Communication once every five minutes from the
Marketing System to every MIC is necessary to post the spot
price. There seems to be little problerm in establishing such
communication with any of a variety of systems presently
available or under test. However, security of
communication and metering are areas of concern. Issues
such as the possibility of communications error or tampering
suggest the desirability of having a reverse communication
capability from the MIC to the Marketing System to, for
example, confirm the posted spot price.
FAPERs are designed so as not to interfere with the
prime functions of the energy-type usage devices they
control. However, customers still need some reason to
install them, since they will cost something. It is possible
that the utility could pay for them or their installation could
be mandated by law. It is doubtful that such coercive
methods would be very effective, however. A more
appealing concept would be to reward frequency-dependent
load behavior so that customers with FAPERs automatically
get a financial benefit.
One way to provide a benefit to FAPER installations is
to change the cost algorithm to:
tl
b(t 1) :f[r(t) + hf(t)] x(t) dt (4)
O ·
where h(t)] is a price differential that is a decreasing
function of. frequency, roughly of the form shown in Figure
2. Thef(t) is the frequency deviation from nominal. On the
long-term average, this logic would yield financial benefits
for custorners with FAPERs.
t . .
FIGURE 2: FAPER Price DifferentaZl
A potential disadvantage' of this approach is that
customers receive financial benefits from FAPERs only
when the FAPERs actually affect demand. FAPERs can
provide a spinning-reserve function even when it is not
used. Therefore, an alternative approach is to have MIC
estimate what portion of a customer's demand is under
FAPER control, on the average. This would be done by
observing load changes coincident with frequency changes.
This percentage would be used as the basis for a billing
credit.
Further discussion of the MIC subsystem and associated
customer subsystems is the topic of a companion paper [2].
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Homeostatic Utility Control is a concept which looks
forward to the utility systems at the turn of the coming
century. The basic premise is that technological and
economic conditions will change over the next 20 years to
create a system whose control mechanisms will need to be
fundamentally different from those of today's utilities.
These differences will come from the revolution in
solid-state control devices which will provide the
availability of metering systems that can interface the
customer with the utility. Such systems will permit the
utility to charge a rate for electric power which equals, or
more nearly equals, the current costs of generating the
power. At the same time it will be possible for customer
generation to be introduced smoothly into the full utility
system and paid for accordingly.
This paper has introduced three concepts which will be
required for the utility control systems of the decades
ahead. Each concept has been matched with a device or a
scheme of implementation: a Frequency Adaptive Power
Energy Rescheduler, an Energy Marketplace, and a.
Marketplace Interface to the Customer. These devices and
control schemes are not the only approaches available but
are intended to initiate the discussion. Given the limited
research work which has been, completed to date,
Homeostatic Utility Control shows potential to:
* Generate a healthier climate in the relationship
between the utilities and customers as customers
see and appreciate the time-varying cost of electric
power.
* Reduce the capital requirements needed for
generation and transmission expansion by reducing
the time variation in load.
* Reduce the need to carry certain types of spinning
reserve which results in fuel and capital savings.
* Reduce the small, rapid governor actions of the
large, central-station generators, resulting in fuel
savings as well as less equipment wear and tear.
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* Allow the system to accept more readily a
stochastically fluctuating energy source, suii as
wind or solar generation.
* Simplify the expansion of coneneratiol.
* Improve the dynamic behavior of the ower system.
* Allow customers to retain complete independence of
choice in pattern of demand as then respond only to
price.
* Simplify control, operation, and pe ning of electric
power systems because the Energy Marketplace and
FAPERs introduce stabilizing forc s which tend to
keep the overall system in a natural quilibrium.
The above list represents the au hors' efforts to
stimulate discussion of what "might be" in terms of the
development and control of electric utilit es at the turn of
the century. This list is not necessarily all-inclusive nor can
its elements be substantiated at present. What lies ahead is
the detailed developmental and analytic work required to
prove both the physical and economic concepts. The purpose
in preparing this paper has been to introduce a new set of
concepts to the field and to bring to the fore the notion that
utility control and operating procedures of the next century
may look very little like those of today. Fundamentally
different control mechanisms, whose constituent parts are in
today's technology, will be required.
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The FAPER Control Logic involves changing this equation to:
T< T(t)< Tu
T(t)< TR
T(t) >T
(A.2)
u(t)
u(t+). = 1
* O
.where
where
Tu(t)
T£(t)
Af(t) < 0 Af(t) > 0
and g[Nf(t)] has roughly the shape'of Figure A.1.
APPENDIX A
FAPER CONTROL LOGIC
The following FAPER control logic appears to have
.many advantages, but analysis of its overall system effect
:has not yet been carried out. Other types of specific logics
'are also under consideration.
In order to make the discussion explicit, the case of an
industrial melting pot is used as an example.
Define:
t: time
T(t): melting pot temperature
Tmin: minimum allowable temperature
To: nominal set point temperature
Tmax: maximum allowable temperature
f(t) =' (f(t) - 60): frequency deviation
from 60 Hz
u(t):f1 heater on
10 heater off
t+: time t plus a small increment
The present thermostat control logic is:
u(t+) = 1
0
Tmin < T(t) < Tmax
T(t) < Tin
T(t) > Tmax
(A. 1)
FIGURE A.1: FAPER Power Frequency Response
Characteristic
APPENDIX B
SPOT PRICING METHODS
In the development of this paper, the most heatedly
discussed aspects have been alternative schemes for the
setting of spot prices. This appendix summarizes some of
the issues and outlines various types of spot-pricing
formulae. No single formula or philosophy is being
advocated here since Homeostatic Utility Control is not tied
to any particular spot-pricing method.
Define:
e(t): time rate of expenditure ($/hour)
r(t): current spot price for electric energy ($/kWh)
x (t): power flow at time t (kW)
g(t): generating capacity (kW)
where the following subscripts and superscripts may be used
to identify specific applications of the above variables.
Subscripts:
k: customer identifier (k 1, ...)
n: utility generator identifier (n = 1, ...)
f: fuel component
op: operation component
m: maintenance component
cap: capital component
cb: customer buying from Marketing System
bb: Marketing System buyihg-back from customer-
Superscripts:
ug: utility generation
ms: marketing system
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hence, for example,
rcb,k(t) = selling price paid by kth cstomer to buy
from the utility
rbb, k(t)
Xcb(t)
efg(t)
xUg9(t)
= buy-back price paid to ktl customer for
selling to the utility
= summed net power flow to 11 customers
= cost of fuel being consum(d by the Utility
Generation
= total utility generation
Pricinq Philosophy
The basic concept of spot pricing is to establish a
reasonable customer buying price (rcbk(t) $/kWh) that
reflects the time-varying cost of energy production and
delivery to that customer's terminals. A customer buy-back
price, rbb,k(t), must also be established for reverse energy
flow. It may be derived from the above or computed
independently.ln either case, rbb,k(t) must be less than
rcb,k(t).One clear issue is that customers should not contribute
to the costs of the supply system "downstream" of their
specific location. Capital and loss costs of the distribution
network will be shared among the customers supplied by that
specific part of the system. This would enable decisions on
future changes to a local section of the distribution to be
made, at least in part, by the affected customers--who
would clearly carry the costs.
Philosophical questions in establishing the customer
buying price rcb k include:
* Should the price be computed on the basis of
historical costs, on the basis of expected future
expansion coats, or should it contain elements of
both?
* Should operating costs at a given point in time be
based on average costs, incremental costs, or a
mixture of both?
* Should capital costs be based on total system
capacity, on the average capital cost of units
presently connected, or on the capital cost of the
last unit connected?
* What value should be assigned to voltage quality,
reliability, and availability of supply?
The customer buying price will normally be dominated
by fuel and capital costs and many methods have been
suggested for the calculation of these cost components,
some of which may have far-reaching consequences for
system planning and operation.
For example, peaking units, such as gas turbines, will
appear much more expensive if capital costs are recovered
only during their actual hours of operation rather than over
the physically useful lifetime of the unit. This cost
difference would be reflected in a significant difference in
the rate of rise of the spot price near the generation
capacity limit; generation expansion policy would probably
also be affected.
Similarly, capital charges would tend to be much higher
if based on future replacement costs rather than on
historical construction costs.
Specific Examples: rcb(t)
Some specifc example of price calculation for the
customer buying spot price rcb(t) follow. Distribution
system costs are neglected for simplicity because of their
variation with customer location and voltage level.
il. "Average cost"
ug (t)/x-((t)
cbt = oep,f,m)+ ecap (B.1)
where
x (t) is t le power flow to customers,
msems (,) is the total marketing system
op, f,.m operating expenditure,
given b"
ems (t = e 9 (t) + eug(t) + eu9(t) +
op,f,mk op
+ ems(t) + r
op(t) + rbbxbb(t)
and
(B.2)
cUgt) is the capital expenditure.
The capital term, ect), can be derived from either
total'plant capital or only that for the units
may'be calculated on either
* a historical basis,
* estimated future replacement cost, or
* some combination of these.
2. "Incremental Cost"
In this case the expenditure is computed
but rb(t) is taken as the local gradient
operating point:
b(t) =[ems fm(t) + eug(t)/axCb(t)
cb op,f,m t cap(t)/aXcb(t)
connected. It
as for case 1,
at the given
(B.3)
3. "Average Cost Plus Quality of Supply"
In this scheme rcb(t) has the components: (i) an
economic cost component derived as in case 1, (ii) a
"short-term quality of supply" component based on the
probability of loss of supply at the present operating point.
This component is designed to signal the customer of the
changing quality of supply owing to problems such as line
overload or stability limits, in order that those who can
provide equivalent quality supply more cheaply by internal
means will do so. There would normally be local as well as
system-wide contributions to this pr ice component.
Revenue obtained from this price component could be
directed towards rectifying the course of the quality
degradation. (iii) A "long-term quality of supply" component
based on system expansion needs, computed by long-term
expansion studies based on predicted system growth. This
component would be spread evenly over all energy sold, and
adjusted only on a yearly basis. It is designed to forewarn
customers of the most likely long-term future trend in pice.
Revenue could be allocated to forward financing of new
major plant.
4. "Marginal Cost"
This approach differs from the other three in that it is
based entirely on the incremental change in future predicted
costs produced by a step change in power flow at the present
time. It would be computed by means of long-term system
expansion studies.
Specific Examples: rbb(t)
Some specific examples of the customer spot buy-back
price, rbb(t), follow. The customer buy-back price may be
derived from rcb (t), derived by an independent method, or
left to float according to demand. There would normally be
the constraint rcb > rbb -
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1. "System Lambda"
The value of rbb would Ie set equal to the incremental
f iel cost of the most. expe nsive utility generation. This
v ould tend to minimize ,verall fuel costs. If utility
c eneration was already at 1 jll avaiable coacity, b)oth rbb
f d r would iise to the natural supply/demand level. In
! e notation of this appendix
a [eg( t)]
rbb a _ (.XUg
rbb a xUg(t)
2. "System Lambda Plus Quality Constraint"
A quality constraint is added to the incremental cost of
case 1. This would tend to give forewarning of operating
problems and give a transition between "normal" and
"emergency" conditions.
3. "Free Market"
This is the ideal free market case where price is always
allowed to find its own level from supply/demand forces. In
this case rbb and rcb move together with an allowance for
marketing system operation.
REFERENCES
[1) F.C. Schweppe, "Power Systems '2000'."
IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 15, no. 7, July 1978.
[2] J.L. Kirtley, Jr., and T.L. Sterling, "Impact
of New Electronic Technologies on the
Customer End of Distribution Automation
and Control." IEEE Power Engineering
Society 1979 Summer Meeting, Vancouver,
B.C., July 1979.
[3] F. C. Schweppe, R.D. Tabors, J.L. Kirtley,
Jr., "Homeostatic Utility Control." A paper
presented at the Distribution Automation
and Control Working Group Meeting,
Baltimore, Maryland, November 20-22, 1978.
Fred C. Schweppe (S'55-M'59-F'77) was born
in Minneapolis, Minn., on November 18, 1933. He
received the B.S.E.E. and M.S.E.E. degrees from
the University of Arizona, Tucson, in 1955 and
1956, respectively, and the Ph.D degree in
Electrical Engineering from the University of
Wisconsin, Madison, in 1958.
From 1958 to 1966 he was with the Lincoln
Laboratory,. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Lexington. He is presently Professor
of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
at M.I.T., Cambridge, He is a member of the
Electric Power Systems Engineering Laboratory
and is associated with the Energy Laboratory at
M.I.T. His general research interests are:
control, operations, and planning for
interconnected bulk-power systems; economic,
environmental, and reliability (security)
trade-offs; and demand modeling.
Dr. Schweppe is a member of Tau Beta Pi,
Sigma Pi Sigma, Sigma Xi, Pi Mu Epsilon, and Phi
Kappa Phi.
Richard D. Tabors (M'79) was born in
Cleveland, Ohio, on October 16, 1943. He
received the B.A. degree in biology from
Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, and the M.A.
and Ph.D degrees in economics and geography
from Syracuse University, New York, in 1965,
1970, and 1971, respectively.
In 1969 and 1970 he was an economist for
U.S.A.I.D., Pakistan. From 1970 to 1976 he was a
Research Associate and an Assistant Professor at
Harvard University in the School of Public Health,
the Division of Engineering and Applied Physics,
and the Department of City and Regional
Planning. From 1976 to present he has been at
M.I.T.'s Energy Laboratory as Manager of the
Utility Systems Program and Lecturer in the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning. He is
the author of Land Use and the Pipe: Planning for
Sewerage and Interceptor Sewers and Urban
Sprawl. His current research areas are in
renewable resource technologies for electricity
generation and utility rate-setting and regulation.
Dr. Tabors is a member of the Regional
Science Association, Association of American
Geographers, and International Association of
Energy Economists.
James L. Kirtley, Jr. (S'69-M'71) was born in
Palo Alto, California, on October 4, 1945. He
received the S.B. and S.M. degrees in 1968, E.E.
degree in 1969, and Ph.D in 1971, all from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Since 1971 he has been a member of the
faculty of the Department of Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science at M.I.T.,
currently holding the rank of Associate Professor.
Between 1965 and 1968 he was employed as a
co-op student by Raytheon. During 1.974 and 1975
while on leave of absence from M.I.T. he was
employed in the Large Steam Turbine-Generator
department of General Electric. He has served as
consultant to several firms in power-related areas.
At M.I.T. he has participated extensively in
the. program in superconducting electric
machines. He has published and/or presented
seventeen papers on this subject. He has taught a
variety of subjects in Electrical Engineering and
Electric Power Systems, and is in charge of the
subjects "Dynamics of Electric Machines" and
"Power Electricity."
Dr. Kirtley is a member of
Sigma Xi and is a Registered
Engineer in Massachusetts.
. .....
CIGRE and.
Professional
Hugh R. Outhred (M'73) was born in
Kalgoorlie, Western Australia on March 22, 1947.
He received the B.Sc., B.E., and Ph.D degrees
from the University of Sydney, Australia, in 1967,
1969, and 1973, respectively.
He is a Lecturer in Electrical Engineering at
the University of New South Wales, Australia.
While on leave during 1979, he is working as a
Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His
research interests are in the areas of power
systems dynamics, control, operations, and
planning.
12
(B.4)
Frederick H. Pickel (S'74) was born in
Seattle, Wash., on June 1, 1952. He received the
B.S. degree in engineer ng and economics from
Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, Calif., in 1974,
and the M.S. degree in oerations research and the
M.S. degree in civil engineering both from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, in 1978. H is currently a doctoral
candidate at M.I.T. in engineering-economic
systems analysis for ene) gy planning.
From 1974 to 1975 he worked with the
Office of Energy Systems at the Federal Power
Commission. In 1976 and 1977 he was with the
Decision Analysis Group at SRI International,
Menlo Park, Calif. During 1977 and 1978 he was
appointed to the Gvernor's Commission on
.Cogeneration, Commoniwealth of Massachusetts.
His work has centered on decision analysis for
long-range planning in the energy industries and
on the economics of cogeneration. He is presently
a research assistant with the Energy Laboratory
at M.I.T.
Mr. Pickel is a member of the American
Economic Association, American Geophysical
Union, International Association of Energy
Economists, Operations Research Society of
America, . Sigma Xi, and The Institute of
Management Science.
Alan J3. Cox was born in Ottawa, Ontario on
September 10, 1952. He received a B.Sc. in
Environmental Science from York University in
Toronto in 1976 and a M.A. degree in Economics
from the University of British Columbia in 1978.
During 1978 he was a Research Associate at
U.B.C.'s Program in Natural Resource Economics
studying the economics of utilizing wood waste
for heat and electricity production in British
Columbia's pulp and paper industry. He is
currently a Visiting Economist at M.I.T.'s Energy
Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass., where he is
primarily associated with photovoltaics projects.
His chief interests are the evaluation of
alternative energy sources for industrial use.
Mr. Cox is a member of the Canadian
Economic Association.
13
Chapter 2: POWER SYSTEMS ECONOMICS AND PRICING
2.1 Introduction
Communications and metering technologies have limited our ability to
reflect short term changes in utility operating costs in the price of
electricity sold to the customer. Recent advances in both communications
and in metering technologies brought about by the availability of
microprocessing equipment and by dramatically rising energy costs has
focused increased attention on pricing methodologies which produce more
efficient consumer responses. The short paper which follows presents a
concept of "spot prices" in which it will be possible for the consumer to
receive information on pricing as frequently as every five minutes. Such
systems are being considered initially, for larger users such as
industsries and large commercial establishments rather than for
residential customers. The spot pricing structure is largely blind to
the pricing methodology chosen and as a result is equally applicable to
average costing structures as it is to marginal costing structures. In
addition, implementation of a spot price system does not in any way
preclude other customers from existing on long term energy contracts, or
any other structure analogous to today's rate schedules.
A set of issues have been identified which effect the economics and
pricing of electric power systems, which could be more efficiently
handled using Homeostatic Control. Basic to these issues are questions
of the methods by which prices are set, and the regulatory process by
which price information passes between the utility and the customer. The
paper which follows does not discuss the issues associated with the
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methods of pricing available to utilities; specifically it does not focus
on questions of marginal versus average costing, and of embedded versus
replacement costing. These issues are amply covered in the literature on
utility rate setting. (See, for instance, Kahn (1970)). It is
significant at the beginning of this discussion to identify a critical
issue to utility economics and regulation which is central to the concept
of Homeostatic Control systems; the establishment of formulae for pricing
as opposed to the setting of price schudules.
Current practice in utility pricing allows the utility to establish
before the regulatory commission a schedule of charges to be applied
over some period of time to a given customer class. This schedule is
fixed in time and by class regardless of any changes in patterns of
consumption and with limited flexibility in passing on changes in costs
of generation, both of which may occur during the time period between
rate hearings. Advanced systems of rate schedule setting, discussed in
greater detail later in this paper, include the use of time-varying rates
which reflect a hybrid of schedules and formulae, essentially using
specific formulae to establish variable rates imposed during time
intervals which can be established to be as short as five minutes. The
acceptance and implementation of systems such as Homeostatic Control
require that there be an acceptance of formulae to be used in setting
rates.
While, as we shall discuss below, there are clear economic
advantages to completely flexible, time-varying rates, the acceptance of
the use of a PUC agreed-upon formula will depend on the amount of
uncertainty that consumers of all classes will face in predicting a price
15
or any given future time interval.
2.2 Rate Calculation
Within the area of rate setting one of the major concerns of
electric utility analysts is that of assuring that each additional unit
of demand is faced with an appropriate price for that demand. One issue
over which debate takes place deals with the question of whether rates
should be set according to embedded costs (also called 'historic' or
'accounting' costs) or whether prices should reflect the costs of adding
one more unit of capacity and producing more energy.
The historic approach is that most often used by regulators and is
justified as allowing electricity-generating monopolies to recover their
sunk capital and their operating costs plus a reasonable rate of return
on expenditures actually made on their capital equipment. While embedded
cost rate-setting has been shown, in Joskow and MacAvoy (1975), to result
in financial stringencies for utilities that are faced with increasing
loads, the same paper suggests that these capital shortages can be
overcome by allowing a sufficiently high rate of return, fourteen percent
being suggested as an adequate rate.
The replacement or marginal approach, favored by economists,
requires that consumers pay for electricity the costs of the resources
actually required to meet additions to their demand (or, conversely,
benefit by the value of resources not required due to conservation
efforts). While embedded-cost pricing of electricity will cover the
costs of holding the utility's current stock of capital, marginal-cost
pricing implies that the utility charges a price for the capital
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component of electricity that is equal to the cost of recently completed
or imminent projects. Total revenues under the latter scheme will thus
appear to reflect the costs of replacing all the utility's generating
units at those units' current (or 'replacement') costs. The marginal
concept leads to the conclusion that at any given level of demand, the
price of electricity should reflect the replacement capital cost plus the
fuel costs of electricity from only the generating unit 'switched on' to
meet that demand.1
An improvement that can be made to any fixed pricing schedule
(either embedded or marginal) that imposes one price for electricity
demanded in all periods, is that of time-of-day (TOD) pricing. Under
this scheme, prices in any given time period correspond, roughly, the
expected costs of maintaining the supply of electricity necessary to meet
expected demand in that time period. The chief problem with any fixed
schedule of TOD prices is to know how wide each time bracket should be.
A regulatory body wishes to avoid making the peak time brackets so wide
as to impose peaking prices on demands that can be met entirely with
base-load plants, but not so narrow that any shifts in peaks will result
in peak demands facing base-load prices.
The advantages of Homeostatic Control is that, whatever the pricing
formula adopted, a new price can be calculated and set for any time
1We will not be addressing, here, the problem of redistributing the
surplus revenue that may result from replacement-cost pricing. Many
schemes are available that would meet criteria of economic efficiency
(so that rebates do not effect purchasing decisions) and equity (for
instance, to soften the impact on high electricity costs on low-income
customers).
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period, down to at least five minute intervals. The price will be set
using information on the fixed and variable costs of producing
electricity to meet the level of demand encountered by the utility during
the previous time interval. These prices will be set automatically
utilizing agreed upon formulae and, therefore, without the intervention
of the regulatory body.
In addition to benefits gained by eliminating rigid TOD-pricing
periods, this system removes the need for periodic reviews of rates and
thus some of the non-optimal responses (from an economic point of view)
that utilities will make in attempting to profit-maximize (as opposed to
cost-minimize) under regulatory constraints with only periodic reviews
and with delays between rounds of 'test year' calculations and
uncertainties as to the timing of the next review. There is already a
wealth of literature on these problems, just one segment of that
literature discussing the existence (or attempting to measure the
magnitude) of the Averch-Johnson effect 2 by which utilities favor
capital investment over other inputs not included in their rate base.
Other writers, including Bailey (1970) and Baumol and Klevorik (1970),
suggest that regulatory lags and fixed prices will stimulate cost-saving
research and innovation. Klevorik (1973), using a still more
comprehensive model points out that such conclusions are too strong and,
possibly, false. Nevertheless there seems little doubt that regulatory
lags do lead to non-optimal supply decisions. A clearer case of the
biases that regulatory lags impose on input decisions arises when these
2 The original reference is Averch and Johnson (1962). The literature
on the A-J effect is reviewed in Joskow and Noll (1978).
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lags are combined with prices that are allowed to rise only with
increases in the cost of one input, usually fossil fuels. Such an effect
is posited, in Atkinson and Halvorson (1976), to offset the
Averch-Johnson effect.
In summary, then, we find that Homeostatic pricing will have two
distinct economic benefits; first, the removal of rigid time-of-day
pricing periods on a randomly fluctuating demand and, second, the removal
of intra-period incentives for the utility to make inefficient production
decisions. When combined with a marginal-cost pricing formula, utilities
with some portion of their supply under Homeostatic pricing will find
themselves facing less pronounced peaks in demand. In addition the
utility may be offered large blocks of
power during peak periods, as cogenerators, for instance, find that their
costs of producing electricity are equal to or lower than the utility's
additional costs in generating that power.
Customer willingness to accept formulae rather than strict
schedules, industrial willingness to augment cogeneration potential for
sales to the utility and utilities' willingness to offer firm contracts
for electricity purchases from customers will depend, as we have said, on
i) the stability of prices from one period to the next, which we
call 'inter-period consistency' and
ii) the predictability of prices at some time interval of some
future day, given information on the price during the same interval
of some previous day. This point will depend on whether information
about recent loads, about meteorlogical data and about maintenance
schedules will allow accurate predictions of prices to be made and
thus reduce uncertainty in investment, operating and housekeeping
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decisions of both customers and utilities.
Examining the inter-period consistency and predictability of pricing
formulae is the main point of this paper. In order to undertake this
exercise we have created a simple model of utility customer interaction.
A description of the utility being modeled and of the model itself, is
found in the next section. In the subsequent section we present some
hour-by-hour results generated by various pricing formulae from our model
and draw conclusions as to the variability of prices. Finally we discuss
a broader range of issues and behaviour patterns than can be captured in
our modeling effort.
2.3 Utility Scenario
In order to examine the behavior of prices under Homeostatic
formula-based pricing, a simple model of a synthetic utility has been
developed. The utility modeled is based upon an EPRI-developed synthetic
utility for the northeast but contains no hydroelectric capacity and no
pumped storage. The generation capacity is divided into 1200 MW of
nuclear, 200 MW of coal, 3600 MW of oil and 500 MW of gas turbines. Heat
rates for the plants are assumed flat over their operating ranges and
have been developed from information provided by a set of New England
Utilities and thus represent reasonable regional averages. The load data
for the analysis has been provided by Boston Edison and scaled down to
give a peak demand of 5042 MW, which occurs in August. Financial
information is based on information provided by New England Electric
(NEES). Average costs for operating, fuel and transmission and
distribution are also those estimated by NEES, the latter being added as
a fixed amount to the cost of each kWh generated. More detailed
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assumptions about the synthetic utility are to be found in Table 2.1.
The utility thus developed represents an oil-based system with a
high proportion of nuclear. It's peaking requirements are provided by
gas turbines which are required infrequently through-out the year. We
shall see below that, as one would expect in a system with a large amount
of base and intermediate power being generated arising from oil-burning
units, the prices calculated do display a stability and inter-period
consistency over a broad range of demand. Prices do vary upward as one
nears the system peak in the summer and winter months.
The analytical model developed is a short-term production-costing
model which has been simplified for our purposes to look at only three
weeks per year for each of seven rate formulae which we examine. The
weeks chosen were one off-peak in the spring, one week in August, which
represented the summer peak, and one week in December which represented
the winter peak. The base analysis did not include any allowance for
either maintenance or for forced outages given the time periods
analyzed. As will be seen, a sensitivity run was carried out in which a
major base load plant was removed from the sytem. During the spring
period this removal represents a planned maintenance while during the
summer and winter this would more nearly characterize a forced outage.
2.4 Pricing Formulae
We have used six of many possible pricing formulae for the purpose
of this presentation. We will describe each in detail, though
descriptions of the calculations will be provided in a subsequent section.
Case 1: The first case defines capital cost to be the average cost
of capital for all electricity generated over a one year period, computed
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TABLE 2.1
ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA SOURCES FOR
HOMEOSTATIC UTILITY SIMULATION
NUCLEAR COAL OIL
FUEL COSTS
($/MBTU)
HEAT RATES
(MBTU/MWH)
CONSTRUCTION DATES
0.40
10.4
1975
ANNUAL COST
CARRYING FACTORS
EMBEDDED/
REPLACEMENT
CAPACITY
FACTOR
.1460/
.1610
.7765
1.69
9.5
1962
1
2.90
9.3
1961
OIL 2
2.90
9.4
1967
.1545/ .1545/ .1545/
.1695 .1695 .1695
.8550 .7900 .7083
OIL 3
2.90
9.9
1973
GAS TURB
3.70
14.0
1970
.1545/ .1543/
.1695 .1693
.3349 .0436
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on the utility's embedded rate base. The fuel and operating cost
(hereinafter referred to merely as the fuel cost) is the averge fuel cost
for all electricity generated during the relevent time interval. We
refer to this as the allocated fuel cost. The price charged is the sum
of these two costs.
Case 2: The fuel cost in this case is the allocted fuel cost as
described in Case 1 and the capital cost is again based on the historic
costs of each unit. However, capital costs are based on the actual
amounts of electricity produced from each unit. The capital cost during
any time interval is, then, the average of these capital costs, per kWh,
of all electricity produced to meet an interval's demand, which we refer
to as the allocated embedded capital cost. The price set is the sum of
the allocated fuel cost and the allocated embedded capital cost.
Case 3: The capital cost considered here is, again, the flat,
average embedded capacity cost used in Case 1, while the fuel cost is the
fuel and operating cost of the marginal plant used to meet the interval's
demand. The price is the sum of these costs.
Case 4: The capital costs here are, again, the same for all
periods, but are based on the annual capital costs incurred if all
generating units were replaced at current prices for those units. Fuel
costs are again the marginal fuel cost and the price set is the sum of
these two costs.
Case 5: The capital costs are allocated capital costs but with
replacement costs of generating units being used to compute the average
capital costs for all units used to meet an interval's demand. The price
is set by adding to this cost the marginal fuel cost.
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FIGURE 2.1
Simplified Production Costing Model
Flow Diagram
Initial Price
and Demand
Forecasts
System Fuel
Cost and Capital
Allocation Curves
Alternative
Pricing
trtPnv
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Hourly (or smaller)
data on prices, all
system cost parameters
parameters
Case 6: The price in this case is set by adding the marginal fuel
cost and the averge capital cost of electricity generated from the
marginal unit. Both capital and fuel costs are included in prices for
each period of the day.
2.5 Model Description
The model is initiated from an annual run of SYSGEN, a flexible
electric utility production costing and reliability model, which is
described in Finger (1979). SYSGEN estimates individual plant capacity
factors, taking into account forced outages and maintenance schedules.
Capital costs, either flat average costs, or fully allocated costs
are computed using annual "cost-carrying factors" which have been
provided by New England Electric. They are a proportion of either the
original gross investment in, or the replacement value of, each
generating unit and include the reveue that must be achieved in order to
achieve the utility's allowed return on investment, Federal, state and
local taxes, and depreciation. The cost-carrying factors are listed on
Table 2.1.
The actual simulation of the utility customer interaction is
portrayed in the flow-diagram of Figure 2.1. The simulation is initiated
by reading the demand for the first one-hour interval of the week being
modeled. The model then generates the price that the utility would
charge for electricity generated to meet that demand level, depending
upon which formula was imposed. If demand is at all elastic, the model
computes the new demand level at that price, computes a new price based
on that demand and iterates until convergence is achieved.
25
Simulations are repeated for each hour. The model also keeps track
of total revenues, total costs, fuel consumption and the mean and
variance of prices. Output is in either numeric or graphical form.
2.6 Results
As discussed above, the purpose of the analyses carried out has been
to evaluate the interperiod consistency of rates set by using the spot
pricing concept, to evaluate the predictability of rates given the
concept and to evaluate the potential for energy savings given a level of
elasticity which might apply in any specific situation. In addition, it
is important to analyze the impact of prices of a scenario in which a
major generation source was not available. The section which follows
will cover each of these four points.
Interperiod consistency: As can be seen from Figure 2.2, the hourly demand
curves for the three weeks being studied (April, August and December) are
relatively smooth, though, particularly during the peak months, they do
show specific, relatively sharp changes from one hour to the next.
Figures 2.3 through 2.8 represent graphs of price of electric power
given the utility system discussed above and the pricing scenarios
discussed in the preceeding section.* From these graphs a number of
specific conclusions can be drawn. The most important is that, while
there are sharp steps in price (representing changes most frequently in
the marginal or in the incremental generating source), the system does
* It should be noted that Figure 2 contains the full range of plotted
information, average capital cost, average fuel cost, incremental and
marginal fuel cost (assuming current New England market prices
represent the marginal fuel cost) and the calculated spot price of
electricity.
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FIGURE 2.2
Weekly Demand Profiles
Week 1, Spring
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
Week 2, Summer
Week 3, Winter
27
4048
MW
0
5042
MW,
TO
Saturday
4705
MW
,· ·, ·.. 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
............-. . ....... -
------------------ -. . ...... ......
.-------------- -..........- -. ---'
FIGURE 2.3
BASE CASE PRICE
Week 1
- - - N - . .. · .._~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ , L ......... !_ |- 
Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
Week 2
........................... PPPPFPm. P"·PP ? t f P? !- I *PPh`DP
Week 3
28
5
Sunday
a
Monday Saturday
·42
Mills
tO
42
0
42
Mills
0
- ------·-- -------- - ---- ~ ~ ~ - ....... .......
-
___ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~____~~~~----------
FIGUIIRE 2.4
Case 2 Prices *
Week 
4 5 ........ . ............... .. ....... ............. B
'. .. .. .... .. ... ..... ..... ...... ... .. .. .. . .... .... .... .... ...
i~~ 1 s....., , . ., .....o...... .,,, , , ..
0 °. . . ....... . . ...... . . ........ -.D
O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~''' ''' ".~
iq i l l s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Wp~ .-.. - . . " . - ' . . . - . ' ' " . ..
, .,·· ,·.- .. - .. -.,.--.............. .......
, 
. .... 
.o..... ', _ , o,,°°°.. . . . . .
Week 3
""' " "..... .....
...... . '""' .......... A
..... .... .. .  ......... . .. ..A
. "'' B.
.'''°"'"°°°'"' °' "° "'°°' ' °" '' ........ ......... .. .. .... ............. ...... ... .........
o, , · . .-- ...
-~~" .. ' .. . o o o ,'~ · , , o
~~- `'` ~ -- -.... ................. I....I....
A. Price
B. Marginal or Incremental Fuel Cost (Assumed Same Given Present Fuel Costs)
C. Average Fuel Cost
D. Allocated Capital Cost
29
45
Mi Ils
0,
45
Mills
0
- --- ---------
FIGURE 2.5
CASE 3 PRICE
Week 1
..
e ee.-eeee .ee·e eeee' ee ee· e'''''e~''e·e eeeelelleeeledIlleeell eele eele le· leeeeelel ·le.eeleee ee e ·l·eeeeee
e l e l e e e l l e " ~ ee
·
el ' e e" e e
·
e e e l e * l l ' '
.
Week 2
.*.,e eem'ee ll elee egl elelll eee ele .i e e ee eeeelle. ele. ee...le elee, 41 e.,,..i ee ~ e..~ ee.eIee..ee.
loek 3
30
55
Mills
0
~80
Mills
55
Mills
__r · ____ ·________L__C··_·I_·L______
I
.............................................................................................................................
FIGURE 2.6
CASE 4 PRICE
Week 1
55 . -..........................
Week 2
Week 3
mo........................o........................................ I~00Q.........................................................................
31
Mills
0
80
Mil l s
TO
55
Mills
nl~
------- -
yl
i
FIGURE 2.7
CASE 5 PRICE
Week 1
· ·. *· ·· ·
Week 2
.. e .·e.· ·· ee · · e.. 
··
· · · ·~~~ ~ ~~~~~~ *1··· · ·· · ~ · · · · ·
..... .... ........ .. .......................
.· ·· ·
.·· · ·· · · ·
Week 3
................................ ...... I......,......... ............. ............ ..... ......-": ... I.................
32
60
Mills
0
80
Mills
60
Mills
0
.... _....._._.
- ___. --
··
··· ·· ···· ·· ·· ··
······ ·· ··· ·· ·· ·· ·· ·· ···-··
··· ···
FIGURE 2.8
CASE 6 PRICES
Week 1
A
B
C
Week 2
A
B
C
Week 3
·................. ......--.--. A
............
,,,. ,,.,..,....,..,. 
........ ...... 
. .
~ $~* ~p ~ 4 $f i 9~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ *
.......... ........ .. '... ....... ...... . ...... ........... ...........
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ...,,,., ..... . . . ............................. 
................... ... 
............... .......... 
........... . . . . .
,, , , . mleee e..... -.................
...... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ eel~.e ....... e~ *~. ~ ~t·g ~ * ~ * ~ 4 ~ i ~ ~f 
~ ~ e ~ ~ I!1111lllllllllllllll.11111tlll*11111111111111111.. 
. . . . .
·· · I I I · .I ·I L· I I · ·II ·· · I I .1 ( I I .I ..)( I i I) I . I I I( 1 * 11 1 e ! ! ! ! t l l l ll( I I I I 
.melel·'em e llle·le·ll ~.
e.-* e2· eme· 
eeeee'eee e"'el-~4'e eeeem'e'eeeeele·
e·· · mm=····· ·a
~ee· 
·
····· ·
·· ·········
·~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ee
· ··
···~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ee~
· · · · ~~~ ~~. .· 
·
·
· i··
"·f 
"'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~~ ~ ~ee m ee'e'lee
A. Pri ce
B. Marginal or Incremental Fuel Cost (See Figure 4)
C. Average Fuel Cost
33
60.
Mills
0
65
Mills
tO
65
Mills
tO
B
C
_ 
I · ·
not tend to show sharp interperiod jumps, i.e., there is not a tendency
for prices to move up and down sharply over sets of sequential time
periods. Table 2 presents a summary of the mean, standard deviation and
maximum and minimum values for prices in each of the cases studied.
It is interesting to note that the distribustions are skewed to the low
side. The pricing schemes result in relatively tight distributions with
the majority of hours experiencing prices below the weekly mean.
A final point to note is that the spot pricing concept has been
proposed for periods of time less than one hour. Given the evidence to
date, there is little reason to believe that for time periods of less
than one hour extreme fluctions will be seen, though clearly the price
will fluctuate more than is shown in the one hour simulation. The fact
that the simulation presented here is for a simplified utility genertion
system with relatively few production units, and with flat heat-rate
curves means that the simulation will show greater jumps in prices than
will occur in the real world given large numbers of generating units.
Predictability: Referring again to Figures 2.3 through 2.7, it is possible
to visually evaluate the predictability of rates from one time period to
the next given very limited data. Weekday prices in each of the three
week periods analyzed can be predicted with high accuracy knowing no more
than the price available during the same time period on the previous
weekday. Weekend prices appear equally consistent, though information
concerning the previous Saturday or Sunday would be most useful in
prediction of weekend or holiday prices. If one adds only one additional
datum, hourly weather prediction, it is probable that nearly
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TABLE .2.2
PRICES UNDER ALTERNATIVE
(in Mills/Kwh)
SCENARIOS
MEAN ST. DEV. MAX.
42
42
42
37
40
40
38
40
40
50
51
51
50
51
51
57
58
57
42
42
42
3
3
3
4
3
3
2
3
0.5
2
3
0.5
2
4
1
54 8
59 12
58 8
56 1
62 12
58 6
59 7
76 25
65 15
37
40
40
54
57
57
4
3
3
42
44
44
43
45
44
51
75
51
51
75
51
61
83
59
64
122
64
57
87
85
64
122
122
42
44
44
7
8
8
64
64
64
35
WEEK
BASE 1
2
3
MIN.
42
42
42
27
33
34
30
32
33
27
50
50
CASE 1
CASE 2
CASE 3
CASE 4
CASE 5
CASE 6
OUTAGE 5
OUTAGE 6
ELASTIC 2
ELASTIC 6
27
50
50
38
55
55
1
2
3
38
48
48
1
2
3
53
54
53
1
2
3
48
48
48
1
2
3
30
40
33
38
48
48
all of the hourly variability in the price from one day to the next can
be explained. The one circumstance in which this is not the case is that
in which there is a forced outage, particularly if such an outage occurs
during a time period in which the system is at or near its peak. Under
such circumstances there will be price increases in those pricing schemes
in which incremental or marginal capital and/or fuel costs are charged.
While the predictability of such an event is low, a probability
distribution for the occurance of the event can be constructed and the
distribution of likely prices under such circumstances can be readily
defined.
2.7 Catastrophic Plant Failure or Forced Outage: As discussed above, a
major forced outage, particularly those occurring at or near the system
peak, will have a significant impact on the price charged for electric
power given the majority of the pricing schemes evaluated in this paper.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the variability in prices given the removal from
the generating stock of 600 MW of nuclear capacity. Because the
synthetic utility developed contained limited reserve capacity (roughly
10%), the cases analyzed showed significant increases in price which
reflected additional periods in which peaking equipment was required to
meet the load. In both pricing cases chosen, cases 5 and 6, the system
was taxed to its fullest during peak periods and as a result the prices
reached levels in excess of 100 mills. The reader should also see Part 5
of the is report for a discussion of the spot price implications of the
"quality of supply" component which becomes significant at times in which
the system may approach its limits and be in some potential danger of
collapse.
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2.8 Elasticity: A significant purpose in time variant electric power
rates is the modification of consumer behavior as a function of price
(elasticity). The traditional concepts of elasticity do not cover the
time intervals implied in the frequent movement of prices in the
Homeostatic Control concept. Some work is being done to estimate price
responses to regular, TOD price schedules. As a result, while it is not
possible to predict empirically the response of industrial customers to
changes in price which might occur either hourly or on the proposed
shorter time periods, we can be confident that some price response will
exist. In part this is because the consistency of pricing changes
throughtout the day, throughout the week and between seasons would allow
consumers to respond in their production process/patterns of consumption
with both short- and long-run elastic responses.
Figure 2.11 show two cases, (two and six), of changes in demand as a
function of an assumed elasticity of 0.1 and a scenario in which energy
consumption is not held constant. As would be expected, the overall
impact is to shave the peak significantly and thereby to reduce the price
charged by the utility for peak power, particularly given pricing schemes
such as cases five and six in which there are very large differentials in
price between the base and peak periods. Again, as would be expected,
there are no dramatic changes in price seen given this highly simplified
scenario. Considerable additional research effort is required in this
area to evaluate the potential for shifting of load and the resultant
price changes which this would bring about.
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2.9 Conclusions
The analyses discussed above have pointed to three significant
conclusions concerning the potential for pricing schemes such as that
proposed; these conclusions relating to interperiod consistency,
predictability and consumer response. The most significant finding has
been that the prices from period to period are consistent and are
predictable. This consistency and predictability allows a customer to
respond to spot prices as a regular operating activity rather than as a
system of constant emergency. At the same time, however, the customer is
advised, via price, of any emergency conditions which do exist within the
utility generation and distribution system and is able to respond to
these conditions. From the point of view of the initial analyses carried
out, the concept of spot pricing will have the advantages discussed in
the early paragraphs of this paper, namely that the scheme will eliminate
the current problem in time-to-day pricing in defining the time periods
for which specific tariffs will apply and will eliminate the economic
inefficiencies inherent in infrequent utility commission rate reviews,
i.e., the Averch-Johnson effect and inefficiencies caused by automatic
rate adjustments in fuel costs. There are still, however, a number of
issues which need to be developed to analyze fully the potential for
spot-pricing within the overall scheme of Homeostatic Control.
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2.10 Discussion
Three questions were raised during the discussion which followed the
presentation of the spot pricing paper. These questions centered around
the following issues: (1) efficiency and equity, (2) predictability, and
(3) implementability. The paper itself focused in large part on the
issues of predictability of prices given limited information. The
discussion which followed the paper's presentation accepted the
conclusions of the authors with regard to (1) predictability of the
prices given the information available, (2) the impact analyses on
elasticities in so far as the analysis had gone to date, and (3) the
impact of major system interruptions in so far as the simplified
production costing model used was able to indicate the level of price
change which would be inherent in such an analysis. Questions of
implementability were generally held to a later discussion of consumer
response and quality of supply, though, as will be discussed below, there
were questions concerning the rationale for implementing a system with
such short time blocks.
The major area of discussion concerning pricing centered around the
statement by the authors that the spot pricing scheme as proposed would
be equally applicable to average costing schemes as to marginal costing
schemes. However, the average costing schemes would not give the
customer signals as dramatic (or as economically correct) as the marginal
costing schemes. But they would, none the less, give price signals which
reflected increased utility costs of generation. The discussion then
centered on the use and definition of marginal cost pricing for electric
power. In that discussion it was suggested that the definition used in
the spot pricing paper was inconsistent with previous work, a point
43
accepted by the author. The most generally accepted definition was that
marginal cost pricing is both a measurement of the response change (to a
change in demand) by the system planner who makes long-range decisions
and by the system dispatcher who is responsible for short run,
moment-to-moment decisions. Stated in this manner long-run marginal cost
pricing involves primarily capital costs, i.e. those costs associated
with marginally increasing system capacity. In the short-run the
marginal cost is one of fuel and operating costs (given capital is either
available or not available in the moment-to-moment time frame).
In contrast to the definition above, the Spot Price analysis
presented utilized a concept of marginal pricing, allowed by the spot
price formulation but not by other structures, which calculated the price
of electricity on the basis of both the marginal cost of fuel (short term
definition) and the allocated capital cost of the marginal unit of
generation. In this manner the spot pricing system allowed for both the
allocated marginal capital and the operating costs to be included within
the rate. The conclusion of this discussion among the economists present
was that marginal costing was the correct method but that the definition
of marginal cost was ambiguous. Little discussion was forthcoming on the
author's point that it was possible using spot pricing to accept average
or embedded costing formulae as easily as marginal costing formulae into
a spot pricing scheme. Spot pricing is not the only pricing scheme which
would be available to customers. Customers would be able to choose that
scheme, including flat rates, which most closely fit their load
requirement and production/consumption mix.
A second major area of discussion surrounded the issue of the
advantages of spot pricing relative to systems available today such as
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time-of-day pricing or even flat rates. The basic question raised was
one of the objective function associated with such a scheme and the
relative costs and benefits of installation of such a highly variable
pricing structure. The discussion provided both the positive and the
negative implications of such a scheme. The most significant question
was that of the objective function, or stated differently, what would one
expect to gain through such a pricing system? The answer to this
question was debated in such terms as cost minimization and overall
economic efficiency. The issue was not fully resolved until discussions
in a subsequent session in which the definition generally agreed upon was
"cost minimization on both the supply and demand side subject to a set of
constraints which would in general be related to environmental issues,
etc."
On the negative side of the issue it was pointed out that the spot
pricing concept would have a significant implementation cost above that
for either flat rates or, more relevantly, for time-of-day costs, and
spot pricing might have little if any additional benefits. A second set
of negative comments were raised around the issue of responsiveness or
potential for response on the part of small consumers. Here the
discussion was both focused forward to the session on consumer response
and the authors pointed out that the spot pricing scheme was focused
primarily on the large energy consumer and did not preclude in any way
the use of a combination of rate formulae and schedules responsive to
customer needs. A third set of negative comments was raised on the
manner of implementation of changes in the spot price as individual
utilities add to their capital stock. The example given was one of the
addition of a transmission line and when the utility would be allowed to
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add this capital cost into their rate base. Related to this question was
that of how the losses in equipment for either the short- or long-term
would be reflected in the formulae presented to the consumers. The
discussion and solution suggested that such problems would be handled
much as they are today through hearings before the PUC's and that such
changes would not be expected to be automatically or instantaneously
entered into the rate. The following question pointed to the possibility
of "cheating" under such a system but was promptly answered by a utility
commissionner who indicated that the cheating or inefficient allocation
problem would be no different than that encountered in the fuel
escalation clauses which had been handled quite effectively by the PUC
wherein the costs incorrectly allocated had been disallowed to the
utility.
The discussion then focused on a set of positive attributes of the
spot pricing scheme. The first was that the spot pricing concept was not
totally original but had been proposed by Professor William Vickery,
among others. The spot pricing concept is presently in partial practice
within the utility industry with sales of power between utilities.
Second, as mentioned above, the concept of changing prices reflecting a
formulae rather than a fixed schedule is an accepted pricing scheme
utilized through the present fuel adjustment clauses. Third, the concept
of large consumer response to such rapidly changing prices is being
tested in San Diego, California and appears to be working well within
that environment and therefore the suggestion should, when combined with
the hardware proposed, function to minimize costs.
Other issues which arose were spot pricing versus long-term
contracts. While spot pricing is not so different from the commodity
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exchange with bidding occurring on both spot and futures markets, the
real question is whether or not spot pricing for energy, in this case
electrical energy, is superior to providing electrical energy through a
long-term contract as is done today. The uncertainties associated with
continuously changing prices on short or no notice raised specific
concerns among the industrial discussants particularly in terms of their
ability to respond effectively under these conditions.
A significant discussion surrounded the issue of the benefits that
one could expect to accrue from a give minute interval pricing
structure. It was suggested that such a structure would be, in effect, a
form of price rationing which would have the effect of strongly
encouraging the participating customer to use economic dispatch of his
power needs, providing a means of eliminating much of the need for
interruptible loads in which the customer has little if any say in the
decision-making process. A related issue concerned the benefit of a five
minute interval pricing structure versus the cost of putting in a
communications link to accomplish it. Here again, it was pointed out
that communications links of this type are already in use in similar
forms in other industries, or in the case of San Diego Gas and Electric,
are already in use between the utility and specific of its customers.
Thus, the additional cost of developing a two-way communication system,
given the rapidly decreasing costs of communication technology, would
appear to be not as negative as to make the costs outweight the benefits.
In summary, the discussion of the first conference session wandered
beyond the narrow bounds which the authors had created within the
discussion paper itself to look more broadly at a number of aspects of
the proposed Homeostatic Control system. The queries raised by both
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discussants and the general group discussion which followed confirmed the
initial analyses presented. A set of issues were raised, mainly those
associated with the marginal value of homeostatic control over
time-of-day pricing. Three were acknowledged to be significant and were
taken up later in the discussion of customer responses. A first cut at a
methodology and a set of numbers to answer this particular question was
presented later in the conference. The debate of the correct rate
setting formula in terms of marginal or average cost was never concluded
though the most active participants clearly sided with marginal costing.
Probably the most significant conclusion drawn by one participant toward
the end of the discussion period was "What ever you do, don't study the
concept to death, go try it!" This recommendation reappeared at a number
of other points throughout the meeting.
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Chapter 3: CUSTOMER RESPONSE SYSTEMS
3.1 Introduction
The key issues to be discussed in the conference in the area of
Customer Response Systems are:
-What types of customer-utility interactions will the customer
prefer or accept?
-How can and will customers respond to different types of
customer-utility interaction?
The following material follows:
3.2 Customer Response Systems: Background
3.3 IEEE PAS Paper: "Impact of New Electronic Technologies to the
Customer End of Distribution Automation and Control"
3.4 IEEE PAS Paper: "Physical Economic Analysis of Industrial Demand"
3.5 Homeostatic Control Initial Hardware Development
The material in (3.2) is intended to provide a broad background
discussion on how industries can respond in an environment such as
provided by homeostatic controls. Preprints of two papers to be
presented at the IEEE PAS 1979 Summer Power Meeting are included as (3.3)
and (3.4). "Impact of New Technologies" (3.3) provides more technical
detail on the electronic and information flow associated with homeostatic
control. "Physical Economic Analysis" (3.4) discusses the possibility of
industrial customers rescheduling some operations in response to prices
(the discussions are on time rates but also apply ways to homeostatic
concepts). Section 3.5 presents a summary of the current status of
hardware development.
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3.2 Customer Response Systems: Background
Background discussions address the following questions:
1) What opportunities are presented by advances in communications
and computation?
2) What types of information flows between utility and customer
are possible?
3) What can customers do to take advantage of information exchange
with the utility?
4) What are the major issues of customer acceptance?
5) What types of new customer capital equipment will be required?
3.2.1 Opportunities
In recent years there has been explosive growth in the capabilities
of equipment used for computation. Computers are now available in both
very large and very small sizes, with an enormous range of capabilities.
Matching this growth has been a sharp reduction in their cost, so that
today an enormous amount of computational capability can be had for very
little money. Examples of equipment using small, inexpensive special
purpose computers include all of the little hand-held calculators that
are now so common, as well as the electronic games that have become
popular recently. Many systems concepts which, until recently, were
prohibitively costly are now possible because of advances in
microelectronics. In the future, it is reasonable to expect that the
intelligence of a controller will be a very small part of the cost.
During the last several years a number of groups have carried out
research and development of systems for implementing two-way
communications between a utility and its customers. As a result of these
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studies, several different types of communication system have been
demonstrated to be feasible. Generally, these systems have been intended
for use in automatic meter reading and direct load control.
Communication media which have been used in successful demonstrations
include power line carrier, telephone lines, radio wave, and power
frequency ripple. Systems employing each of these, and/or combinations
of these, are currently operational.
This revolution in electronics provides many opportunities for
advancements in equipment to be used for distribution automation and
control, load management, automatic meter reading, variable price
metering, small scale load shedding, and many other purposes.
Computers are now used in load management schemes in some industrial
and commercial sites. MIT, for example, has a mini-computer which serves
to control the environmental control systems within some of the
Institute's buildings. One of the functions of this machine is to reduce
the fifteen minute peak load, thus to save on demand charges. It is
logical to expect that, as the opportunities for economical application
expand, more and more customers will choose to have some of their
energy-using functions be controlled by a computer. As the benefits of
mass production reduce costs, even small commercial and residential
customers may be expected to make use of sophisticated energy control
systems.
3.2.2 Possible Information Flows
It is possible to envision many different types and combinations of
types of communications between the utility and its customers. The case
of Homeostatic Control will be used as a basis for this discussion. At
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the end, other types of information flow will be considered. There are
three entirely different types of communication which must be considered
here, and it is quite important to understand the distinction between
them. The first type of communication is between the central utility and
equipment belonging to the utility at the customer's site. Generally,
this equipment will be in place of the meter (today this is a watthour
meter, while under Homeostatic control it would be somewhat more
sophisticated and would so be a fancier name). The second type of
communication is between the utility apparatus on the customer's site and
the customer or the customer's own equipment. Finally, the customer's
equipment will pass information around a communications system entirely
local to the site. Under the Homeostatic control concept, there is an
importation segregation of information flows, maintained by the equipment
at the interface between utility and customer equipment. At that point,
all communication of information from the customer equipment to the
utility would be controlled by the customer's own equipment. The utility
would have no capability of "looking into" the customer's site.
Various types of information flows are required by Homeostatic
Control. The data link between the utility and the meter would carry at
least two prices for electrical energy: the "buy" price, and the
"buy-back" price. The first of these is the price paid by the customer
at any given time period. The second price is the price paid by the
utility for power delivered by the customer from, say, on-site
generation. There may be additional prices reflecting the value of
reactive power, etc. In addition, the data line would carry meter
polling requests from the utility and, perhaps, information such as
forecasts of future price to allow the customer some time to adjust
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energy use. Information returning over this line would include meter
readings and, perhaps, rate confirmation information.
Of the information on the utility-meter link, some is passed on to
the customer. These include all of the prices and price forecasts. It
will not, of course, be necessary to pass on such information as polling
requests although certain issues of privacy, discussed below, may make
this desireable.
Several other types of information transfer may be desired by
Homeostatic Control. For example, it would be possible for the
utility-customer data link to mediate a sophisticated transaction
regarding interruptible power sale. The utility, in a quest for a
certain amount of rapidly interruptible power, might hold an electronic
auction among its customers. Under such a scheme, it would offer an
increasing price differential for the sale of energy that could be
rapidly disconnected. Customers (or more likely, customers' computers)
would "bid" for such interruptible power, until the utility had met its
requirements. The sequence of offer, accept, and of course the attendant
dissent (in case of emergency) could be sent over the utility-to-customer
data link.
Another possible type of information that might be carried on this
data channel would implement a utility control scheme that might be
called "microshedding." Under emergency conditions, certain classes of
load might be deemed to be sheddable. The utility would send out a
microshedding instruction over the data link, resulting in the
disconnection of the sheddable load. By pre-arrangement, several
different classes of load could be arranged into a priority scheme, thus
allowing for a series of load shedding steps, which would be invoked in
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order, according to the severity of system emergency. The major
advantage of this sort of a scheme is that it might avoid total
disconnection of customers in the event of a severe system emergency,
thus allowing them to maintain critical loads.
Yet another type of information transfer possible with the utility
customer information link is actually already in use. This is direct
control of customer loads. As an alternative to clock control of loads
such as water and space heaters, direct control can prevent difficulties
with time changes, clock inaccuracies and tampering.
3.2.3 Customer Use of Information
There are several identifiable uses for information passed on to the
customer. Price information would be loaded into the variable rate
watthour meter, to be used for establishing customer charges. It would
also be transferred to the customer to allow the customer to re-schedule
loads or to make other decisions regarding electric energy use. The
utility would use a polling signal to recover from the meter such
information as energy use (actually, in this case, it would be energy use
weighted by price), and to verify the price stored in the meter. The
existence of rapid, reliable communications and computer capability might
also allow for the ready negotiation of interruptible load arrangements.
For example, a customer computer might be programmed to accept the offer
of interruptible power with a price reduction of at least a certain
amount. Similarly, the utility might be able to offer such interruptible
power only under certain circumstances. The negotiations for such
interruptible power might, conceivably, be done completely automatically
or, at least semi-automatically. The communications link might also be
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used to provide load shedding orders. Certain classes of customer load
might be classified as sheddable, and thus be controlled, directly or
indirectly through the customer computer by the utility.
There will, of course, be important limitations on the
communications system. For example, with the type of communications
systems now being proposed, bandwidth limitations restrict the capability
of the system. Inportant restrictions include the inability to confirm
the price transmitted to each customer meter in real time. Further, the
communications system might not be able to confirm load shedding of each
customer under emergency conditions. Fortunately, the computational
abilities which may be built into utility equipment at the end of the
distribution line can make up for most of these problems. In addition,
certain other forms of communications system (dedicated wire or optical
fiber), or of communications system arrangement (using computation at
widely distributed locations) might overcome these limitations.
3.2.4 Customer Acceptance
It is necessary to consider what actions a customer might take to
take advantage of information from Homeostatic Control. Many customers
will be able to reschedule important loads to times when the price is
low. Examples are heating, cooling, and pumping. It might be necessary
to run certain processes only at times during the day when such processes
are economical. Of course, some loads might be considered interruptible,
and thus qualify for a reduced rate. The rate differential for
interruption might be different for different loads, and so the utility
might have to pay more to obtain the required volume of interruptible
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load at different times. Thus a customer might have a class of load that
is interruptible at some times, but firm at others.
There is major uncertainty about the nature of customer response to
the options presented here. For example, how would a customer respond to
a (time-variable) spot price? This question is critically important, for
it relates to the elasticity of demand. It is reasonable to expect that
different types of load, representing different classes of process, will
have different inherent elasticity of demand. It is reasonable to expect
that the elasticity may be related to the value of the product in
relation to the cost of the electric power consumed in its manufacture.
Some processes have a greater value, in relation to the cost of
electrical energy used, than others. Many commercial and, perhaps most
residential uses will have a very small elasticity. That is, increases
in price will have very little impact on demand. It is hard to imagine,
for example, a department store or a home turning off the lights on a
dark night because the price of electricity happens to be high.
The issue of elasticity of demand is made more complex by the
possibility of load rescheduling. Many types of load processes can be
rescheduled, or carried out at times during which the price of energy may
be low. This is particularly true of such uses as space heating, pumping
for domestic and irrigation uses, cooling, etc. In many cases, new
equipment, such as storage tanks might be required to take advantages of
time variable price, and so the true long-term elasticity of demand may
not be observable, even to an experiment.
There is also the possibility of time variable prices, which imply
very low rates at certain times, attracting new classes of load to the
electric power system. For example, if cheap electricity were to become
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available at certain times of the day, electric space heating in
conjunction with storage might become attractive. The possibility of
this happening would be enhanced by the large-scale use of generation
systems which are relatively capital intensive and fuel price
insensitive, such as wind, solar, and nuclear sources. In fact, very
wide price fluctuations might be expected on a system dominated by wind
or solar generation, because of the intermittent nature of these
sources. Such a system might have a very high load diversity factor,
with the lowest prices occurring at the same time as peak system loads!
Customer response to the widespread use of interruptible load sales
and microshedding is even more uncertain. For example, it is very
difficult to predict just what sort of price differential would be
required to get customers to accept interruptible power. For many
classes of customers, generally residential and commercial, the existence
of interruptible power must be essentially "transparent". That is, the
customer must not be able to detect, or at least must not be
inconvenienced by, load interruptions. It is not hard to envision
completely transparent operation of certain types of load, which might be
referred to as "energy" loads. Thus it is reasonable to expect that
interruptible arrangements beyond this point is problematical. The
ability to "flip a switch" has a considerable value.
All of this leaves a substantial question as to the ability of a
utility system to use spot prices or interruptible contracts to help
achieve a greater degree of system security and operational economy.
This is clearly ground for further study.
There are many means at the customers disposal for affecting price
response. The crudest form of response would be manual. A customer
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would watch the price (or set an alarm at a trigger price) and then go
around turning things off. On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect
that prices will vary in a fairly regular way. Based on a little
observation and a knowledge of the weather and the day of the week, a
customer should be able to predict the load fairly well. Thus
pre-scheduled load behavior would be possible. Finally, a customer might
have a computer do the load control. There are, of course, some computer
based load controllers in existence now, so it is clear that this mode of
control is already feasible. As the cost of computation goes down, the
market for load controlling computers will improve. In fact, mass
production of this equipment would bring the cost of load rescheduling
equipment into the range of feasibility for small commercial and maybe
even residential customers.
It should be noted that the economical implementation of mass
produced load rescheduling equipment will depend upon easy installation.
A load rescheduling computer will require a variety of types of
information: price from the utility, process data (tank levels, storage
temperatures), input from the operator, and so forth. It will also
generate data to be transferred: commands to process equipment and
operator information. Thus a data transfer medium will be required. The
benefits of mass production and simple installation would be most easily
achieved if a standard data bus were available. Just as much equipment
is now plugged into a power bus of standard characteristics, installation
of data handling and control equipment could be essentially a plug-in
operation.
Privacy of customers will be a major issue if high speed, reliable
two-way communications becomes a reality. Rapid meter polling would
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result in the accumulation of a lot of information about a customer. For
example, a time-series chart about one's energy consumption could tell
just how late that party lasted, and whether the host made it to Church
in the morning. Ways of controlling the method of meter polling and
access to the resulting information will have to be formulated. Customer
acceptance of the variable rate meter will also be an issue. It will be
necessary to convince people that this is not just another utility
rip-off.
Security of the system will also be a major issue. Tampering with
watthour meters is a major concern to utilities today. The more
sophisticated meters offered by Homeostatic Control, while presenting a
more complex problem for the would-be tamperer, also offer the
sophisticated cheat a lot of opportunities. Very careful thought will
have to be given to the communication system to reduct the opportunities
for invasive tampering to, say, arrange for a bogus price signal to be
applied to one's own meter.
3.2.5 Customer Equipment
A variety of customer investments and energy use changes is
anticipated so they can take advantage of price variations. These
actions would vary from re-scheduling loads to low cost times through
running certain processes only when price permits to running or not
running certain processes at all. Some of the customer responses will
involve the installation of new capital equipment both for energy control
operations and for alteration of process operations.
First, a customer could employ a fairly sophisticated communications
and computation system. Such systems are already in place in some
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locations, generally those of very heavy energy users. It is to be
expected that, as the incentives become greater and the price of
electronics falls, the incidence of such systems will increase. A
customer would typically have two basic elements to his energy control
system. The first would be an energy controlling computer system. This
computer could be as simple as something that alarms at a certain high
(or low) price level or it might be as sophisticated as a machine that
can be entrusted with negotiations of interruptible power agreements.
The device would accept price, process, and control information and then
control energy-using devices and processes. Information transfer and
control would take place over the second important part of the customer's
system, the data network. At the present time, both the computers and
the data networks used for this type of control are large and custom
built systems. It is reasonable to expect the effects of mass production
to be felt in this business in the not too distant future so that these
devices will come within the reach of even small customers. Customer
site computation and communications is the subject of the paper which is
attached to this section.
Second, customers would be expected to make new capital investments
that would allow them to use electricity even more flexibly than they can
with their current energy-using equipment. In industry, incremental
capacity might be built for some types of energy-intensive equipment so
that overall plant throughput could be achieved by running only during
low spot price periods: examples include extra chippers, pumps, or
pulverizers. In conjunction with this added capacity, new storage
facilities are required to save the intermittently-operated process's
inputs and outputs for coordination with other manufacturing stages:
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examples are storage bins or tanks for pumped liquids. If rates were to
dip low enough at times, the installation of heat pumps in conjunction
with storage capacity might become feasible for space heating. Time
variable prices would also affect competition between electricity and
other energy sources for some processes. It is quite possible that
dual-fuel process equipment might be manufactured. When electrical power
is cheap, it would be used, but during times of expensive power, a switch
would be made to other sources, such as natural gas. This raises the
possibility that time variable prices might actually allow electricity to
displace other fuels at certain times. Heat pumps and storage provive
one example. If price fluctuations were wide enough, such a combination
would become economically competitive with other common heat sources such
as light oil or natural gas.
Over the long run, industries that operate their plants more
flexibly might move to areas where fluctuating prices posed no large
penalty, while industries that needed stable spot prices for electricity
might be biased toward regions where expected or abnormal price changes
were less likely.
Customer generation is a special class of the investments that are
simplified under Homeostatic Control. This includes the typical
emergency generators and cogeneration plants along with the less
conventional renewable resource technologies. The customer and the
utility would not be tied to a complex combination of stand-by charges,
demand charges, capacity credits, and energy buy-back contracts. Instead
the spot price information and the low costs for economic control of the
generation would encourage operation almost as if the generator was
dispatched directly by the utility. If the customer's generation fails,
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a price reflecting current cost conditions is paid rather than one based
on an expected set of conditions -- if that current price is very high,
the customer then has the option either to buy the power or to cut
electricity consumption.
This customer generation could easily benefit the utility as well as
the owner. Energency generation, triggered by an abnormally high spot
price to the customer because of local distribution limitations, would
reduce the customer's net load and benefit the utility by reducing line
loads. Since increases in electricity cogeneration are most economic if
they are coupled to a simultaneous increase in steam output, process
steam use would be coordinated with utility-wide electricity needs not
merely the single plant's electricity consumption
In certain types of power systems the time of minimum price might
not be the time of minimum use. A system dominated by intermittent
sources with limited controllability, such as wind or solar energy, might
have generation that drives the price down dramatically when the wind is
blowing or the sun is shining. In such systems energy using devices with
large storage capacity would operate to take advantage of the cheap
price, and might actually cause the system to produce maximum power at
time of minimum price, contrary to the situation in a power system served
primarily by fossil fuel generation.
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3.3 IMPACT OF NEW ELECTRONIC TE;N;31IOGIES TO THE
CUSTOMER END OF DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATFION AND CONTROL
J.L. Kirtley, Jr.. T.L. Sterling
Electric Power Systems Engineering Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract - Recent years have seen explosive growth
in the areas of microelectronics, digital electronics
and communications. The same time period has witnessed
substantial pressure on energy prices. These two facts
have motivated the formulation of advanced control
schemes for electric utilities, to even out system
load and to distribute costs in an economically optimal
way. This paper describes ways in which the advances
in electronic technology might be employed to help
implement advanced control technologies.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen explosive growth in the
areas of microelectronics, digital electronics and
communications. Performance of systems in these fields
has improved dramatically while prices have fallen.
These advances provide the means to build control sys-
tems that will, in the future, help improve the per-
formance and reduce costs of electric power systems.
The rising cost of energy is providing pressure
for changes in pricing structures to more fairly dis-
tribute the cost of providing electrical generation.
Rising costs are also making nonconventional sources
and co-generation more attractive. It is reasonable
to expect these trends to continue.
Such influences, plus the opportunities presented
by developments in electronics, have led toward the
formulation of innovative concepts in Distribution
Automation and Control and related fields. One new
concept in this area is Homeostatic Control, described
in a companion paper [1l. Implementation of these
advanced approaches will require the development of
specific types of electronic systems. Of particular
interest is the type of system which will be required
at the customer end of the distribution line.
Advanced concepts in power system control will
require data transfer across the interface between
distribution line and customer. Computation, control
and monitoring systems will also be required. The
purpose of this paper is to discuss how elements of
new electronic technologies might be assembled to form
a coherent, effective system at the customer site.
The discussion is made with Homeostatic Control in
mind, but the type of system described can implement
other types of control strategies, separately or con-
currently.
This paper is also a proposal for the development
of certain types of electronic hardware, software, and
standards. The implementatiun of the types of control
structures described here would be greatly facilitated
by the existence of standard data links.
New Electronic Hardware
Among the most impressive of all technological
developments in recent years are the great advances
that have been made in microelectronics. The industry
To be presented at the IEEE Power
Engineering Society, 1979 Summer
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has passed from Integrated Circuits through Large Scale
integration to Very Large Scale Integration. Single
chips carrying as much complexity as the large com-
puters of only a few years ago can now be produced for
only a few dollars each, and the price/performance
trends show no indication of saturation. Microelec-
tronic circuits include general purpose devices
(microprocessors and memories), and specialized devices
(calculator chips, device controllers, communications
link interfaces). Many system concepts which, until
recently, were prohibitively costly are now possible
because of advances in microelectronics. In the ftJre
it is reasonable to expect that the intelligence of a
controller will be a very small part of the cost.
Data communications has enjoyed rapid advances
because of the application of digital techniques and
the development of new media. In particular, stand-
ardized interface hardware and protocols have enabled
different manufacturers to produce devices that can
interact with each other (even with devices made by
the competition). A wide range of media for data com-
munications is now available, ranging from carrier
signals on power lines to optical fibers. The combin-
ation of the advances in both microprocessing and dig-
ital communication permits the develoment of sophis-
ticated distributed processor control systems.
Requirements of a Very Advanced Control System;
This discussion is cast in terms of Homeostatic
Control. It will become clear, however, that th. tpe
of customer interface and control system described
here would be useful for other control strateries and
features.
Briefly, Homeostatic Control incorporates a stra-
tegy in which both ustomers and the power supply sys-
tem each accommodate to the needs of the system as a
whole. It incorporates two basic strategies:
1. Frequency Adaptive Power Energy Rescheduling
(FAPER) is a means of short term system frequency con-
trol implemented by rescheduling energy loads. System
frequency is used as a key: if frequency is low, FAPER
turns energy loads off, while if frequency is high,
FAPER turns energy loads on. The term energy load used
in this context means a load that can be re-scheduled
over a short period without adverse effect on the cus-
tomer. Hot water heaters, space and process heating,
electrolytic tanks, water pumping and many other types
of loads are of this type.
2. Spot Pricing [2] is a means of allowing the
price of electric power to reflect its true economic
value. The spot price would vary with time, increasing
as system load increases to reflect the fact that la-
tively expensive generation must be used at system peak
load. It is expected that price variations will proipt
customers to reschedule some uses of electric power
away from times of system peak load. The Homeostatic
Control concept of Spot Pricing differs from the notion
of time-of-day rates in that the Spot Price would vary
to reflect actual instantaneous system and load condi-
tions.
Several capabilities are required in the control
and communications system at the customer end of the
distribution line. These are:
1. Communication from the power company to tth
customer and to the metering system. This is necessary
in order to announce the spot price, and would be use-
ful for other purposes.
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2. Communication from the customer-end metering
system back to the power company. This is not neces-
salry in the initial Homeostatic Control notion, but
would, most likely, be necessary in any practical im-
plementation. It would be used for verifying the spot
price and for automatic meter reading.
3. Load level sensing. This is the front-end
function of an energy meter. In addition to supply-
ing information required for billing, this function
could supply information on load responsiveness to
frequency or other signals. The usefulness of this
information will be discussed below.
4. Variable rate price integration. With vari-
able rates it would be necessary to keep track of a
customer's usage, not in terms of kilowatt hours, but
rather in terms of money. This function must accept
spot price and usage, multiply the two and integrate
the result over time.
5. Frequency Detection. This is the front-end
function of FAPER. Information from this function
would be used to control energy rescheduling, and per-
haps to determine load responsiveness.
6. Customer load scheduler. This function would
accept data from other elements of the system and turn
on or off customer loads.
7. Customer scheduler-to-load communications.
Some link between the scheduler, other elements of the
system, and loads which may be physically separated
would be required.
System Description
figure 1 shows a block diagram of a configuration
for a customer control and communication system. The
blocks in the diagram really refer to functions of
the system, although in most cases they will corres-
pond with specific pieces of hardware.
Fig. 1 Customer Control and Communication System
The Marketing Interface to Customer (MIC) s the
communications link which transfers information bet,;:an
the power company (Marketing System) and the custo:or.
It consists of several functions. The Market to Cus.
tomer Communications Link (MCCL) is the actual informa-
tion transfer path. In addition, MIC contains a Dyna-
mic Rate Integrating Demand Monitor, which serves to
replace today's watthour meter.
The Dynamic Rate Integrating Demand Monitor (DRIDM)
is the watthour meter of this system, although its
functions are more complex than those of today's meters.
This element has within it several functions. The
power level sensor is a transducer which detects load
level. The cost integrator accepts information from
the power level sensor and price information from the
MCCL. It uses these two pieces of information to gen-
erate customer cost, which it integrates and stores.
The frequency sensor provides information to the cus-
tomer's energy controller (ERAC) to implement frequerncy
adaptive control (FAPER) and a load responsiveness sen-
sor detects if and to what extent FAPER is working.
The intra-Building Data Link (BDL) is the function
that connects all of the customers' hardware together
and, in addition, connects to the MIC. It provides the
necessary paths for information flow.
The Energy Resource Allocation Controller (ERAC)
is a function which schedules the customer's loads.
It accepts data on price and system frequency from MIC
and issues commands to energy-using devices via BDL.
With that brief description of the system, it
would be worthwhile to discuss each of the important
elements of the system.
The MCCL is a data communication system employed
to interconnect the electrical power supplies (arket-
ing System) to its customers. Several such systems are
already under development and testing [3]. Any of
three types of communication media are employed in sys-
tems presently under development. These are poser line
carrier, telephone wires, and radio. Ultimately, the
possibility of optical fiber must be added. The speci-
fic selection among these possibilities is not import-
ant for this discussion. The primary motivation for
power company-to-customer communications systems has
been automatic meter polling. Technical considerations
in no way limit the use of such systems to this domain.
For all applications considered here data rates would
not have to be very high because message traffic would
be sparse and message lengths would be short. Further,
much information transferred, such as price information,
would be broadcast, with all MIC's on the system re-
ceiving at once.
Because two-way communications systems are proving
to be feasible, it will not be necessary to say much
more about this part of the system.
The Dynamic Rate Integrating Demand Monitor may be
thought of as a very "smart" electronic power meter
with communications interfacing. This element will be
required to interface with the MCCL and the customer
communications system (BDL). It will incorporate some
fairly sophisticated computational abilities.
DRIDM is an instrument that will be made economic-
ally feasible by microelectronic technology. The com-
putational facilities within this instrument would be
contained on one or a very few chips comparable with
today's microprocessors. Thus these devices may be
mass-produced at very low cost per unit. To accommo-
date for differences in installations, process instruc-
tions for DRIDM may be contained in Read-Only memory.
In its normal-operating mode DRIDM will accept
and store a datum representing price from MCCL. At
frequent intervals it will measure power usage; multi-
ply that by the price, and then add the resulting num-
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ber to the register in which cost is accumlulating. At
les-s frequent intervals DRIDM will receive polling in-
quiries from the Marketing System, through MCCL. These
inquiries will be about the price currently stored (to
verify that DRiDM has, indeed, the right price) and
about the cost stored in the accumulator.
DRIDM will also contain an element to measure sys-
tem frequency. This information will be passed on
through BDL to ERAC, to implement frequency dependent
(FAPER) control. DRIDM may also contain elements to
reinforce the use of frequency dependent control. For
example, it would be possible to measure load frequency
responsiveness by observing load changes coincident
with changes in the frequency signal. A rate differen-
tial could be offered by the Marketing System for the
frequency responsive part of a customer's load. Alter-
natively, frequency dependent loads could be rewarded
by having a rate differential dependent on system fre-
quency. Loads that accept energy at high system fre-
quency, but not low system frequency, would pay less,
because the rate would be a declining function of fre-
quency. Development work will be required to find
appropriate ways of building reliable and economical
power and frequency transducers for this application.
ERAC would be a customer-owned function, which
might take any of many forms. For large energy using
industries ERAC might be a very sophisticated computer,
while for residential users it might be nothing more
than a frequency-dependent controller and a wall dis-
play indicating instantaneous price.
For users with enough energy load to justify the
cost, ERAC would acceptthe spot price from MIC, and
status messages from elements such as thermostats,
level sensors, etc. It might also accept predictions
of price, weather, etc. ERAC would then schedule
energy loads in such a way as to minimize the total
energy bill. This behavior will, of course, tend to
even out total system load.
In time, it is reasonable to expect that small,
inexpensive ERAC's will come onto the market. These
would be built using microelectronic technology, and
might become quite inexpensive as have, say, electronic
games and toys. Thus it is reasonable to expect that
a large fraction of system loads would eventually come
under ERAC control.
The Building Data Link is an element used to
transfer information between the DRIDM, the customer's
ERAC, and energy-using devices on the customer's sys-
tem. It is possible, in principle, for the customer
data transfer functions to be handled by a hard-wired
system. That is, twisted pairs of wires might be con-
nected between the IC and the ERAC, and from the ERAC
to each load. This, while it would work, would not be
a very good solution, for it would imply a custom
installation for each customer. In addition, changes
to the system would be difficult and expensive to im-
plement.
A better solution to the communications problem
would be to formulate a standard for a BDL. This data
link might employ a single data bus, to which each of
the elements to be involved in information exchange
would be connected. The BDL would, most likely, employ
a packet switching scheme for addressing messages, as
opposed to line or path switching.
The use of a standard Building Data Link offers
several advantages. A standard would imply that data
link interfaces could be mass-produced. The BDL inter-
face could be produced as a single chip, and would
therefore be quite inexpensive. Installation and sys-
tem expansion would be made quite easy and inexpensive:
any device with data communications requirements would
be built to "plug in" to the data bus.
In a very real sense the existence of a BDL stand-
ard would be very much like the existence of a stilaJFri
for power for small energy-using devices. ,ost en :',
using consumer and commercial goods, from electric ;i-
writers to washing machines, employ a common standard
for electric power. The standard specifies the volc--e
frequency, and connector to be used. Because such a
standard exists the installation of most electrical ~-
vices is accomplished by simply plugging into a powIPr
socket. It is hard to imagine a situation in which
such a standard did not exist, and in which different
appliances were to require different voltage (or worse,
frequency).
It should be noted that the BDL standard proposed
here would be useful for much more than implementing
Homeostatic Control. All sorts of equipment, including
devices that are not energy-using, can be controlled
through such a link. One can envision the rapid and
easy implementation of systems such as security systems
(fire and burglar alarms) with distributed elements,
control of lighting, or even process control. A stind-
ard conmmunications link system, if it were to become
accepted, would result in data buses being installed
in many locations, with a very wide range of uses. Thus
BDL would cause Homeostatic Control to be synergistic
with many other possible uses.
Modes of Use
Now that the basic elements of the system have Letn
described, it is appropriate to examine some of the ays
in which it might function.
To implement the customer's end part of Homeostatic
Control, the system has two functions. One of these is
to implement Frequency Adaptive (FAPER) control. in
the most likely configuration, one element of the DRCi,;
would be a frequency sensing element. This would ce-
erate a signal (a binary number) representative of fre-
quency deviation from nominal. This number would We
transferred, through BDL, to the energy rescheduler
(ERAC). ERAC would have available to it other pieces
of information about the energy load processes them-
selves (such as temperatures, levels, etc.). With this
information ERAC may be used to implement a FAPER con-
trol law of virtually arbitrary form.
An alternative implementation of the FAPER control
law would be to install a separate FAPER controller on
each energy load. This implementation might be less
desireable because it would require a frequency m;easur-
ing element at each load. A third possibility would be
to employ a single frequency measuring device which
would be part of DRIDM, but a separate FAPER controller
on each energy load. The only information transferred
through BDL would be the frequency deviation.
An important function of DRIDM would be to provide
positive motivation for the customer to install FAPER
control. This could be done by measuring responsive-
ness of the load to changes in frequency. If the fre-
quency deviation signal is generated by DRIDM itself,
a simple correlation of load variation with frequency
variation would be straightforward to implement. The
average frequency responsive load, passed on to the
cost integrator, could be billed with a favorable price
differential.
Alternatively, the price charged for power could
be made frequency dependent, with a negative price
differential for positive frequency deviation. This,
too, would reward frequency responsive loads. The i,-
plementation of this would be simply to feed the fre-
quency deviation to the cost integrator logic, which
would add or subtract a differential from the posted
spot price.
The attractiveness of these schemes, particularly
of the second, depends somewhat on what type of power
level sensor is used, and on how often use is recorde.
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The frequency dependent price would be useable only if
energy use is recorded frequently enough to catch sys-
tem swings.
The responsiveness of this system to spot price
variations will vary according to the customer. Spot
price will be "posted" by the Marketing System through
MCCL, thence through BDL to ERAC or to a display. It
is likely that, at least at first, few small customers
will have an ERAC with price responsiveness character-
istics. Many will have wall displays and perhaps annun-
ciators set to alarm at a certain price level. On the
other hand, large customers will employ sophisticated
control systems which will employ, in addition to the
posted spot price, process sensor data and predictions
of spot price, weather, etc. The purpose of these con-
/ trollers will be to minimize total cost by rescheduling
loads from time of high spot price to times of low
spot price.
As an example of this rescheduling function, con-
sider some energy-using process that puts its output
into storage, from which point another process uses
the output. This might be, for example, a water pump
discharging into an elevated tank. If the storage
residence time is fairly long, the controller can oper-
ate the process only when power is relatively cheap.
The word "relatively" is important here, for fluctua-
tions in, say, the weather will affect the variation
in price. The controller might have several set points
associating inventory with price. The lower the inven-
tory, the higher the price below which the controller
will operate the process. For some processes it might
be necessary or desirable to employ information from
the weather forecast in order to oFprate the process
at near minimum price.
All of this will, of course, serve to even out
fluctuations of system load, because many intermittent-
ly operating processes will be rescheduled to take ad-
vantage of cheap rates. Perhaps more important, it
will result in substantial reduction of system peak
load, because many loads will avoid the time of peak
prices.
Under Homeostatic Control, the communications link
(MCCL) has several functions. In the "uplink" direc-
tion it posts the spot price periodically. In the
"downlink" direction it may be asked to repeat the
spot price, to verify that it has it correctly. A
communications system with such capabilities may also
be used for automatic meter reading: an uplink poll-
ing signal and a downlink cost message. The communi-
cations link might conceivably be used for yet other
J functions. For example, it might be used to transmit
future price predictions, to help customers plan their
energy usage. Other signials, including perhaps load
control signals or emergency warnings might be trans-
mitted through MCCL also.
An important feature of the Marketing System
Interface to Customer (MIC) is the one-way nature of
information flow. The Marketing System can pass infor-
mation to the customer through MIC. It receives infor-
mation only from the metering elements (DRIDM) within
the MIC interface. No information owned by the cus-
tomer is accessible through this system. Thus this
type of control system does not threaten customer
privacy.
While this discussion has been cast largely in
terms of Homeostatic Control, it is important to see
that the system described here might be used for pur-
poses that are not explicitly part of that control
strategy. One example would be a pricing scheme more
like what is presently in use, with fixed (or time-of-
day) rates and a peak demand charge (which might be
time varying). Under such a scheme the MCCL would be
used for automatic meter reading, perhaps for time-of-
day rate rescheduling and for announcing modifications
to the demand charge structure.
Under a scheme such as this, the function of te
energy rescheduler (ERAC) would be to coordinate vari-
ous loads to operate at low rate times and to smooth
out total load. The BDL would function in the same
way under this system as under Homeostatic Control.
The system described here could be used to imple-
ment a load shedding scheme which might be termed
"Microshedding". Under this scheme, a relatively large
number of loads could be designated as interruptible.
Of course this is done now, but only with few, rather
large loads. With the appropriate communications and
control structure a much larger fraction of total ss-
tem load could be made interruptible, without affecting
the continuity of service to important loads. With
such a scheme a utility could shed a substantial frac-
tion of its total load without totally disrupting any
customers.
The flow of information would be like this: The
utility would send a signal requesting a load reduction
through the MCCL. Passed to ERAC, the load reduction
request would prompt ERAC to turn off some loads. The
load reduction request could be for any level of load
curtailment. It is even conceivable that different
customers could buy power at different priority levels,
so that lower priority customers, who would pay less
for their power, would have a greater risk of curtail-
ment and/or a larger fractional load reduction in an
emergency. The role of the DRIDM in this scheme ould
be to monitor the load curtailment to verify that it
did, in fact, take place. Enforcement of the load re-
duction could be through one of several mechanisms:
For example, a punitively high rate could be charged
for power drawn above the curtailment limit. Alter-
natively, a customer who did not meet the load reduc-
tion request might be turned off completely. This
would be accomplished through information interchange
between DRIDM and the utility, and a service entry
breaker.
The communications and control system described
here may be used to help control the injection of cus-
tomer generated power into the power system. This
power might come from alternate energy sources (wind-
mills, solar collectors or small waterwheels) or fro!n
cogeneration. In the future the power system will be
expected to purchase power from customers who have it
to sell. The rate that the system will pay will be
less than the selling price to other customers, so the
DRIDM must be able to remember a buying, as well as a
selling, rate. For those customers with generation
capability both a buying and a selling price must be
posted. This should be no problem with the system pro-
posed here. The communications capability of this sys-
tem will even allow the utility to exercise some con-
trol over the generating units, through direct control
or through price. It is possible, for example, that
the utility might control reactive power through field
excitation, either directly or by paying for VAR's.
CONCLUSION
There are many pressures which will tend to force
changes in the operation of power systems in the future.
The increasing cost of fuels and difficulty of building
generation facilities will make load levelling more and
more attractive. In addition, increasing fuel cost
will make alternative sources and co-generation more
important. All of this will produce pressures to mike
the price charged for electricity reflect more accurate-
ly its true.economic cost. Rates that are variable in
time are necessary to do this correctly.
The tools required to implement variable pricing,
frequency adaptive controls and other advanced concepts,
exist today and will become more economical in the fu-
ture. Very sophisticated controllers may, through the
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use of microelectronics, be made very inexpensively.
One possible configuration of hardware functions
has been described here. It meets the requirements of
Homeostatic Control and can satisfy other requirements
as well. Clearly, however, other arrangements of func-
tions are possible, and it is not intended that this
arrangement pre-emp all other possibilities.
Several different hardware functions are required
to implement the system described here. Of these func-
tions, the utility-to-customer data link (MCCL) is al-
ready under development. Various power-energy resched-
ulers are already in place in hard-wired environmental
control systems for large building, so it is not diffi-
cult to anticipate that development of such devices
will be straightforward.
Further work will be required to develop two
essential pieces of equipment. One of these is the
Dynamic Rate Integrating Demand Monitor, which has
several important functions. In particular, the
development of an inexpensive, accurate frequency
measuring device will be an interesting challenge.
The most difficult problem here is the definition
of a standard for the Building Data Link (BDL). The
difficulty arises not from the technical requirements,
which are not terribly stringent, nor the anticipated
price, which will be quite low, but from the necessity
to get many people and organizations to agree. In
order to be useful, this data link standard must be
observed by many different manufacturers, many of
them making competing equipment.
The stakes in this development are very high.
The development of an effective, well-observed stand-
ard would result in large economies of scale. The
BDL interface would become very inexpensive. Manufac-
turers of many types of equipment, including equipment
that is not energy-using, would build apparatus that
would transfer information through the bus. Thus the
data link itself would become common, making the con-
venience of implementation of sophisticated-energy
controls high. On the other hand, if a standard can
not be agreed upon, the implementation of controls for
energy loads will be difficult and awkward.
An immediate goal of the electrical power industry
and.society as a whole must be to improve the manner
in which we use available energy generation and distri-
bution resources to conserve energy, enhance capital
investment return, increase reliability, and augment
the quality of the customer product. Only by greatly
increasing the resolution of control and making it
more responsive to the realities of the energy market-
place can these goals be achieved. An essential ele-
ment to the realization of these goals is the utiliza-
tion of a distributed interactive control system, an
example of which has been provided by this paper.
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ABSTRACT .
Physically based models of the demand for elecd-
tricity of industrial customers provide insight into
what types of production schedules are feasible and
how rescheduling will change the load shape. Physical
models can be combined with economic analysis to ana-
lyze a variety of issues related to electric rates,
load management, the cost of outages, etc. For exam-
ple, the reduction in the monthly electric cost due to
rescheduling of a production process can be compared
with the extra cost incurred due to wage differentials.
One key tool is shown to be the comparison of the k'
per person of a production process with the "breakeven
kW per person" of the firm as determined by the rate
and firm's usage pattern. Two electric rates are ex-
plicitly analyzed as examples; a declining block rate
and a time of day rate.
1. INTRODUCTION
The need for physically based rodels for electric
demand is becoming crucial as the utility capacity
planning, load forecasting, and rate setting probles
become ever more complex. Physically based models for
industrial demand can provide some answers to questions
concerning changes in production schedule, effects of
new technology, e.g. solar power, effects of new rates,
e.g. time of day pricing, load management and the cost
of outages (value of reliability). An overall fra.e-
work for physically based load models was discussed
in [1 and [2] in general terms. This paper summarizes
some of the results of a study of seven industrial cus-
tomers of New England Electric System [33. See Table
1 for a brief description of the seven companies. The
modeling of each individual industrial customer con-
s.ists of two general steps. Step 1 is to develop a
physically based load model. This was described in
F43. This paper addresses Step 2 which uses the re-
sults from Step 1 and makes various types of economic
analyses.
One specific issue analyzed in this paper is the
effect c electric rates on industrial customers. A
given irdustrial customer might respond to a rate
change in various ways such as:
. No change in electric power usage
· Reschedule plant operation to change electric
power use patterns keeping total plant pro-
duction constant
. Change total plant production (in extreme
case, close plant)
. Install new equipment.
To be presented at the IEEE Power
Engineering Society, 1979 Summer
Meeting, Vancouver, B.C. July, 1979
F.C. Schweppe
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Electric Power Systems Engineering Laboratory
. Cambridge, Massachusetts
The analysis done in this paper assumes the rate change
is not enough to effect the total production level of
-the industrial customer. Issues associated with a cus-
tomer installing new production equipment in response
.to rate changes are not considered. The key issues con-
sidered are whether an industrial customer will resched-
ule operation and if so, how?
The physical/economic analysis described in this
paper does not yield direct predictions of the changes
in load due to a change in one of the exogenous vari-
able, e.g. electric rate, labor cost, etc. Rather, the
method provides a way to analyze an industrial firm and
identify those possible alternatives that are clearly
uneconomical and those that are possibly economical.
This type of insight is helpful to regulatory agencies,
utility rate designers, and planners in the evaluation
of the possible effect on utility's load shape and peak
demand due to a change in an exogenous variable. The
i'deas can also be of direct value to the managers of
industrial processes as the ideas are developed from
their point of view.
2. REVIEW OF PHYSICAL LOAD MODEL
As described in the companion paper [4], physical
load models for individual industrial customers consist
of "stochastic elements" 'and "storage flow constraints".
These general models can be employed in various ways.
Only those aspects pertaining to the particular appli-
cations of this paper are reviewed here.
In [4] the stochastic modeling is done in contin-
uous time and then converted to discrete time. Here
only discrete time, n = ,2 .... is used where the time
increment is 15 minutes. Define as in [4]
Pj(n): power demand (15 minute average) at
time n of jth process (equipmient) of
customer
PT(n) = E Pj(n): total demand of customer
J
(1)
Pj(n) = Xj rj u(n) (2)
X installed kW capacity of jth process(equipment)
rj: percentage of kW capacity when process
(equipment) is on; 0 < rj < 1
u.(n): utilization factor; 0 < uj(n) < 1
The utilization factor is a stochastic (ra.ndom) rocess
which in [4] is modeled as a 2 state .%arkov process.
One key statistical parameter of this process is
a: fraction of tinme process j is on dJring
a particular work shift
E[uj(n)] aj
and the mean value of ecrnand is given by
E{PT(n)} = F.(n)} = X r. .j (:
j j 
68
Define
D maximum PT(n): Peak demand (15 minute average)
of customer for one month (assume occurs some-
time during-first shift)
AD.: Change in peak demand if customer reschedules
the operation of the jth process (equipment)
from 1st shift to either 2nd or 3rd shift.
Since PT(n) is a random process, LD; is a random vari-
able. However when the total plant demand is the sum
of many small equipment demands, analysis of the stat-
istical properties of ADj shows that a good approxi-
mation is (see [3,4]),
Dj : = Xj rj aj3 333 (4)
This is very important as it says the stochastic vari-
atio'n can be ignored and only mean values are needed to
determine the change in monthly peak demand due to re-
scheduling. The same conclusions also applies to
monthly electrical energy consumption.
The storage flow aspects of the physical model
view the overall industrial process of a particular
customer as a series of "material storages" connected
by "processing flovis" where the processing flows in-
volve the use of equipment which consumes electricity.
The constraints imposed by the size of the storages
and the maximum allowable process flows place restric-
tions on the types of rescheduling the customer can do
(if the total production is to tie held constant).
3. ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC RATE STRUCTURES
Two types of electric rate structures are used in
this analysis.
H rate: Reducing block type rate
X rate: Time of day type rate
The numerical values used in the analysis are "realis-
tic" but are to be viewed as only examples.
The monthly charge under H rate is:
MCH(c,D) = fd(D) + fe(,D) + fuel adj.
where
MCH(c,D) = monthly charge (S/month)
fd(D) = monthly demand charge ($/month)
fe(c,D) = monthly energy charge ($/month)
= total energy usage (KIH/month)
D = maximum of 15 minute average demand (ICA)
MCH(E,D) is a piecewise linear function which can he
expressed as:
MCH(EC ) = 510 + 3 D
0 0 L,,a,] no~ jaM~k
+ . ? , v 
t I,
l JICQ 2} °
(6)
j c +' fuel adi.
16 0 %1 0
MCH1(c =
aD
1.54 $/kW o ' Do < 200 hour
1.76- -. · .200 < Co/D O< 300
.00
3.14 . . 300 < Co/Do < 400
3.54.-'. 400 < Co/Do < 500
3.79' . 500 < c/D00
;MCH(c, D)
ae
The monthly charge under X rate is
MCX(c1,e2 ,D) = 100 + aD + 0.01517 l
+ 0.0027 2 + fuel adj.
where
(7)
MCX( 1,e2,D) = monthly charge ($/month)
cl = energy usage during peak hours (kWH/month)
c2 = energy usage during off-peak hours
(kWH/month)
= + 2
Peak hours are defined as from 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. of all
working days and the remaining hours are off peak. 
is a coefficient for demand charge and has values of
6.50 $/kW for summer and 4.08 $/kW for winter. Sun.er
months are defined as the four months from June to
September and the rest of the months are defined as
winter. Note that
MCX
- 'seasonal
aMCX = 0.01517 ($/kWH)
;MCX = 0 0027 ($/kWH)
Let be te difference between2
Let Sh be the difference between
charges under the two rates
Sxh ': MCIH(,D) - MCX( 1 ,c2 , D) '
the monthly
(9)
After substitution, Eq. 9 becomes
Sxh -- 41 ( -e.Ci; 1 F' ?, ' ;.'Ity (X c ) + 1 ( i · l
-. .0l57) a + (-j--C - O .00277j (-)
8 :¢1/2
( i )
where
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2.547 ¢/kWH 0 < Eo < 50,000
2.247 50,000 < o < 100,000
1.937 100,000 < o < 200 00
1.827 200 < /D0 < 300
1.367 300 < c/D o < 400
1.267 400 < C0/Do0 < 500
1.217 500 < co/D
Let ys, Yw, Ya represent y during sunisner, winter and
yearly average. Figure 1 shows Ya as a function of c/D
0
cAJz
9
"I
I
-. 1
200 300 400 500
60/ D (hours)
O
Figure 1 Comparison of
(assuming no change
600 700.
H and X Rates
in schedule)
with as a parameter. The curves for Ya and ys are
similar in shape but numerically quite different (see
[3]). Such curves provide a convenient summary of the
difference between the two rates. It is easy to deter-
mine whether a customer with a given D, 1, and 2 will
pay more or less under X or H rate. If the range of D,
el1, and c2 for all customers is available, such curves
provides a useful vehicle for comparing the effect of
switching from H to X rate (assuming the customers'
usage patterns do not change).
This section has shown, by example, that analysis
and comparison of different rates follows naturally
simply by expressing them as well defined mathematical
functions. The approach is bviously equally applic-
able to many other types of rates.
4. EFFECT OF ELECTRICAL AN;D LABOR COST 0,!
rPRODUCl iiN SCiiEDULES
Knowledge of the partial derivatives of the month-
ly charge such as
?!!CH eH
aD ' ,; , etc.
are useful to a manager who is trying to save money by
balancing possible savinos from rescheduling due to
reduction in electric cost ith the increase in labor
ccs t.
For s-;-! ,ci'y, co'jtr : cu ::r w ith e' r?]e
ations pres,.rt!y sachituled for first sift. ,in the
effect of rescheduling the jth process (equipment) to
2nd or 3rd shift can be analyzed as follows (assuming
total energy consumption is not changed).
ATMCj = Ll Cj +4- AOCj
The
. the
Define
(1l)
ATMCj: change in total costs due to rescheduling
MCj change n monthly charge for el
NMCj. 'change- in monthly charge for electricity
:AOMC: change in other operating costs
analysis considers only salary cost effects to keep
example simple. Thus
AOMCj = (ARj)(HWj)(NPj) (12)
NP.: number of persons needed to operate jth
process (equipment)
HWj: working hours/person/month
AR.: change in hour salary rate from first shift
to second or third shift.
However other costs such as extra lighting and heating
can also be included in a straightforward fashion to
AOMC.
Now for H rate
Do +AD
MCj JD¢,
1 aCH(c do
a D 
where D is the original peak demand and Do+CDj
new peak demand. If the change is not large, a
able approximation is
AMC = Dj ;MCH(c,D)
Combining (4), (11), (12) and (14) yields
MCH(ED)
ATMCj - X j j aD
+ (ARj) (HWj) (NPj)
Define
X. r. a.
Aj = NP (kW/person)3
e AR. x HW.
Ae =3 jj aMCH
aD
(13)
is the
reason-
(14)
(15)
(16)
(kW/person)
= Additional labor cost/Derson (S/person)
Saving per kW reduction in demand ($/kW)
A. is the "break-even kW of electrical
per person". Then it follows th*,-
There is a monthly saving only if
Aj > Aej3
denand
(17)
The analysis, leading to (17) was done for H rate.
For X rate the only change is that 2,,MC.H/3D is repl-ace
by
where NHI is the number of hours involved per month
that change from peak hour operation to off-peak tour
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"operation and
EMCX Mcxj NHI
is the dollar savings per month derived from energy
rate differential due to rescheduling of a 1 kt! con-
stant expected power demand from the first shift to
the second or third shift.
Condition (17) provides a tool a manager of a
firm can use to decide whether or not to reschedule
any operations. One possibleprocedure the manager
might use is as follows:
Step 1 - Find process (equipment) j such that
A > A
Step 2 - For processes (equipment) j which pass
Step 1, find those whose rescheduling
will not violate any flow-storage
constraints
Step 3 - Do detailed cost analysis on those
processes (equipments) j which pass
Step 2
Our experience with the seven firms studied and the
numerical values used showed that only a few processes
j survived Steps 1 and 2.
Table 2 shows some of the numerical values for
the larger Aj for the seven firms of Table 1. Of
course many processes have smaller values (a secre-
tari'es' Aj is uch less than unity). Table 3 shows
the parameters that are used and the resulting break-
even A under both H and X. Figure 2 shows graphs of
how the break-even A for X rate vary as functions of
season, type of rescheduling and wage differential.
All these numbers are given here only as examples to
illustrate the type of results to be expected. No
attempt should be made to draw any explicit, general
conclusions from them.
"two hour peak period". Follrwing the argu c-et.s that
lead to the use of Eq. 4 for a single industrial cus-
tomer, the utility should usually try to influ !ce earch
individual industrial custo;.,er to reschedule 'r.eir o-
eration to reduce the total I-W11 they consumre cring
this· two hour period rather than to reduce th-ir peak
demand. (15 minute average) during this period unless
one customer completely dominates the total de and.
The installation of special "load control" syste;s by
the customers in order to reduce their 15 minute. peak
demands is often not effective load management from the
utility's point of viewv. It reduces the individual
customer's demand charge but may have very little
effect relative to reducing the peak demand the utility
must meet.
6. RATE DESIGN
Suppose a utility wants to design a time of day
rate for industrial customers which will reduce the
utility's peak demand. Assume the Aj (kW/person) and
flow storage constraint models are available for all
industrial customers. Then rate design could concept-
ually proceed by trying to find a time of day rate
with breakeven A that are "substantially" less than a
"reasonable percentage" of the Ai which are not effect-
ed by flow storage constraints. Graphs such as Figure
2 can give a rate designer a feel for the possible
effect of hypothesized rates.
If all the Aj are less than the A, it is clear
no production scheduling changes ill e made. 'ow-
ever the analysis discussed in this paper provides no
mechanism for predicting how large Aj-Ae has to be to
provide enough financial incentive or a manager of an
industrial firm to "go to the trouble' of reschedulin .
Conceptually such a mechanism could be develoced and
added to the physical load model, , A A concepts but
it is not discussed further here.
Often it is desired to constrain new rate designs
so that the total utility revenues are not changed.
The ideas of Section 3 can be used to handle this con-
straint.
X
Figure' 2 Behavior of X Rate Break-even
kW/Person Ae
3
5. CUSTO'MER PEAK DINND VS. UTILITY PEAK DEMAND
llen considerq!i leoad naa .-',-"- t issus it s
3 j i ...! . ' ' r , C . S not nec-
ecss rilt.' t~.,::;cr. . flP ~'' !'·'.l:'"; ', [' h;" a . ';
meetr. A'ssur.:e tile uti'li y's Loeal dc:ard' (residoential,
cormercial and industrial) is such that there is a
7. SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRODUCTION RESCHEDULING
Suppose X kW of demand can be economically re-
scheduled from first to third shift. Let NPC be the
number of people that are rescheduled from the first
to the third shift. Let Ae min be the smallest break-
even Ad that can be found Jfor all the customers.
Then
NPC < X
Ae min
3
If X = 100 MW, Ae min 50 k/person, the:
NPC < 2000 people. JThus the number of people effec-
ted will usually be relatively small if reschedulii
is done ec:onc, ica1iv bc usa Onl v workrs wito hriz h
power usage (i.e. Iarse kW/person) are resche dl2;d.
8. NET DEMAND CHANGE FROM PRODUCTIO! RE/C"'S"LTI
Assure the inru strial cuave r-^sc"vJ!e'
NPC people fronr; first to third i,. Ths 
duce industrial der and during the first shift but
many of these people will o hre and cause an in-
crease in residctial derrTr;i. Ti em`,ecS is rot. -,
ii- i>...-ri, r- t; l i -f e r
edict and economics are iored, it is po le 
sizeable percentage of tiie reduction in the industial
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ia
"Name" of C
Small Plast
Brush
Abrasive
·Soap
Foundry
Printing
Small Custc
Monthly Peak
Doemand k)
tics 850
3400
4300
.- 3500
1600
810
omer Product 1500
Table 1 Brief Description
Furnace for melting steel
Machine Shop
Printing Press
Waste Baling
Plastics Extrusion Molding
Tower (synthetic soap process)
Monthly Energy
Usage (k PxlO__
410
'1500
1800
- 1250
'1000 .
320
350
of the Seven Industrial
Aj(kW/person)
Product
Extrusion plastic olding
Extrusion plastic molding
Abrasive
Powder aad bar soap
Sluice gate and industrial rolls
Telephone directories.
Pocket and kitchen knives
Companies
Present
Schedule of Operation
1700 3rd shift
2 to 20 1st shift or multiple shift
20
60 _
7 to 150 Three shifts/day, five days/!
week intermittently
200
Table 2 Examples of A.3
AR
$/hr-person
lst-2nd lst-3rd
shift shift
0.75 1.00
0.50 0.50
0.45 0.60
0.15 0.25
0.15 0.25
0.3 0.38
0.5 0.5
Table 3
A (kW/person)j
X Rate
lst-2nd lst-2nd lst-3rd lst-3rd
winter sunmer winter summer
27 18 28 20
18 12 14 10
16 11 17 12
6 4 7 5
6 4 7 5
11 8 11 8
18 12 14 10
Break-even k,4person A for X and H Rates
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Company
-Foundry
Small Cus-
tomer
Products
Printing
Small
Plastics
Brush
Soap
Abrasive
H Rate
1st to 3rd
46
50
34
12
12
21
25
_ _ _
MC /k
3.79
1.75
3.14
3.54
3.54
3.14
3.54
_ ., P. .
sector demand could be off set by increases in the
residential sector.
9. ELECTRIC POWER "SUPPLY CURVES" OF A MANUFACTURING
FIRM
In the field of microeconomics, the supply curve
is used to express the quantity of certain products
available for sale as a function of the price ($/quan-
tity). The supply curves to be discussed here express
the quantity (kW) of electric power demand a particular
industrial customer might be willing to "sell back" to'
the utility at a given "price". ($/kW). The utility
would like its customers to reduce their usage of power
during the peak demand hours; for this, the utility is
willing to pay the manufacturing firm a "price". "Sell-
Ing back" refers to the fact that the customer will re-
duce its electric power usage by a certain amount of kW
during certain hours of the day and time of year.
Define
CP: cost to the customer of rescheduling jth
equipment ($/kW)
Then assuming storage flow constraints are not violated,
AR. HW.
CP= A $/kWj AJ
where as before, AR- in the salary differential and
HWj' is the number of hours effected. Then the "supply
curve" of a particular customer is defined as a plot of
CPj v. kW when the CPj are ordered in terms of in-
creasing $/kW costs.
As an example, consider a utility with flat daily
summer peaks which occur during the first shift and
sharp daily winter peaks around 7:00 a.m. The utility's
daily peak can be reduced in the summer if an indust-
rial customer reschedules from first shift to third
shift and in the winter if the customer delays its
second shifts from, say, 4:00 pm to midnight to 9:00 pm
to 5:00 am. Figure 3 shows supply curves for "Printing
Company". The supply curve for winter is lower because
the number of hours involved is 5 hours per day per
person as-compared to 8 hour/day/person for summer and
because the wage differential is lower between second
and third shift.
i 3 16-
24--
S
4-g:
'~I,
B I
-- - I wiatr , 1
tda ;d I - i
Qantity of eend Avtllablo (at)
Fig. 3 Electricity Supply Curve
Figure 3 is only an exarplhe for one customer and
the nu -.eric:: ai vaues i '~ry iely beot.eeni c:ustom-
ers. However the "nonlirnear, snarpiy rising" nature
of the curve is to be expected for most custo;mers. A
utility can often buy a few kW cheaply but the costs
rise rapidly when a lot of kW is to be bought.
10. VALUE OF RELIABILITY
There is an ever growi.ng desire to associate num-
erical values to the worth of having a reliable power
system.- One approach is to evaluate the cost of power
curtailments caused by a capacity shortage (generation
and/or transmission).' It is reasonable to expect that
industrial customers will be effected first. and asked
-(forced)' to reduce their use of electricity during cap-
acity shortage periods. Supply curves such as in Fig-
-ure 3 can be used as aids to rate design but can be in-
terpreted just as easily in terms of the cost to the
customer of partial curtailments.
The nonlinear nature of electric supply curves such
as Figure 3 emphasizes the need for extreme care when
analyzing the cost of curtailments. For example, assume
that the utility has to reduce its demand for 3 hours in
the afternoon by curtailing the industrial sector demand
by 10%. If 10% of the customers were custoff entirely,
the costs could be very large. If each customer was
curtailed by 10%, the costs would be much less. The
least cost would result if the utility had supply cur-
ves such as Figure 3 for each customer and choose a
curtailment logic that minimized the costs.
11. DATA REQUIREMENTS
The rate design, supply curve, cost of curtailment
etc. studies just discussed proceed in a straightfor-
ward fashion provided all the Aj, flow storage models,
etc. are available for all of the utility's industrial
customers. In practice this requires a massive data
collection and manipulation effort.
One conceptual way to reduce the data requirements
is to try to use "sampling theory" and consider only a
few "representative" customers. Unfortunately it ap-
pears that this approach will not be very effective
for the industrial sector. Customers with identical
SIC codes may respond completely differently to rate
changes, etc. because differences in plant layout,
labor availability, etc. can result in different A and
flow storage constraints. At the present time the
authors of this paper feel that data from a high per-
centage (over 50%) of a utility's industrial customers
will be needed before really reliable analysis can be
made for many of the issues of real concern.
This does not mean however, that it is always nec-
essary to obtain complete equipment inventories and
flow storage models for each customer. For many stud-
ies, it is only necessary to consider the equipment/
processes with the largest Aj or those with Aj above
some level. Such "partial inventories" can then be
combined with measured 15 minute demand patterns to
address many of the issues of concern. The research
effort as summarized in [3,4] and in this paper obtain-
ed complete equipment inventories, developed complete
stochastic models, and then cc-oare tese cceis :it:;
observed plant behavior. The success of this provides
some real justification for the much easier procedure
of using limited inventories of only the large Ai
equipment/processes combined with recorded demand
patterns.
Many utilities have "industrial representatives"
who maintain close contact with individual industrial
customers. The authors of this paper rfel :;'iat te
.bc t + .:ay to ' ...
d:,3nd anavsi s is tc :'.oiF t'nOu *''r Lile.' ein . : I.;-;~i
rer. ..... ?liv 'TThehy can ti .; i ...- '' : ,
h,:i A si't .... r' mtteria! w!,:h V - e .,. . -, .,s
work with the customers themselves to obt'in tle reeded
information. If it is necessary to only mail
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questionnaires to the industrial customers, the
questionnaire imust be very carefully designed to get
the type of information that is really needed. In
either case, the authors feel the needed data can be
obtained with a reasonable (albeit non trivial).amount
of effort.
12. bISCUSSION
One main' point of this paper-is the obvious one
that in order to analyze how the industrial demand' for
electricity will respond (to rates, outages, etc.-); it
is necessary to consider thecustonmer's point of view.
Thus it is necessary to learn which of the processes
(equipments) within the customer's plant:
. could be rescheduled considering constraints
on plant flows and storage
. are cost effective to rescheduling
Physical flow storage models provide information on
constraints. Another main point of this paper is the
derivation of two key quantities for economic/cost
analysis. They are:
A. - number of kW used by process j
j number of persons needed to run processes
which is obtained from the physical model and
Ae: breakeven kW/personJ.
Ae. 'dollar cost per person due to reschedulingj dollar saving per kW due to rescheduling
which is obtained from the rate structure and salary
(and other) costs. A final main point is that analy-
sis is greatly expedited by representing the rates as
well defined mathematical functions. Given the needed
Aj and flow storage constraints for all the industrial
customer, answers to many questions related to rate
design, load management, and cost of curtailments can
be obtained as illustrated by the application dis-
cussions of this paper.
As indicated previously a sizeable but not un-
reasonable effort will be required to obtain the
needed data. It is reasonable therefore to ask, "Is
there ar easier way to try to get the same result"?
In the e.thors' opinion the answer is no. The authors
considered the use of a variety of quantities such as
SIC code, kW/person for the total plant, value added/
kWH for plant, peak demand to monthly energy ratio,
ratio of electric costs to total operation costs, etc.
However the authors could not see how to relate such
quantities to the key issue of how a plant nianager
might respond, Without such a tie, the authors feel
that such data cannot be used to address questions of
the type considered in this paper.
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APPENDIX: ENERGY MARKET PLACE
The main text of this paper presented ideas and
results of a technical nature. The following comments
have been separated off as an appendix because they
express personal points of view.
The work done on industrial load modeling as re-
ported in [3] and [4] and the main text of this paper
has lead the authors to believe that present day rate
structures such as the H rate and time of day X rate
are very artifical and restrictive. They do not allow
billing that really approximates the true cost of ser-
vice. They do not allow the uility to obtain the
type of load management that exploits the savings in
fuel and capital costs that are really possible. They
do not give the customer enough motivation and or free-
dom to adapt his. electric usage patterns to the
utility's true costs and needs.
Reference [5] predicted that in the future, elec-
tric energy would be bought and sold in an open "energy
market place" with "spot price rates" which vary con-
tinuously depending on demand, plant usage, etc. Such
an energy market place appears to answer the problems
associated with long term contracts like the H anid X
rate. It would be of benefit to both the utility and
the customer. An energy market place could eventually
include residential, commercial and industrial custo-
mers but it would probably start being implemented in
the industrial sector.
The forecast in Ref. [5] of the growth of the
energy market place in this country was made because
the energy market place seemed (to the authors) to be
the only rational way to go. The study of the seven
industrial customers of the New England Electric Sys-
tem as discussed here provided much of the motivation
for that belief.
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3.5 HOMEOSTATIC CONTROL INITIAL HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT
3.5.1 Introduction
Implementation of Homeostatic Control will require moderately
sophisticated hardware at the customer's site, for price responsive
consumption and FAPER control. In order to obtain a preliminary
understanding of the level of complexity, difficulty of design and
construction, and cost of this equipment, two of the most important
pieces were constructed at the M.I.T. Electric Power Systems Engineering
Laboratory. The first of these is a Frequency Adaptive Power/Energy
Rescheduler (FAPER); The second is an Energy Rescheduling and Allocation
Computer (ERAC). A brief description of each of these devices follows.
3.5.2 ERAC
The ERAC would be used to control energy allocation at a customer's
site. Its objective would be to minimize total energy cost, while
satisfying the needs for electrical energy of the customer's production
processes. It would operate by turning processes on or off according to
process levels, current and projected price of electricity and the needs
of the customer's processes. The major optimization strategy employed by
the ERAC would be to operated processes relatively more intensively at
times of low electricity cost, and relatively less intensively at times
of high electricity cost. The type of process computer currently in use
to control HVAC systems could, if properly programmed, perform this
function. However, at present such systems are relatively large and
expensive, and are of use primarily for only large energy consumers. In
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order to be useful for smaller customers, a relatively inexpensive,
easily installed control system will be required. The objective in the
development of the ERAC was to build a small computer which would be
amenable to plug-in installation.
A second element in the ERAC project was the development of a
version of a building data link (BDL). This would be important part of
any energy control system in which plug-in installation is to be
required, as it would provide the communications link between the ERAC
and the production processes which it controls. The BDL need be designed
for economical installation and effective operation. In particular, it
must be flexible enough to handle a given number of devices in both input
and output modes, and must provide for rapid access to each of those
devices.
The ERAC which was built for this project is fairly simple in form,
but is capable of sophisticated software control functions. It is a
small, general purpose computer, with specialized input and output
ports. The processor used is an INTEL 8085 microprocessor. This is an
eight bit wide processor unit with a generalized instruction set and a
four level interrupt structure. Instructions for the processor, which
handles all input and output operations, as well as process control, are
stored in read-only-memory. This allows a wide variety of control
strategies to be used, with no changes in hardware. There is, in
addition, limited random access read/write memory used for scratchpad
operations.
The ERAC has three separate comunications channels. One channel is
for the Building Data Link (BDL). This is a bi-directional channel, over
which ERAC can talk to or listen to any of several peripheral devices
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which would drive actuators or would return process control information.
A second communications link built into this ERAC is a serial link
adapted to communicate with a teletype. This channel is used to accept
price information, to simulate the signal which would, under Homeostatic
Control, come from the power company. The third communications link is
to the front panel of the device, which contains a ninteen key keypad and
a sixteen digit LED display. These two elements, in combination, are
used to establish communications with the user. The keypad is used to
set price dependent setpoints and to issue commands to units to turn off
or on. The display is used to show current price and usage, and to
assist in data input.
A block diagram of th ERAC is shown in Figure 3.1, and a photograph
of the finished device is shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. It should be
pointed out that this is a development device, and is consequently much
larger than would be a commercial product.
In operation, the keyboard/display is used to give the instrument
instructions regarding price dependent process setpoints. Price
information is accepted by the ERAC through the serial input port. At
each interval of time, established by an internal clock, the ERAC checks
all process levels through the BDL and compares these levels with
setpoint levels which correspond with the currently valid price. "On"
and "off" instructions are issued through the BDL.
3.5.3 FAPER
The FAPER is a device which implements a frequency dependent process
control law. The device built is a stand-alone FAPER, with no external
control or communications requirements. The device makes a very precise
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Figure 3.1 :ERAC
78
PROCESSOR
BUILDING
DATA
LINK
Figure 3.2
Figure 3.3
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frequency measurement, plus a process level measurement. Internal logic
then implements the FAPER control law.
The FAPER built for this project uses a general purpose single chip
computer (INTEL 8748), with instructions programmed into an internal
read-only-memory. Process setpoints are established by thumbwheel
switches on the front panel. The process level is accepted as a voltage
level, and digitized into a form useable by the computer using an
analog-to-digital converter. The FAPER gives a single command output for
"on" or "off."
A block diagram of the FAPER is shown in Figure 3.4, and a picture
of the completed device is shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6.
6.4 STATUS
At this time, the ERAC and FAPER described above have been
constructed. At the time of the conference the software (the
instructions residing in memory) for each device was being de-bugged, a
time requirement well understood by participants fimiliar with
development of microprocessors.
80
Figure 3.4: FAPER
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3.6 DISCUSSION
3.6.1 Introduction
In the discussion which followed the presentation on Customer Response
Systems and consumer response to the Homeostatic Control concept, three
major issues were addressed:
o At what audience (consumer class) is the Homeostatic Control
concept being aimed?
o What kind of response can you expect from the consumer
utilizing a Homeostatic Control system?
o What will convince the consumer (public) of the value of the
Homeostatic Control concept?
3.6.2 The Audience
The consumer class generally first expected to implement the Homeostatic
Control concept is the industrial sector and some large commercial
customers. This group is presently the only major sector conserving
energy in the energy economy. The question asked was how can one expect
industrial customers to increase their conservation costs by implementing
the Homeostatic Control system when they are already conserving the
greatest amount of energy? It is anticipated that the information gained
from the usage of MIC1 and similar interfaces will justify the costs
incurred by the industry. Indeed, the information on variable rates sent
to the industry will generate the required energy cost as their demand
increases when the price is low and decreases when the price is high.
1The Marketing Interface to Customer (MIC) is the communications
link which transfers information between the utility and the customer.
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A concern brought up was that Homeostatic Control might be perceived
as an "engineer's toy." Indeed, it was pointed out it was an "economist
toy" if anything and represented only a small change in the behavior
patterns currently being shown by industry, the major change/advantage
being that the industry and the utility were working toward the same
objective. While the industrial and large commercial users are
anticipated to be the first to implement this system, in the future
smaller commercial and residential customers could implement the
Homeostatic Control concept were it to be cost effective.
Since the industrial and large commercial sectors are the most
likely first adopters of Homeostatic Control systems, the discussion
centered around the issues and constraints relevant to their needs.
Participants agreed that specific industries would be willing to
reschedule processes, and reschedule people, in response to the spot
rates. To respond would require that the given industry be able to gain
(that it be cost effective). Other industries, especially those with
lower energy to labor and/or capital ratios might not find the concept
economically attractive and therefore might not adopt. Additional
experiments and analyses are required to define the break points for
individual industries.
Constraints that an industry need take into consideration are:
o Since energy costs may only be in the range of 4-6% of the
total costs born by an industry, what is the industry's
incentive to use a system that would reduce energy consumption
thereby reducing energy costs when they are such a small part
of the overall cost structure?
o Production rescheduling would be difficult given that (1)
schedules are prepared in advance, (2) schedules may be set at
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a central corporate location, not at the plant site, (3)
certain processes cannot be economically rescheduled, and (4)
to reschedule people who may not be willing to work other than
those hours already scheduled.
Such a calculation was done for the New England Electric System (NEES)
wherein customer response to pricing dislocations were tabulated. The
following takes one through the calculation and typical response of the
customer who was a small industry in the western part of the State of
Massachusetts.
3.6.3 Customer Response: Industrial
· Consider jth; process of an Industrial Customer
Xj: average power of process j (KW)
Nj: number of operators needed for process j
R(t): operator salary at time t ($/person hour)
Define
p(t): spot price buy at time t ($/KWH)
Assume jth process can be rescheduled from t to t2
Benefit .Cost Ratio Savings from Rescheduling ($/hour)
Cost of Rescheduling ($/hour)
xi[P(tl) - P(t2)]
NjLR(t2 ) - R(tl]
Assuming
P(t1) > P(t2)
R(tl) < R(t2)
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(KW/person)
P
o = nominal price
Ro nominal salary
R P(t 1- (t 2)
= () R(t2 ) - R(tl)o 0 ) Then
(person/KW)
% price change
% salary change
P
Benefit Cost Ratio A ( )
0
% price change
% salary change
Po = .05 ($/KWH)
Ro = 5 ($/person hour)
= 10 2 (person/KW)
P0
R0
Then some representive values are:
Benefit Cost Ratio
Electric Furnace 17 
Soap Tower
Plastic Extraction Molding .1 to 1.5 S
Machine Shop .02 5 to .2 S
Secretary .0025
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Define
A. -Jx
J Nj
s
Assume
In summary, it was felt that the economic incentive for the utilities and
some large commercial and industrial customers is likely already here.
On the other hand, there needs to be more analysis and economic
incentives for the small commercial and residential customer to
incorporate Homeostatic Control into its energy supply/demand network.
The question remains, however, as to the measurement of the benefits and
costs associated with the rescheduling implied in the spot pricing
scheme. While no specific calculations were possible in the preparatory
work for the conference, the structure for the analysis and a set of
generalized numbers were presented in the foregoing figures. It would be
especially important to overcome the obstacle of mechanical errors
emanating from the automatic devices provided on each customer's site.
Such errors could ultimately doom the Homeostatic Control concept much
the same as the problematic solar heating and hot water systems
demonstrations did for the solar industry. The values are derived from
earlier work in the northeast by Schweppe and Manichaikul (ref) and are
broadly indicative of both the style of analysis required and the order
of magnitude results one could expect.
3.6.4 What Response Can Be Expected From the Customer?
The customer's response is expected to be based on the individual
firm's (individual's) economic interest and the magnitude of that
interest. As was discussed at the end of the last section this economic
interest will vary with energy usage, with energy intensity and with
energy price. The discussion divide responses into those that could be
expected from an industrial customer from the residential. Siting
evidence from the San Diego Gas & Electric work with time variable rates
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for large industrial customers, it appeared that there was considerable
ability on the part of specific consumers to alter their load and to
reschedule given the appropriate signals from the utility. Discussion
concerning smaller and residential consumers was less enthusiastic
concerning their ability or desire to respond to such signals. An
example given for residential water consumption had shown that at most
four or five specific values for water could be used before the customer
would be faced with information over load. A second point brought out in
the residential discussion was the apparent value of repetition or habit
in the response to specific rate structures, thereby arguing in favor of
some type of regular time of day rates--the example given that of the
telephone company.
Four specific steps were suggested for analyzing the potential
response on the part of large consumers:
1) In depth research on customer processes and potential response
areas.
2) Experimentation to determine the likely impact of these rates.
3) Development of support of regulatory community.
4) Educational programs for a broad range of consumers.
The final point from the discussion was one of caution concerning
the reduction in cost associated with the control devices themselves.
While it was agreed that the price of chips was likely to continue to
fall, in all likelihood the chip will account for only a small portion of
the overall cost of the control device.
e8
3.6.5 SUMMARY
The aforementioned issues support the hypothesis that industrial and
large commercial users will be the most likely first adopters of the
Homeostatic Control system. As the system is more widely used, some
residential customers are likely to install the system, but not to the
same proportions as the industrial and commercial community.
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CHAPTER 4: HOMEOSTATIC CONTROL AND UTILITY REGULATION
4.1 Introduction
The principal issues associated with the acceptance or
implementation of Homeostatic Control by Public Utility regulatory bodies
may be addressed in the following two areas.
Issues associated with the concept of spot pricing. Is spot pricing a
concept that can be adapted into the legal requirements of public
regulation?
. Given the state and Federal regulatory environment, can/will
it adapt to a formula-based regulatory environment as opposed
to a schedule system for utility rates?
· Given the Federal role in utility regulation and in particular
PURPA, will Homeostatic Control systems add to the complexity
or simplify the regulatory system?
Issues associated with the methods by which spot prices will be
determined. Will spot prices utilize current embedded/average costing
methodologies or will marginal costing be adopted by individual Public
Utility Commissions?
· Marginal costing implies the existence of excess profits for
the utilities. In what manner will such profits be redistributed
to consumers?
· What impact will congenerators and small generators have upon both
the price of electric power to other customers and what will be
the price for electric power either brought by the congenerator
or small generator or bought back from the congenerator and
small generator by the utility?
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The sections which follow will discuss Regulatory Practices and
Homeostatic Control in section 4.2; Meeting Utility Revenue Requirements
in section 4.3 and a discussion of Homeostatic Control and the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act in section 4.4.
Homeostatic Control, like any other innovative utility pricing or
control system, presents regulatory agencies with a number of issues to
resolve. Some of these issues are conceptual; e.g., Is the concept of
spot pricing in accordance with the legal requirements of public
regulation? Others are logistical; e.g., By what method are spot prices
to be determined? The situation is complicated somewhat by the recent
passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),
which in itself is creating ripples throughout the country because of the
uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of a number of its key
provisions.
This paper will investigate a number, but by no means all, of the
ramifications of Homeostatic Control on the regulatory agencies and the
effect of the regulatory environment on its implementation. Topics to be
covered include a discussion of Homeostatic Control and traditional
regulatory practice, looking at both conceptual and logistical issues; a
more in-depth look at the problem of meeting utility revenue requirements
under Homeostatic Control; and the relationship of PURPA and Homeostatic
Control.
4.2 Regulatory Practice and Homeostatic Control
From the regulator's point of view, there are a number of unique
features of Homeostatic Control that need to be examined to determine if
they are in consonance with traditional regulatory practice and law. A
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few possible problem areas are discussed below as examples to be
considered.
4.2.1 Spot Pricing
Perhaps the major innovation of Homeostatic Control is spot pricing,
the determination of rates at the time of purchase, rather than the use
of a prespecified, scheduled rate structure. Although there have been
some experiments with this concept (e.g., San Diego), the closest most
states have come to it is the monthly or quarterly fluctuation of the
fuel adjustment charge in response to changing fuel prices, generation
mix, and customer consumption. The concept of dynamic rates, therefore,
first must be reconciled with the legal requirement of most states to
have approved tariffs on file with the regulatory agencies.
Traditionally, tariffs have included prespecified rate schedules as well
as terms and conditions of service; however, unless a state's law
requires prespecified schedules, the method of determining and applying
rates can also constitute a tariff. For example, many states use
electricity or gas adjustment clause tariffs that specify the method of
calculating a variable adjustment charge. Conditions, such as upper
limits of such charges, can also be included in the published tariffs to
provide an automatic control against excessive rates in any given time
period. Such tariffs, it seems, could also be used to implement spot
pricing unless, as mentioned, statutory language requires a stricter
definition.
The other innovative feature of spot pricing, besides its dynamism,
is its two-way nature. That is, spot prices are determined both for
customer purchases of electricity and for utility buy back of
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electricity. State regulatory agencies may or may not have jurisdiction
over the buy back rates paid, for example, to cogenerators selling
electricity to utilities. (See further discussion below in the section
on PURPA.) If there is state jurisdiction these buy back rates might be
subject to the usual tariff requirements or they might be covered by
regulated contracts between the utility and the congenerator. Whichever
method is used, the parties will have to be able to specify the
methodology used in calculating the rate in order to receive approval
from the regulatory agency. As above, unless there is a strict statutory
requirement for prespecified rates, this should pose no undue conceptual
problem to the regulatory agency. (As an example, many regulatory
agencies currently approve contracts for interruptible purchases of
natural gas, where the price varies according to the current market price
of fuel oil.)
Spot pricing may, however, pose a logistical problem. Rates or
charges based on a methodology require periodic regulatory review of the
calculations made using that methodology. The reviews will have to be
done in a timely fashion in order to be meaningful, and this will require
a more or less continuous staff commitment. Regulatory agencies may be
reluctant, because of budget constraints or other factors, to allocate
staff and other resources to these periodic reviews. Unless the agency
is willing to make this commitment, this logistical problem becomes a
conceptual one as well; for the regulatory agency will almost certainly
eschew a dynamic rate system over which it is unable to exercise its
statutory obligation of review for fairness, accuracy, etc.
Another logistical problem with spot pricing is the format of the
electric bills. It will be necessary to design a bill format that
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clearly presents consumption and price information for the entire billing
period. Not only is this a legal requirement in most jurisdictions, but
it is also a useful tool for customers who may be considering load
management or energy conservation investments. If spot prices vary every
five minutes, as is now envisioned, a graphical display of consumption
and price might be a possible format. Whatever method is used, it will
have to be easy to read so that, as mentioned below, the customer has an
opportunity to fully understand and, if necessary, dispute the bill.
Another logistical concern is the need for an education program for
those customer classes that will be affected by Homeostatic Control.
Programs similar to those being offered by many utilities to explain
time-of-use rates will be required. Customer understanding is clearly
necessary if Homeostatic Control is to work and if it is not to receive
immediate adverse reactions from the utility's customers.
In summary, a regulatory agency, in reviewing the concept of spot
pricing, will probably find that such a concept can be legal and proper.
However, unless the agency is willing and able to monitor and calculation
and collection of revenues under spot pricing, to ensure a clearly
understandable bill format, and to require a customer education program,
it may not adopt the concept. Further development of Homeostatic
Control, therefore, should include mechanisms for reducing the time and
effort required of regulatory agencies in monitoring the application of
spot pricing, in designing appropriate bill formats, and in designing
customer education programs.
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4.2.2 Marketing Interface to Customer
Another feature of Homeostatic Control, the market interface to
customer (MIC) raises other issues of concepts and logistics. One of the
uses of MIC can be automatic meter reading. Some jurisdiction may
require on-site meter reading by utility personnel. If this is a
statutory requirement, legislation would be required if the MIC were to
be used for this purpose. If this is a regulatory requirement, new rules
or regulations would have to be promulgated.
It is almost a certainty that the use of the MIC for automatic meter
reading will raise the issue of invasion of privacy. With the MIC, the
utility can monitor energy use by a customer on a more or less continuous
basis. The seriousness of this as a privacy issue remains to be seen.
The telephone company, for example, already exercises a similar
capability, and the issue is usually not raised with that utility.
However, since this will be a new application, the subject is likely to
arise in any legislative debate or regulatory hearing on the subject.
If automatic meter reading as a concept is approved, at least one
logistical problem remains. Even assuming the accurate reading of
meters, there will be a need for a complaint mechanism so that customers
can question meter readings that are perceived as incorrect. Most
regulatory agencies currently have methods of resolving billing disputes,
but these may have to be adapted to the particular characteristics of the
Homeostatic Control system. As mentioned above, the bill format is an
important part of this process. However, another minimum requirement
will almost certainly be an on-site display of consumption that the
customer can read to monitor his own electricity use and thereby compare
his expectations with the bill received from the utility. Further
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development of the MIC should therefore include a device for on-site
display or storage of electricity use.
4.3 Meeting Utility Revenue Requirements Under Homeostatic Utility
Control
Summary
This section discusses some implications of Homeostatic Control on
the electric utility rate-setting process. In particular, it focuses on
the affect of Homeostatic Control on the ability of a utility to earn its
allowed level of revenues and compares this situation with that resulting
from the application of traditional time-of-use pricing. Mechanisms for
insuring the comparability of allowed and achieved revenues are
discussed. Special attention is paid the problems of the interplay of
marginal cost pricing and Homeostatic Ceontrol as this affects utility
revenues.
4.3.1 Allowed Revenues
An electric utility is permitted by a regulatory agency to collect
revenues that allow the company to recover its costs and earn a
reasonable return on investment. Revenues are generally set according to
the following formula: R = O.E. + V x r where,
R = annual allowed revenues
O.E. = annual operating expenses for a test year
V = rate base (i.e., net plant in service) in a test year
r = allowed rate of return
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Regulatory agencies vary in their definition of test year for rate-
setting purposes. In establishing test year operating expenses, some
agencies use a historic test year (e.g., the most recent 12-month
period); some use a projected, or future, test year; and others use a
combination (e.g., 6-months historic and 6-months future). Similarly, in
establishing the test year rate base, some agencies use a year-end
figure, and some use an average of the beginning and end of the test year.
The important feature of all methods, though, is that allowed
revenues are based on a pro forma expectation of the utility company's
costs. The rates that are devised to acquire the allowed revenues are
similarly based on a pro forma expectation of consumption by customer
class and within customer class.
4.3.2 Achieved Revenues
It can be seen from the above that, even without time-of-use rates,
spot-pricing, or other innovative pricing schemes, the utility's ability
to earn exactly its allowed revenues in a given year is unlikely.
Achieved revenues in the years following a rate case can exceed the
allowed revenues (if sales are higher and/or operating expenses are
higher than expected). Thus, it is very unusual for a utility's achieved
revenues to equal it's pro forma allowed revenues.
Given this uncertainty in normal circumstances, any rate system that
is instituted because of its expected ability to influence
price-sensitive demand lends additional uncertainty to the picture.
Time-of-use rates, for example, are designed to reduce consumption during
peak periods and redistribute that consumption to off-peak periods. To
the extent that rates are properly designed and if all on-peak energy use
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is turned into off-peak energy use, achieved revenues need not vary from
allowed revenues. However, if the reductions in peak energy usage are
not transformed in corresponding increases in off-peak usage, revenue
losses will occur. Similarly, if high on-peak rates are mistakenly
assigned to inelastic demand, and on-peak consumption therefore, does not
fall, excess revenues will be collected.
Thus, we find a generic problem with time-of-usage sensitive rates.
If elasticities of demand are incorrectly calculated and incorporated
into the rate structure at the time the rate structure is designed, the
utility's achieved revenues will vary from its allowed revenues. As
mentioned, this variation can either be positive or negative. Therefore,
periodic adjustments in rate schedules, especially during transitional
periods of rate innovation, will be necessary to insure that achieved
revenues more closely approximate allowed revenues. As data on
elasticity are gathered for the various customer classes, the process
will evolve, and it can be expected that an equilibrium will be
approached.
Spot-pricing under Homeostatic Control will, like traditional
time-of-use pricing, face this problem. If the spot prices are set with
no regard to likely demand elasticities, revenue overages or shortfalls
will result. The situation is complicated somewhat in that spot-prices,
especially during the transitional phases of its implementation, will be
likely to change, not only in magnitude, but in pattern. These changes
will make it difficult to predict elasticities and incorporate them into
the spot prices.
Looking at it another way, one can envision three phases in the
implementation of any time-of-use pricing, but especially in the
implementation of spot-pricing and the rest of Homeostatic Control:
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Phase I - Customers react to spot-pricing by changing energy
consumption habits and their use of their existing
stock of capital items (e.g., appliances and
machinery). ("Instantaneous and Short-Term
Elasticities")
Phase II - Customers react to spot-pricing by making changes in
their capital stocks (e.g., more efficient
appliances, load-controllable machinery).
("Long-Term Elasticity")
Phase III - Customers make minor changes in consumption patterns
depending on period to period changes in spot
prices. ("Long-Term Equilibrium")
The length of these phases cannot be known with certainty. Neither can
the magnitude of the relative changes in consumption of each phases be
predicted in advance.
Thus, utilities and regulatory bodies will be facing three dynamic
and interrelated processes:
(1) Operating expenses and rate base will be changing over the
years;
(2) The magnitude and pattern of spot prices will be changing over
the years; and
(3) Customers' consumption habits and their elasticities of demand
will be changing over the years.
Item #1 occurs now, even without time-of-use pricing or
spot-pricing, and it is taken into account with the filing of new rate
requests by the utility. In the 1950's, rate decreases were awarded as
costs fell and consumption per customer increased. In the 1970's, rate
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increases are awarded in the face of rising costs and decreased or
increased customer usage. A key feature of this process, however, has
been the relative stability of rate levels and rate structures.
Time-of-use pricing and spot-pricing would still allow periodic rate
cases to adjust company expenses and revenue requirements. However, one
might be concerned about the inter-rate case period in which, because of
the dynamics of pricing and consumption, achieved revenues might vary
substantially one way or the other from allowed revenues. Mechanisms
that can address this problem on a more or less continuous basis might be
required and could be designed.
For example, a running balance of overages or underages could be
maintained and applied as a periodic credit or debit to the current rate
structure. Thus, if a utility's revenues for the month of April were
much lower than projected, May's prices would be adjusted upwards to make
up the difference. A degree of tolerance could be built into the system
by, for example, having six-month rather than a one-month running
balance. In addition, the threshhold level that would detemine what
constituted an overage or underage could be set to avoid large
fluctuations from month to month. This kind of process is common to the
fuel adjustment clauses used throughout the country. In a number of
states, fuel costs are estimated in advance and the fuel adjustment per
kilowatt-hour is set in advance. Adjustments to the next month's or
quarter's fuel adjustment are then made depending on the actual fuel used
and its cost and the energy consumed by customers in the estimated period.
Objections to this running balance method might be expected,
depending on its design. For example, regulatory agencies probably would
not want the rate structure to track costs so closely that the company
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achieved revenues that guaranteed it a certain return.l1 (The fuel
adjustment clause if often designed to guarantee a one-for-one
pass-through of fuel costs.) If the whole rate structure were to
guarantee this same one-for-one return, there would be no incentive for
cost-control by the utility. (Indeed, this has been a complaint of the
fuel adjustment mechanism.) This concern may be alleviated by setting a
fairly high threshhold level of revenue underage because the running
balance was to be applied to rates, and then the balance was to be
applied to rates, and then the balance might not be applied in full. In
contrast, a fairly low threshhold level of revenue overage probably would
be set to ensure that the utility's earner return was not excessive.
This method would require more bookkeeping and auditing than is currently
done in most jurisdictions, but it appears to be a workable alternative.
Other schemes could be designed. For example, an escrow account
could be established that would be applied every six months or year in
the form of a rebate or surcharge on each customer's bill. This scheme
has the obvious public relations advantages if there is a rebate and the
obvious disadvantages if there is a surcharge. It also does not address
the problem of a severe cash flow problem for a utility in the period
between surcharges.
In summary, the type of scheme developed, and its sensitivity, could
be adapted to the magnitude of the revenue problem. Alternatively, no
new mechanism could be instituted, leaving the regulatory agency and the
1 Revenues are set to allow the utility an opportunity to cover expenses
and earn a reasonable return. They are not meant to guarantee the
company that return. The analogy is often given of a fishing license
which, while allowing you to catch up to the maximum number of fish
day, does not guarantee that you will do so.
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utility to adjust allowed revenues in the current fashion, a rate case
every few years. This latter course might be quite adequate if
time-of-use rates or spot-pricing were instituted gradually, so that the
revenue effect in any one year would be minimal.
4.3.3. Marginal Cost Pricing
The above discussion is complicated further if rates are set on a
marginal cost basis rather than on an embedded cost basis. The "excess
revenue" problem relating to marginal cost pricing has been discussed
many times in the literature. Simply put, a problem arises if customers
are charged the marginal price of generating capacity when the utility is
only entitled to receive the embedded cost of capacity in its revenues.
Recall that the rate-setting formula, above, allows a return on new plant
in service. Thus, unless a regulatory agency allows construction work in
progress in the rate base, the company is not permitted to earn a return
on future plant. If rates are based on marginal (i.e., future) costs of
capacity, and if new capacity is more expensive than existing capacity,
achieved revenues will exceed allowed revenues (unless demand is so price
elastic that consumption drops enough to compensate for the higher rates
per kilowatt-hour.)
This excess revenue problem is usually handled by a method known as
the "inverse elasticity method". If, under the traditional time-of-use
rate scheme, expected revenues will always exceed allowed revenues
because of increasing marginal costs, the inelastic blocks of consumption
(usually, the initial blocks) are discounted, providing the utility with
less revenue than otherwise. The rationale for this scheme is that, by
discounting these early inelastic consumption blocks, no increase in
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consumption will occur because of the discount. (If the discounts were
applied to elastic blocks, increased consumption in these blocks would
result and would defeat the purpose of the marginal cost pricing.) While
this method has been debated pro and con, it does offer a possibility of
matching allowed and achieved revenues under tradition marginal-cost
based time-of-use rates.
However, if spot-pricing is implemented with marginal cost pricing,
the inverse elasticity method cannot be used to solve the excess revenue
problem, at least not in the same way. The basis of spot-pricing is to
let the customer respond to the spot price in his or her own way. One
cannot say that the first unit of consumption occuring at, say, 5:00 PM,
is inelastic, for it might be occuring at that time because the user is
sensitive to price at that time. In short, there is no way to determine
a priori which uses of electricity are least elastic for a given
customer. In theory, one could say that the first few kilowatt-hours of
all those purchases at 5:00 PM might be inelastic and therefore should be
discounted; but this would have to be done at every other 5-minute
interval of the Homeostatic Control day as well.
Of course, approximations could be made. If it were determined
that, on average, demand in late evenings was inelastic, all spot-prices
from, say 10:00 PM to midnight might be discounted. Some, especially
price sensitive customers, could garner an extra benefit from this added
discount, but consumption for all customers might not change
appreciably. The danger of this technique with spot pricing would occur
if a miscalculation of the inelastic demand period were made, and a large
shift of consumption occurred to the discounted time period. This could
actually result in a revenue shortfall as opposed to the revenue overage,
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in effect "over-solving" the excess revenue problem. (Similar problems
exist with traditional time-of-use pricing. If the elastic, rather than
inelastic blocks, are mistakenly discounted, it will stimulate an
inappropriate shift in consumption.)
In summary, the use of marginal cost pricing in setting spot prices,
if these costs exceed test year embedded costs and unless consumption
were drastically reduced as a result, could result in excess revenues to
the utility, unless a mechanism similar to the inverse elasticity method
is applied.
4.4 Homeostatic Utility Control and the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978
A review of the provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA) and the characteristics of Homeostatic Control
indicate that the two are compatible. The tests that are to be applied
by state regulatory agencies as part of their consideration of the
ratemaking standards set forth in PURPA generally are applicable to
Homeostatic Control and should present no fundamental difficulties for
those agencies. The exception may concern interruptible rates, which are
envisioned by PURPA and may or may not be a part of Homeostatic Control
and quality of service pricing, which is a new concept not envisioned by
PURPA. The problems that will be encountered by the regulatory agencies
in evaluating Homeostatic Control for purposes of PURPA are equivalent to
the problems they will face in evaluating traditional time of use
pricing. The data collection requirements of PURPA may assist in
implementing Homeostatic Control, and Homeostatic Control, in turn, may
assist utilities in meeting these data collection requirements. Finally,
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PURPA's ratemaking requirements on cogenerators and small power producers
can be easily incorporated into Homeostatic Control.
4.4.1 PURPA Sectins 113 and 115
Congress, in passing PURPA, found that there was a need for a
program "providing for increased conservation of electric energy,
increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by electric
utilities, and equitable retail rates for electric customers." The
program established in the Act requires that the state regulatory
agencies with jurisdiction over electric utilities formally consider a
number of ratemaking standards and make a determination as to whether
their adoption of those standards would further the purposes of the Act.
Six ratemaking standards are set forth in the Act:
(A) Cost of service. Rates charged by a utility shall be designed,
to the maximum extent practicable, to reflect the costs of providing
electric service to each class of customers. The cost of service shall
be determined by methods that permit identification of differences in
cost incurrence: (a) for each class of customers, attributable to daily
and seasonal time of use of service; and (b) attributable to differences
in customer, demand, and energy components of cost. In prescribing such
methods, the agency shall take into account the extent to which total
costs to an electric utility are likely to change if additional capacity
is added to meet peak demand relative to base demand and if additional
kilowatt-hours of electrical energy are delivered to customers.
(B) Declining block rates. The energy component of a rate shall
not be sold according to a declining block rate structure unless that
structure is cost-justified.
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(c) Time-of-day rates. The rates charged to each class of
customers shall be on a time-of-day basis, reflecting the costs of
providing service to that class at different times of day, unless such
rates are not cost-effective. Cost-effective rates are defined as rates
whose long-run benefits to the utility and the customers in the class
concerned are likely to exceed metering and other costs.
(D) Seasonal rates. The rates charged to each class of customers
shall be on a seasonal basis, reflecting the cost of providing service to
that class in different seasons of the year. No cost-effectiveness
criteria is required for these rates.
(E) Interruptible rates. Each utility shall offer industrial and
commercial customers interruptible rates wich reflect the cost of
providing interruptible service to that class of customer.
(F) Load management techniques. Each utility shall offer to its
customers such load management techniques as the regulatory agency has
determined will be practicable, cost-effective, reliable, and provide
useful energy or capacity management advantages to the utility.
Cost-effective techniques are those that are likely to reduce maximum
kilowatt demand on the utility where the long-run cost-savings to the
utility of such reduction are likely to exceed the long-run costs to the
utility associated with the implementation of those techniques.
The conference report accompanying PURPA expands on a number of
these standards and gives more indication of the intent of Congress in
enacting the Act. Perhaps the most significant statement in the
conference report is one that asserts that the conferences:
Do not intend that time-of-day or seasonal variation in rates
exactly reflect the time-of-day or seasonal variation in costs of
providing service. A less than proportional increase in rates at
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the peak may be appropriate to send the signal to the consumer to
reduce elastic demand for peak energy without causing unnecessarily
high rates which have no effect on inelastic demand at the peak.
This statement appears to be a retreat from the pure cost-of-service
based pricing set forth in the Act. It apparently stems from a concern
about inelastic household or other users facing high rates on peak. This
presents a bit of a dilemna to regulatory agencies because it introduces
equity concerns into a process otherwise directed towards economic
efficiency.
The Conference Report also asserts that the requirement that rates
"take into account" differences in customer, energy, and demand charges
does not imply a specific methodology for determining cost of service.
Congress was reluctant to legislate the use of embedded, short-run
marginal, or long-run marginal costing methodologies, and thus this
decision is left up to the regulatory agencies.
Two of the components of Homeostatic Control, spot pricing and the
FAPER, bear on the provisions of Sections 113 and 115 of PURPA. (The
MIC, while involved, is essentially a communications tool, and need only
be considered in terms of its cost and its effect on the
cost-effectiveness of the Homeostatic Control system. As we shall see
below, the MIC can have a role to play in meeting other PURPA
provisions.)
The first, concept of spot pricing is in consonance with the
purposes of these sections of PURPA in that spot prices charged by a
utility can meet the cost of service standard, the time-of-day standard,
and the seasonal rate standard of the Act. In fact, one can reasonably
assert that spot pricing exceeds the expectations of Congress in its
desire to have rates vary with time-of-use. It is to be noted, too, that
Congress did not require that rates be set in the traditional (i.e.,
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prespecified, scheduled) manner. There is no hint of a prohibition of
dynamic, constantly adjusting charges.
However, as explained in another paper of the Conference, it may be
necessary to modify the strictly cost-based spot prices to include a
"quality of supply" component. In short, it might be necessary to ensure
system stability by sending higher-than-cost prices to customers before
capacity limits are reached. In theory, maintaining the quality of
supply could be considered a cost of service, but it is not a cost in the
traditional use of the term. In fact, if quality of service pricing is
used, it actually represents a short-term price adjustment used to avoid
either (a) short-term costs of system instability or (b) long-term costs
of new capacity. The level of quality of service prices would be based
on the desired customer response, not on a physical cost of providing
service. (The upper limit of such prices might be the cost of additional
generating capacity, since this would be the long-term solution to the
anticipated peak load; but even higher prices could be charged if there
were a policy decision to avoid building new capacity.)
Quality of supply pricing was not envisioned by the authors of
PURPA, and so its compatibility with the purposes of the law is
debatable. Taking a broad view of the law and its desire to make
efficient use of existing generating facilities, quality of service
pricing presents no problem. Taking another view of the law, and
especially the Conference Committe's concern about high on-peak rates,
quality of supply pricing might face problems. More investigation of
this topic is necessary, particularly the extent to which quality of
supply pricing will actually be needed, and if needed, the magnitude and
duration of the prices charged.
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Second, spot pricing bears little relation to declining block
rates. In theory, the two could exist simultaneously, although this
appears unlikely. While spot pricing presumes no particular rate
structure, it would seem that declining block rates are incompatible with
a pricing scheme that has constantly varying rates according to demand on
the utility system. (One would have to imagine, for example, a declining
block rate that falls with each additional use of energy that occurs
between 5:00 and 5:05 PM, while another declining block rate would exist
for energy use between 5:05 and 5:10 PM, and so on.) It thus seems that
the two concepts are inconsistent in practice.
Third, Homeostatic Control may or may not include interruptible
rates. Under spot pricing, a customer would set his or her own
threshhold for load shedding, and this threshhold would be based on the
spot price reaching a certain level. The customer's "reward" for
interrupting his load would be the avoidance of high electricity costs.
The utility's reward would be a reduction in load during peak periods,
although as noted below, the exact amount of the reduction would not be
known with certainty until it actually happened. Other customers would
benefit, too, in that their spot-buy-price for electricity would drop (or
rise more slowly) due to the withdrawal of the interruptible customer.
It could thus be argued that the existence of spot-pricing makes it
difficult to calculate a special "cost of providing interruptible
service" to a given customer class, for the cost of providing
interruptible service under this scheme would be the same as the cost of
providing firm service. The capacity and energy cost savings
traditionally gained through the use of interruptible price rates would,
it could be argued, no longer have meaning under Homeostatic Control.
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The use of spot-pricing will allow these cost savings to be recovered by
all customers, whether or not they fall into the traditional
interruptible categories. A convincing argument could thus be made by a
regulatory agency that interruptible rates are inappropriate under
spot-pricing, or that they are equivalent to the same prices faced by all
customers. It is uncertain whether this line of reasoning would satisfy
the purposes of PURPA.
On the other hand, it can also be argued that there is a place for
interruptible rates, even given the existence of spot-pricing. The
advantage of interruptible rates to utility companies is the knowledge
that a definite amount of load can be disconnected in a time of a
capacity shortfall. Spot-pricing does not carry with it the same degree
of certainty about customer responsiveness. (For example, this may be
true particularly during periods of extended hot, humid weather, during
which time demand on peak becomes less and less price elastic.) Thus, it
may be appropriate, especially during the transition period in which
spot-pricing is being introduced and in which its effectiveness in
reducing peak demand has not been measured, to continue the use of
interruptible rates to help insure system stability. Thus, special
interruptible rates might still be offered in recognition of those
customers' contribution to the quality of service being rendered by the
utility to its entire service area. As mentioned in other papers of this
Conference, interruptible rates could be designed in such a way as to
offer industrial and commercial customers the option of being
interruptible customers in some time periods but not in others. In
summary, if one adopts this general point of view, the use of
interruptible rates is consistent with the concept of Homeostatic Control
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and should present no problem with regard to satisfy the purposes of
PURPA.
Finally, the innovative load management technique envisioned in
Homeostatic Control is the use of the FAPER. (Other load management
techniques would certainly be appropriate under Homeostatic Control and,
in fact might be stimulated by spot-pricing.) As presently conceived,
the FAPER would be owned by the electricity customer and adapted to his
or her own power and energy requirements. However, there is nothing
inherent in the concept of the FAPER that would prohibit its being
provided by a utility company if the regulatory agency found it to be
"practible, cost-effective, etc."
In summary, the components and characteristics of Homeostatic
Control appear to be in consonance with the purposes and ratemaking
standards of PURPA, with the possible exception of the interruptible rate
concept included in PURPA, and the quality of supply pricing, which will
possibly be part of Homeostatic Control.
The other problems to be faced by regulators and utilities with
regard to these sections of PURPA under Homeostatic Control are not
unique to the Homeostatic Control system of electricity pricing and
management. The debates over marginal and embedding costing
methodologies will apply to both Homeostatic Control and traditional
pricing systems. The legal and other procedural requirements of PURPA
similarly are not affected by the method of utility pricing ultimately
arrived at. The question of the appropriate pricing of electricity on
peak - whether to allow the full cost of service to be included in peak
period charges or whethr to reduce peak rates in anticipation of some
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inelastic demand -- similarly must be faced under both Homeostatic
Control and traditional time-of-use pricing methods.
4.4.2. PURPA Section 133
Section 133 of PURPA directs the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to periodically collect cost of service data from the
country's utilities and provides that these data must be separated, to
the maximum extent practicable, in customer, energy, and demand cost
components. Among the data to be collected are the following:
(1) The cost of serving each customer class, including the costs of
serving different consumption patterns with each class, based on voltage
level, time-of-use, and other appropriate factors; and
(2) Daily load curves for all customer classes, combined and for
each class for which there is a separate rate, representative of daily
and seasonal differences in demand.
It appears that these data requirements may be of assistance to
regulators and utilities trying to institute Homeostatic Control because
they will provide base line information, as well as periodic updates, on
costs of service and load patterns. The data can thus be helpful in
initiating Homeostatic Control by assisting in determining the potential
cost-effectiveness of the system before it is fully implemented. The
data will also provide information helpful in monitoring the on-going
effectiveness of the Homeostatic Control system and in making adjustments
during transitional phases.
It also appears that utilities faced with these data requirements
may reap an additional advantage from Homeostatic Control and, in
particular, the MIC. The MIC offers the potential for simplified data
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gathering by the utility, providing a flexibility in sample selection,
data collection time periods, and actual processing of data that could be
of great benefit in recording accurate samples of consumption of
different customer classes at a lower cost than is now possible.
4.4.3. PURPA Section 210
Section 210 of PURPA concerns cogeneration and small power
production and directs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to
prescribe rules to encourage cogeneration and small power production and
to require purchases and sales of electricity between such sources and
the electric utilities. The rules must insure that the rates for
electricity purchases by the utility from the cogenerator (buy-back
rates) shall be just and reasonable to the customers of the electric
utility and in the public interest and not discriminatory against the
cogenerator. An upper limit is placed on these rates, equal to the cost
of electric energy to the utility which the utility would othrwise pay
for its own generation or purchase from another source. This
"incremental cost" of electricity can be defined as either
instantaneous-incremental cost or as a longer-term cost of electricity.
The law also provided that sales by the utility to the cogenerator shall
be priced in such a way as to be just and reasonable and in the public
interest and not discriminatory against the cogenerator.
This section of PURPA is also in consonance with the features and
principles of Homeostatic Control. Spot-pricing offers the opportunity
for both purchase rates and buy-back rates to be applied, however, these
are defined by the appropriate regulatory authority. (There is still a
debate as to who will be the "appropriate regulatory authority", for the
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question of state vs. Federal jurisdiction over the actual rates charged
remains to be resolved.) Homeostatic Control offers a flexibility in the
setting of purchase and buy-back rates that may not have been envisioned
by Congress (i.e., dynamic rates depending on the utility's incremental
cost of energy), but there appears to be no prohibition against the kind
of system envisioned under Homeostatic Control.
4.5 Discussion
4.5.1. Introduction
To what extent will the regulatory environment permit Homeostatic
Control to be developed and implemented? How does the Homeostatic
Control concept relate to the current and future regulatory process? How
will the logistics of the two operate? These questions posed at the
outset of this session were addressed during the ensuing discussions
concerning the current regulatory system, pricing systems within the
regulatory framework, regulatory practices and processes, and proposed
implementation procedures of Homeostatic Control. The following provides
a summary of the comments and discussion that followed the regulatory
presentation.
4.5.2. Current Regulatory System
One participant commented that the stated functions of today's
regulatory system are to protect the consumer, protect the utility (by
allowing a fair rate of return), and by setting rates. In other words,
the focus of today's regulatory environment involves a set of overlapping
objectives. These include:
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o maximizing the welfare of the people, reflecting as much as
possible market mechanisms in the process,
o providing "just and reasonable" rates to utility customers
and co- and small generators, and
o providing an economic/financial and regulatory framework within
which the utility can operate.
Recently passed Federal legislation, PURPA (P.L. 95 - 617), incorporates
the aforementioned while giving more guidance to state utility regulators
than before.
Another commentator compared today's regulated utility system to
that of the railroad business wherein:
o the cost of doing business is reflected only accidently in rates
charged to customers,
o resistance to change is a way of life, and
o the burden of proof in a regulatory proceeding remains with the
company, not with the regulatory commission.
He then suggested that while regulatory commissions should be educated to
get beyond the "nothing should ever be done for the first time"
philosophy, researchers should refrain from studying a technology to
death. In so doing, some of the pitfalls that the railroads have faced
may be circumvented by the utility industry.
4.5.3. Issues Concerning Homeostatic Control and Its Interaction with
the Regulatory Environment
Certain aspects of the interaction of Homeostatic Control and the
regulatory environment should be studied in greater detail. The
discussion identified some of these issues:
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o Tracking costs utilizing the Homeostatic Control concept (i.e.,
accounting for the costs incurred during a small time period
such as five minutes may represent a concept highly similar to
a cost of service tariff. This is not totally in accord with
present regulatory practice. There is some concern that rate
cases could become a way of life as companies will continually
be expected to prove costs before a rate change is allowed to
occur. Presently, for example, New Mexico is having trouble
implementing a cost of service tariff, thus raising questions
about the practicality of the Homeostatic Control concept.
With cost of service tariffs, such as fuel adjustment charges,
there is no real incentive to economize since all costs are
simply passed through to the customer. Another point raised
was that under cost of service concepts the utility doing the
poorest job (e.g., in failing to supply the most economical
power) would automatically be able to charge the highest
rates. Would this not occur under the Homeostatic Control
concept as well? A counter agrument was raised to indicate
that such situations occur with the fuel adjustment clause and
in New York at least specific in efficient expenditures for
fuel have been disallowed. Finally, the cost of service
concept may redistribute the risk of doing business (reference
the Alaskan Pipeline case) to ratepayers and away from the
utility's stockholders.
o Utility incentive(s) - Presently, regulatory lag provides
incentive to the utility to maintain efficient operations
between rate cases. However, with a spot pricing mechanism,
116
much of this incentive is eliminated since changes in rates
would occur on a continuous basis.
o Cost-Benefit - Questions benefit of Homeostatic Control in
utility planning operations. Cannot time-of-day rates do what
Homeostatic Control is supposed to do? How will Homeostatic
Control impact upon utility operations and planning?
o How does one plan to implement the pricing scheme proposed under
the Homeostatic Control concept at the State and Local level?
Some could not see from the discussion how Homostatic Control
could accomodate the large array of formulae and rules
presently enforced by the state and local government regulatory
agencies. It was stated that Homeostatic Control could
accommodate the different formulae and approaches by each state
because of its flexibility.
o How quickly will costs underlying the formulae be updated?
Every new transmission line? If not, how are these changes
reflected in the price to the consumer? j Do you gain any more
by going to a short term pricing basis over prespecified
time-of-day? Some agreed that the multiple rate levels were
not as complex concept as was first hinted. For example, one
could use just four rates, changing twelve times a day.
(Discussion referred to a study on water rates that found that
any more than four or five rates confused the residential
consumer.) It was then pointed out that Homeostatic Control
was likely most immediately applicable to industrial and
commercial customers where multiple rates are currently a way
of life.
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o How will quality of service component of spot pricing be accepted
by regulatory agencies? On the whole, saw no problems unless
its complexity baffles the legislators. (Also see Quality of
Supply Pricing discussion which follows.)
o Hostility of regulatory bodies to change may be alleviated with
the accrual of better data and information that has been
required by PURPA.
o What are regulators going to do with the Homeostatic Control
concept when the concept cannot definitively predict revenue
requirements? Through gradual implementation, thus more
understanding, this question and others like it would be
answered. In addition given current regulatory structures
revenue requirements are met only on average.
o What is the objective function of Homeostatic Control? Who
should respond and what are the responses supposed to be? What
exactly do you want the pricing mechanism to do? (See
Thursday/or Friday morning discussion.)
o What specific problem will the close interaction of the utility
and the customer help to solve? Homeostatic is not an
overnight phenomenon - not meant to be an immediate answer to
all problems. Its goal is to solve technical, not regulatory
issues over the longer term. For instance, quality of service
and reliability could be improved through customer
participation in contrast to today's operational environment.
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4.5.4. Definitively Positive Aspects of the Interaction
Two areas were identified that would be positively affected by the
introduction of Homeostatic Control within the present utility
environment. First, spot pricing will provide an impetus for the
deregulation of power production. This was considered to be a healthy
sign. Secondly, the Homeostatic Control concept through its pricing
mechanism is capable of basing its prices on natural cycles (minutes,
days, etc.) rather than accounting constructs (years and months). This
is expected to be a constructive change from the present pricing system.
4.5.5. Summary and Conclusions
In summary, there appears no serious conceptual problem to the
implementation of Homeostatic Control given our present and/or evolving
regulatory system. The above questions are not considered to be
intractable. (Most agreed that FERC should provide more leadership in
regulatory innovation/streamlining.)
However, it was pointed out that through the gradual implementation
of Homeostatic Control, the knowledge gained will mitigate uncertainties
concerning the system. Indeed, it was suggested at several points in the
discussion that the best way to identify the costs and benefits of
Homeostatic Control is to get a utility and an industry together and
approach their public utility commission with a proposal to implement
Homeostatic Control on an experimental basis. In so doing, a learning
situation is set up in which these parties would benefit while
guaranteeing no net cost to the remainder of the utility's customers.
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Chapter 5: POWER SYSTEM OPERATION
5.1 Introduction
The key issues to be discussed at the conference in the area of
power system operation are:
o Is there a need for a quality of supply component of spot price?
o Is there a need for the customer to participate in frequency
and voltage control?
o What are the present trends and future issues in power system
operation?
Some of the important factors related to these questions are:
o How does Homeostatic Control address these?
o What are the trade-offs between alternative approaches to power
system operation?
o What interactions are there between the proposed control
schemes?
o Will Homeostatic Control provide stable operation?
Material included is as follows:
5.2. Power System Dynamics and Homeostatic Control
5.3. Quality-of-Supply Component of Spot Price.
5.4. Generation Frequency Control
5.5. FAPER Operation
5.6. IEEE Spectrum Paper: Power Systems 2000
5.7. Discussion
"Power System Dynamics..." (5.2) provides a general overall view of
system dynamics with emphasis on how homeostatic concepts interact with
them. "Quality-of-Supply Spot Price" (5.3) discusses how system
operational needs lead to a spot price which contains a "noneconomic"
component. "Generation Frequency Control" (5.4) is a tutorial writeup on
power system frequency-power dynamics and control that is provided for
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conference attendees without extensive power system backgrounds. "FAPER
Operation" (5.5) uses the background of (5.4) to discuss the "Frequency-
Adaptive Power-Energy Rescheduler" (FAPER). A copy of an IEEE Spectrum
paper (July 1978), "Power Systems 2000", is included in (5.6). It
provides an even more general background on the possible future of power
system control and operation.
5.2 Power System Dynamics and Homeostatic Control
Homeostatic control consists of the mutually beneficial interaction
of many semi-autonomous subsystems comprising utility generation,
transmission network, distribution network, and customers. All customers
would have the right to buy (consume) or sell (generate) electricity, and
the responsibility to contribute to the stable and orderly operation of
the overall system. Homeostatic Control introduces new modes of dynamic
behavior because it emphasizes customer responsiveness to changing supply
conditions. This is potentially as important to the short time scale of
power system dynamics as it is to the longer time scale of changing
economic factors such as cost of generation.
This document reviews the important modes of power system dynamic
behavior and the time scales in which they occur. The major control
mechanisms introduced by Homeostatic Control are summarized, and their
effects are discussed in a general way.
5.2.1 Time scales for power system dynamics
Power system dynamic behavior is conventionally divided into a
number of time scales. These divisions could still be applied under
Homeostatic Control.
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Protection Time Scale (less than 200 msec)
Rapid switching is needed following equipment failure, lightning
strikes, etc., to preserve system integrity and to prevent equipment
damage. No new procedures have been postulated under Homeostatic
Control, but all private generation would have to provide suitable
disconnection facilities. The overall problem of distribution system
protection is clearly made more complex by the presence of even small
amounts of distributed generation, but not Homeostatic Control per se.
Fast Dynamics (less than 1 minute)
Most dynamic responses of turbine-generators occur in this time
scale. Changes in demand can also take place, particularly at low levels
of aggregation. Alternator field voltage and turbine governor control
systems have an important effect, as do voltage control and automatic
load shedding at load substations. Major disturbances and even system
collapse can occur in this time interval due to loss of generation or of
main transmission components. The likely future trend to increasing
numbers of small, customer-owned generating plants may aggravate
distribution system voltage control problems, and frequency control to a
lesser extent.
Slow Dynamics (less than a half hour)
This is the realm of boiler response, automatic generation control,
and economic load dispatch in conventional power system operation. The
major decisions about generation scheduling and network configuration are
made in this timescale.
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Daily, Weekly, and Long-term Trends
There are cyclic variations in the electricity demand of most power
systems with daily, weekly, and longer time-scales, due to life-style and
weather-dependent factors. The changing costs of electricity production
during these cycles are not adequately reflected in price in conventional
power system operation.
5.2.2 Control mechanisms introduced by Homeostatic Control
Homeostatic Control emphasizes customer responsiveness to changing
power system conditions, via both normally available information such as
voltage and frequency, and the new concept of time-varying spot prices
for customer consumption and generation. Three types of control schemes
have been postulated so far:
a) Frequency-based schemes in which the natural frequency
responsiveness of demand is enhanced. The FAPER has been designed to do
this without deleterious effects to the customer. Similar concepts may
be applicable to customer generation. The FAPER is discussed in detail
in a separate report.
b) Voltage-based schemes which enhance load-voltage responsiveness.
Voltage control at the distribution level may be aggravated by the
introduction of customer generation. Customer devices to control voltage
may have a beneficial effect on system operation. Controlled reactive
power sources may be available from customer generation even when real
power generation is not taking place.
c) Dynamic variation of spot price. The main justification for
time-varying pricing is to reflect the changing expenditure costs of
supply. However, time-varying price could also be used to notify the
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customer of changing operating conditions that affect
viability of the power system and thus the quality of
introduce a powerful new control mechanism that could
efficient (hence cheaper) power system operation, and
stability of the spot pricing mechanism itself. This
discussed in more detail in a separate report, and is
quality-of-supply component of spot price.
the short-term
supply. This would
lead to more
also ensure the
concept is
referred to as a
5.2.3 Time scales of operation for Homeostatic Control schemes
The frequency- and voltage-based control schemes can respond in
principle as quickly as the information content of the respective signals
will allow. The speed and accuracy of the measurement devices may often
be a limiting factor. These controls would normally be effective
throughout the fast dynamics and slow dynamics time scales defined
earlier. Information transmitted via spot price can only be updated at
the price notification rate, which may be too slow for the fast dynamics
period. A concept of "spot price interruptible" has been introduced for
this reason, in which a customer may choose at each price interval to
place part of his load under utility switching control during the next
price period (only for emergency use). This provides a flexible load
interruption capability that can be used as an alternative to backup
equipment capability.
5.3 Quality-of-Supply Component of Spot Price
Homeostatic Control introduces the concept of spot price to reflect
the time-varying cost of delivering electric power to a customer. While
normally dominated by expenditures associated with capital equipment,
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fuel and maintenance, the nature of electric power systems ensures that
more emphasis must be placed on costs associated with maintaining the
quality of the product than in most other industries. Customers already
pay for the features deemed necessary by the electric utility in this
regard, but the spot price concept would allow these issues to be handled
in a more efficient manner and would permit the customer some say in
selecting the supply quality he or she needs, and the opportunity to
contribute to maintaining supply quality if so desired, in terms of his
or her own cost-benefit analysis.
Supply quality issues arise from the desire to maintain high
standards of supply voltage, frequency, and waveform purity at all
customer terminals, except in very rare circumstances. Many conditions
must be fulfilled to meet this criterion, but the major issues may be
grouped as follows:
(i) the need to maintain voltage and frequency stable during normal
operation, including the effects of interactions between the many control
mechanisms present in a large power system.
(ii) The need to avoid noncontractual load shedding or system
collapse in the event of unexpected disturbances or failure of any major
item of equipment, or group of critical items.
(iii) The need to avoid system operating trajectories that may take
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the system or individual components outside the normal operating
boundaries set by stability and overload criteria.
(iv) The need to maintain voltage waveform standards at the
distribution level in the presence of switching transients, load-induced
harmonics, normal load variation and in the future, variations in
customer generation.
These conditions are met in normal power system planning by
providing spare equipment capacity and installing control centers and
control mechanisms to monitor and control utility operation. Customers
remain essentially unaware of the importance of these features although
they pay for them through their electricity bills. Escalating costs and
environmental restrictions on system expansion are tending to increase
both the cost and importance of these measures.
A component of spot price related to quality would tend to act in a
feedback manner to improve the quality of supply. Examples related to
the four previously mentioned groupings are as follows:
(Example i) Control mechanisms are present on many items of power
system equipment to assist in maintaining supply standards. Equipment
installed by customers (such as FAPER or voltage control) to achieve the
same ends would be very beneficial to overall system operation, and could
be rewarded by a component of spot price that increased as voltage or
frequency fell. It should be possible to obtain the most economic
trade-off between customer and utility equipment costs by correct
adjustment of this price component.
(Example ii) Power utilities provide backup equipment to cover the
unexpected loss of generation, transmission, or distribution components.
An alternative in most cases would be to immediately disconnect an
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appropriate component of load downstream of the device in the rare case
of actual device failure. Customers could be given the choice of
allowing part or all of their load to be interrupted at will by the
utility during the next pricing interval. In return they would get a
price discount. For example, if operating policy dictated the need for
extra spinning reserve in the next half hour, its cost could be computed,
and a price component introduced, ranging from zero towards the
equivalent cost level. Customers could pay the additional charge,
disconnect their load, or convert all or part of their load to
interruptible, for which they would not have to pay this particular price
component. Reserve would thus be obtained in the cheapest possible
manner and customers would have some say in the supply reliability they
require, and the ability to adjust the amount of interruptible load at
each price interval. The same principle could be followed at a more
local level to provide backup for items of distribution equipment.
(Example iii) In the course of system operation it may become clear
that the power system trajectory is heading towards an unstable state.
For example, load may be increasing towards the limit of available
generation. Rather than an almost inevitable system collapse or
involuntary load shedding, a component of spot price could be introduced
to notify customers of the impending problem and to discourage any
further increase in load.
(Example iv) Voltage transients and harmonic distortion may cause
harm to some customer equipment and are often produced by equipment
installed by other customers. Spot pricing would allow for a charge to
be levied depending on the particular usage pattern of a device and the
extent of disturbance caused by it to other customers. A neighboring
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customer may install equipment which reduces the disturbance of the
offending device to the system. In this situation charges paid by the
offending customer to the utility could be partly reimbursed to the
neighboring customer.
One further reason for a quality component of spot price is to
ensure the stability of the spot price/demand/generation system itself.
For example, if spot price starts to rise, customers may actually
temporarily connect more load on the assumption that the price may rise
even further in the future. A component of spot price may be needed to
stabilize these dynamics, based on a predictive model of customer
response to price change.
The effectiveness of quality of supply components of spot price will
depend on the length of the pricing interval relative to the time scales
of power system dynamics. Interruptible load, FAPERs and the like will
be more important for a longer price interval than for a shorter one.
The interruptible load component of price may not be needed at all if
spot price could be varied instantaneously; however the importance of the
other quality of supply components would not be affected.
The previous discussion has centered around the customer buying
price and its influence on demand behavior, but the same principles apply
to the buy-back price and customer generation. During emergency
conditions when there is a local or system-wide shortage of generation,
the value of customer generation will depend on the price users are
prepared to pay, which may be higher than the economic expenditure cost.
Here the quality of supply component could be used (as in example (iii))
in a feedback fashion to achieve a balance between supply and demand,
affecting both buy and buy-back price. During normal operating
128
conditions, frequency and voltage control, transients and harmonic
distortion (examples (i) and (iv)) may be important for customer
generation and may tend to reduce its desirability if there is an excess
of generation. In this situation the quality of supply component may
reduce both buy and buy-back prices until a satisfactory balance is
achieved.
In all cases the quality of supply component of spot price would be
used in a feedback mode to achieve a goal related to the overall
viability of the electric power system. The amount of price variation
will depend largely on customer ability and willingness to reschedule
generation and load. In many cases the revenue obtained through this
price term would be reimbursed to those customers contributing to supply
quality (by customer generation, FAPERS, voltage control and the like).
Overall, the quality of supply component of spot price is important to
the philosophy of Homeostatic Control in that it permits the interaction
between utility and customers to ensure the short-term viability of the
power system (one day or less) that the standard economic indicators
cannot provide.
The detailed structure of buy and buy-back prices and the dynamic
interaction of utility and customer decisions are described in the
appendix.
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APPENDIX TO 5.3
1. Structure of spot price
a) Customer buying price (in principle this price could be
different for every customer on the system).
Buying price for customer k, rcb,k(t) = rcb,k,ex(t) + rcb,k,q(t)
where
rcb,k,ex(t) = expenditure price = component dependent on
expenditures, determined by
embedded costs, marginal
costing, etc. as desired.
rcb,k,q(t) = quality-of-supply
price = component dependent on
quality-of-supply issues and
used in a feedback mode to
maintain system viablility.
Note that rcb,k,q(t) can be separated into a part that must be paid by
all customers and a part that need only be paid for firm supply (i.e.,
non-interruptible) during the next price interval. Neither part has a
clear economic basis although both may be related to future expenditures
that may or may not occur. Many factors may be present in rcb,k,q(t)
with their relative importance depending on the properties of the
particular power system.
b) Customer buy-back price
This has the same structure as rbb,k(t) and should be constrained
to be less than customer buy price.
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rbb,k(t) = rbb,k,ex(t) + rbb,k,q(t)
where
rbb,k,ex(t) = expenditure component based on the incremental
cost at the point of supply (fuel, losses,
maintenance)
rbb,k,q(t) = price component (positive or negative)
reflecting the change in quality of supply
caused by substitution of customer generation
for utility generation.
2. Major decision processes associated with spot price in Homeostatic
Control
The decisions are interacting as previously discussed, and as
illustrated in Figure 5.1. The processes may be summarized as follows:
1. Each customer optimizes his demand and local generation trajectories
given present price, past history and future predictions, as well as
present and future needs. Minimizes [own cost, inconvenience] on an
hourly to daily basis essentially without reference to other
customers. Many decisions occur in parallel.
2. Utility optimizes utility generation trajectory and network
configuration given customer demand/generation trajectories,
weather, interruptible loads, FAPERs, etc. to minimize [cost of
supply LOLP, etc.]. This occurs in normal power system operation.
3. HV network price trajectories are determined given all available
information to minimize [error from specified profit, risk of system
collapse and/or overload, instability in price/demand response and
power system dynamics].
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4. Distribution network prices are set given HV network prices, local
losses and local operating conditions to minimize [local cost of
supply, risk of overload or loss of supply, voltage error from
nominal ].
Network/Marketplace Utility Generation
1. Customer determines
demand/generation given
price, etc.
2. Utility determines
generation trajectory
and network configura-
tion
Other :
Icustomers
Figure 5.1 Major decision processes associated with spot price in
Homeostatic Control
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5.4 Generation Frequency Control
5.4.1 Introduction
Power system operation, at a macroscopic level, involves a complex
energy balance between the non-electrical energy supplied by the primary
sources--mechanical energy (from steam, water, wind, tides,...), solar
energy, conceivably chemical energy, etc.--and the energy consumed in the
system (predominantly as electrical energy supplied to loads, but also as
energy losses associated with conversion, transmission, distribution,
etc.).
As a first step towards understanding this energy balance, consider
the situation where a single machine (turbine-generator) serves an
isolated load. The situation is schematically represented in Fig. 5.2.
GENERATOR
irement
LOAD
Changer
Control GOVERNOR
Figure 5.2 Basic single-machine power system
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5.4.2 Single Machine Serving Isolated Load
In undisturbed or steady-state operation, a constant mechanical
power is delivered to the turbine-generator combination. This power is
converted by the generator into an equal amount of electric power that is
supplied to the load. (For the purposes of this discussion, all losses
are neglected.) The voltage waveform at the load terminals consists of a
cyclic (sinusoidal) variation at a frequency that is directly determined
by the speed of rotation of the generator. (The amplitude of this
waveform is controlled by the exciter control loop shown in dotted lines
in Fig. 5.2. The exciter control system is not considered further here,
except to note that its function is to adjust the generator field current
so as to maintain the amplitude of the cyclic voltage waveform.)
Consider now the effect of a disturbance to the above steady-state
operation, specifically one caused by a sudden but sustained increase in
load power. Since the mechanical power input to the system has not
changed at this stage, the energy to supply the load comes from the
kinetic energy of the turbine-generator shaft, and results in steady
deceleration of the shaft. Correspondingly, the frequency of the load
voltage waveform begins to steadily decrease. Two levels of control
action now go into effect, one aimed at arresting the drop in frequency,
and the other aimed at restoring the frequency to its original value.
The former action, that of arresting the fall in frequency, is the
result of the "natural action" of the governor. The governor senses the
drop in shaft speed and opens the steam valve to a position proportional
to the fall in speed, thus steadily increasing the mechanical power input
to the turbine-generator and steadily decreasing the rate at which the
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shaft speed falls. If no other control action were to take place, the
end result would be that the frequency would level off at a value below
the original level, and the new mechanical power input would equal the
new electrical load power.
It is necessary, however, to do more than simply arrest the fall in
frequency that follows a sudden load increase. In order that electric
clocks, motors, etc., function properly, and, as importantly, because the
generating plant is "tuned" to operate most efficiently at 60 Hz and may
suffer damage (due to mechanical resonances in the turbine, etc.) at
frequencies as little as 0.3 Hz away from 60 Hz, it is important to
restore the frequency to its original value. This second level of
control action is obtained by means of the governor speed changer control
(shown in Fig. 5.2) in the following way.
The speed changer position is continuously adjusted, essentially
independently of (but concurrent with) natural governor action, so as to
open the steam valve (and hence increase the mechanical power input) at a
rate proportional to the instantaneous frequency "deficit." Thus, while
the natural governor action alone would only result in frequency
levelling off at some reduced value, the effect of the speed changer
control scheme above is to continually increase the mechanical power
input to the shaft for as long as there is a frequency deficit, thus
eventually restoring frequency to its original value. At this point, the
new mechanical power input is equal to the new electrical load power (but
this increased power input is now completely due to the altered speed
changer position, since the frequency has returned to its original value
and eliminated the contribution of the natural governor action). This
135
control scheme is, for technical reasons, known as integral control, and
constitutes the most basic form of automatic generation control (AGC).
The picture that has been developed so far of the system response to
a sudden increase in load is summarized in Fig. 5.3 (with the numerical
values being typical). The response to a decrease in load is identical,
except for changes in the signs of perturbed quantities.
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Figure 5.3 Power and frequency responses to step increase in load
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A more careful analysis requires better modeling of governor action,
of integral control implementations, of turbine-generator behavior, of
the fact that load is somewhat dependent on frequency, etc. The
simplified description is however sufficient to illustrate the general
features that are to be expected. The main points to be noted in summary
are the following:
-- load perturbations are instantaneously accommodated by
corresponding perturbations of the kinetic energy of the
turbine-generator shaft, with concomitant shaft acceleration
and deceleration;
-- natural governor action on a short (0-5 seconds) timescale
tends to limit frequency excursions from 60 Hz;
-- integral control via the governor speed changer acts on longer
time scale (5-100 seconds) to restore frequency to 60 Hz.
[The above control scheme serves to restore frequency in the steady
state to 60 Hz, and hence in the steady state one finds that electric
clocks are once more running at the correct rate. However, the clock
rate perturbations due to the transient frequency perturbations will have
resulted in clocks exhibiting an error in the actual time they indicate.
For example, if frequency fell to an average value of 59.99 Hz over a
one-hour period before being restored to 60 Hz, clocks would slow down
correspondingly, and be .01/60 x 3600 = 0.6 seconds behind time at the
end of the hour, though running at proper speed at the end of the hour.
The way this is handled in practice is to set limits, say + 3 seconds, on
the allowable accumulated time error. When one of these limits is
reached, the speed changer position is offset a certain amount in the
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appropriate direction so that average frequency is restored to zero, and
the time error is concurrently brought to zero.]
The preceding analysis has dealt with the rather simple and
practically unlikely case of a single machine serving an isolated load.
In practice, a power system is immensely more complicated with several
machines (of different types) serving load in one area, and separate
areas connected via "tie lines" to form an interconected power pool.
Each of these levels of aggregation is considered below.
5.4.3 Operation of a Multi-Machine Area
An area is roughly taken to mean a portion of the power system that
has primary responsibility for meeting the demands of the loads within
it. Typically, areas coincide with the domains of control of the
separate power companies that comprise a power pool. The generators in
an area act in unison, under centralized area control, to manage the
variations of frequency with load. The basic principle here is the same
as in the case of a single machine, except that the AGC signals to the
individual speed changer controls are determined at the area control
center, from observations of system frequency, and are then transmitted
to the different machines as appropriate. (The natural governor action,
on the other hand, takes place locally of course, since each machine is
equipped with its own governor.) The above description is expanded in
the following paragraph.
The major difference from operation of a single machine lies in the
fact that it now becomes important to allocate the changes in
steady-state generation (necessitated by changes in load) among the
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various generators in such a way as to "optimize" overall operation.
Several factors enter this process. First of all, generating plants are
not equally amenable to the variations in generation called for by AGC
action. Typically, large fossil-fuel units and nuclear units are run at
constant generation levels, while AGC action is mainly provided by small
or medium size (under 600 MW) fossil units, by hydro units, and by
combustion turbines. Furthermore, those units which do participate in
the AGC scheme have different limitations on the range over which their
generation may reasonably be varied, and on the rate at which this
variation occurs. Other considerations that enter the optimization
process are such things as the relative costs of fuels, pollution levels
associated with different sorts of plants, the need for reserve
generation (see below), etc. Based on such factors, the AGC signals to
the individual speed changer controls are adjusted by the area control
center in such a way as to appropriately allocate steady-state
generation. The optimization aspects of AGC, as described above, overlap
so-called economic dispatch issues.
Before moving on to consider the operation of interconnected power
pools, some final remarks on area control will be made. Though the focus
of the discussion has been on the control actions needed in an area to
cope with load perturbations, it is common for major system disturbances
to be caused by loss of generation (due to problems at the generating
station itself or with transmission lines carrying generated power into
the area). It is for this reason that generation areas are required to
have various levels of reserve generation. These reserves are classified
on the basis of their relative availability when called upon. "Spinning
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reserve" refers to the amount of generation that is "instantaneously"
available (i.e. on a timescale of seconds to minutes) and consists of
units that are fully operating but only partially loaded. Areas are
typically required to maintain a spinning reserve that is comparable with
the output of the most heavily loaded unit. Other reserves include hydro
and combustion-turbine units, which can be brought up in minutes, "low
bank" reserves comprising steam plants idling at pressure and heat levels
below operational levels, and "cold reserves" that are operative but not
in operation.
Another remark that needs to be made is that although the word
"automatic" was used to describe the above generation control schemes,
there is still a considerable amount of human monitoring, decision,
control, and communication involved, especially under conditions of large
and potentially traumatic changes in load or generation.
5.4.4 Operation of an Interconnected Power Pool
A power pool comprises many areas connected together via tie lines.
Areas can now interchange power with neighboring ones to improve overall
system behavior under both normal operation (short-term and long-term)
and emergency operation. Control strategy, i.e., for pool operation,
will not be considered in any detail here. It suffices to note that the
main extension from area control concepts is that now each area control
center uses observations of not only the local frequency perturbations
but also of perturbations in its tie line flows, in order to determine
the AGC signals to the speed changers of machines in the area. Thereby,
in the hypothetical steady state, the frequency in each area is restored
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to 60 Hz and tie line power flows are back at prearranged values. (These
prearranged or scheduled interchanges are designed to take advantage of
differences between the daily, weekly, or annual energy usage patterns of
the various areas, and reduce the ratio of peak to average generation for
each area.) In practice, of course, persistent load or generation
fluctuations give rise to continuous fluctuations in area frequencies and
tie line interchanges.
The term 'local frequency' was used in the previous paragraph to
draw attention to the fact that in any multi-machine system there is no
unique global frequency: the frequency measured at one point will differ
from that at another. This is mainly because the perturbations of system
kinetic energy needed to accommodate load fluctuations involve dynamic
swings of the different turbine-generator shafts, each with its own
characteristics, and each affected in a different way by the distributed
load fluctuations. It turns out that the frequency perturbations within
an area occur essentially in unison, because of the close and multiple
(i.e., 'strong') couplings between generating units in an area. For this
reason, the description of area operation tacitly assumed a well-defined
area frequency. However, distinct member areas of a pool that are only
weakly coupled to each other can have noticeably different frequency
perturbations.
5.4.5 Concluding Remarks
One class of system operations not yet mentioned is concerned with
protective relaying and switching in a power system. They serve to avoid
equipment damage and preserve system integrity. They occur automatically
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on a time scale of fractions of a second (say less than 200
milliseconds), and are occasioned by such events as line faults,
lightning strokes, loss of field excitation in generators, etc.
There are, needless to say, countless other factors that have been
ignored or glossed over in the above sketch. Power systems are perhaps
the largest engineered systems known. They are, to a major extent, the
result of "evolution by parts," so much so that very many interesting and
important questions remain regarding how the parts affect the whole.
This has been an attempt only to provide a simple account of the major
factors and considerations entering the control of generation.
The Appendix that follows presents data taken from the literature to
demonstrate the sorts of frequency fluctuations that follow from the
preceding discussion, and as observed in actual and simulated power
system operation.
142
APPENDIX TO 5.4
Dynamic Behavior of Power System Frequency
I. Normal Operation
The first figure, Fig. 5.4, illustrates the fact that system
frequency is continually varying due to load and generation changes.
Figure 5.4 Trace of system frequency in U.S. Eastern Interconnection
over a period of 2 hours. Trace is characterized by fairly rapid
fluctuation of about .01 Hertz and larger excursions which last for
several minutes or hours.
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The following figure, Fig. 5.5, confirms that the extent of typical
frequency fluctuations is of the order of 0.01 Hz (cf. also Fig. 5.3 of the
text).
PWIf
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Figure 5.5 Probability density function of system frequency deviation
for August 6, 1977 data. Sharp peak at 0.001 Hz is due to
instrumentation defect. (* is before trend removal, and heavy line is
after trend removal.)
It is also of interest to know the characteristic time scales on
which the frequency fluctuations occur. In the discussion of
single-machine dynamics (cf. Fig. 5.3) it was said these were on the
order of 5-100 sec. This is in agreement with Figs. 5.6, 5.7 below,
which show that most of the fluctuation lies in the 0.5-6 cycles/minute
range.
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Figure 5.6 Power spectral
density functions of system
frequency deviations for heavy
load data (Curve A) and for
light load data (Curve B)
Figure 5.7 Relative power
spectral density function of
system frequency
The lower frequency spectra are
associated with load changes and
colored by AGC response while the
higher frequency spectra are
colored by governor response.
The natural frequencies of the
governor loops are in the 2-6
cycle per minute range.
Fig. 5.8 illustrates, by means of simulation results on a
multimachine system, that the frequency perturbations at different points
of a system are different. All the curves (except the dotted line)
denote measurements of frequency deviation at different generator
locations.
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Figure 5.8 Frequency Deviation Comparison for different machines
(simulation study)
II. Response to Large Disturbances
The following record, Fig. 5.9, presents an interesting picture of
system frequency deviations after large disturbances. Two line faults,
occurring 25 seconds apart, caused system frequency to drop all the way
to 59.9 Hz. In Fig. 5.10 are shown the responses to this pair of faults
of the two plants available for control at the time. It is evident that
both pick up generation within 2-4 minutes. (The total generation power
lost as a result of the faults was 620 MW, and it is seen that the two
controlled plants together increase generation by essentially that
amount.)
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and John Day powerplant for June 18, 1975 disturbance
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5.5 Frequency-Adaptive Power-Energy Reschedulers (FAPER's)
5.5.1. The Context
Fluctuating imbalances between generated and consumed power in a
power system directly lead to fluctuations of system frequency. (The
reasons for this relationship have been described in an elementary way in
the section on Generation Frequency Control.) In normal operation of
typical systems, these frequency fluctuations remain within 0.01-0.02 Hz
of 60 Hz, while immediately following a large disturbance it is possible
for system frequency to deviate by as much as 0.1 Hz from 60 Hz. (It
must be noted that deviations of no more than 0.3 Hz can lead to damaged
turbine blades, etc.)
Power plants operate most efficiently if allowed to generate a
steady output. One would especially like to release large utility power
plants from the tasks of tracking load variations and of adjusting their
generation to accommodate variations in the outputs of other sources of
generation. Several techniques have been proposed for so-called "supply
management" and "load management," with the objective of, among other
things, allowing generation to be maintained at more nearly steady
levels. (See [1] for a good survey of this subject, and [2] for a less
detailed sketch of the load management area.)
Supply management is, at present, largely restricted to energy
storage via pumped-storage hydroelectric plants. Such a plant consists
of a reversible flow pump/turbine unit that can use any excess system
generation to pump water up to a storage reservoir and subsequently, when
system load increases, use this stored water to generate power that is
repaid to the system at a cost in overall efficiency.
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Load management schemes have primarily concentrated on so-called
energy demand loads, such as water or space heating. These loads demand
a fixed total energy over an interval of time, but place few constraints
on how the delivery of energy is distributed over the interval. They are
thus amenable to management without particular hardship to the customer.
(Such loads may be contrasted with power demand loads, for example
lighting, traction motors, etc., where the demand is for a specified
instantaneous power, not an average power as with energy demand loads.)
The control mechanisms for such loads have been classified, see [1], as
being either direct or indirect controls.
Direct control refers to schemes where the utility directly
manipulates the load. This may be carried out via pre-set clocks at the
load end, or by "ripple control" signals impressed on the power lines and
thereby transmitted to loads, or by radio signals, telephone links, etc.
These schemes are typically used in conjunction with specially designed
energy demand loads such as electric storage heaters. (It is worth
noting that this sort of direct control is practiced far more routinely
and extensively in Europe and Australia than in the United States.)
Outside of the clock-controlled scheme above, direct control methods such
as ripple control can potentially form the basis for turning the power
system into "a closed-loop system, by using a computer...to monitor the
network status via hardline connections to the appropriate monitoring
points in the network, and to initiate automatically the transmission of
the appropriate commands." [2] The present conception of direct control
is still, however, that of a means of smoothing out slow demand
variations. (For example, storage heaters are typically heated during
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the night-time off-peak period, and the heat is then released as needed
during the day.) The exception to this occurs when the system is in an
abnormal condition, in which case interruptible loads may be signalled to
turn off. In more extreme straits, under-frequency relays, which sense
the fall in frequency that accompanies loss of generation, may trip and
shed blocks of load.
Indirect control refers to load management via methods such as
time-of-day pricing or other economic incentives, or by regulation. It
exists in various forms in the United States. The aim, however, is still
the smoothing of slow and predictable variations in demand.
One of the key contributions of the Homeostatic Power System
framework is the fact that it makes the conceptual transition to
rapidly-varying, closed-loop, distributed decision-making and control.
The indirect control methods described above thereby evolve into the
concept of an energy marketplace, with spot prices varying adaptively in
time and exerting indirect control on both distributed supply and demand,
and with customers becoming more involved and more sophisticated in their
relationship with the rest of the system. Along with this, the
communication and hardware aspects of direct control schemes evolve into
those needed for implementing the energy marketplace. And finally, the
concept of direct control is itself modified; rather than requiring the
utility to sense system conditions and command appropriate responses, one
attempts to make loads themselves sensitive to system conditions and able
to contribute autonomously to the required control action. This latter
type of load response is exemplified by the Frequency-Adaptive
Power-Energy Rescheduler, or FAPER.
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5.5.2. FAPER Operation
The operation of one suggested FAPER design, as described in the
accompanying paper on Homeostatic Utility Control, is reviewed here.
Other designs are possible and will be mentioned. The FAPER presented
below is intended for operation on deadband type control systems, for
example room heaters. In normal operation, a heater is on until the room
temperature reaches some upper threshold, denoted by Tmax; at this
point the heater turns off. The room cools gradually as a result of
natural heat loss, and eventually the temperature falls to some lower
threshold, Tmin, at which time the heater is switched back on.
The idea now is to make such units frequency responsive, in the
following sense. A drop in system frequency is indicative of excess load
on the system and one would like to therefore encourage heaters that are
currently on to turn off. This may be done by lowering the upper
threshold below Tmax by an amount that is a direct function of the
instantaneous frequency deficit. On the other hand, a rise in system
frequency corresponds to excess generation, so, to encourage units that
are off to turn on, one could raise the lower threshold from Tmin by an
amount that is a direct function of the instantaneous frequency excess.
This scheme is represented by the relationship graphed in Figure 5.11,
which shows how the upper and lower thresholds, Tu and T1
respectively, will vary with the frequency perturbation Af ; a positive
of Af denotes a frequency excess, a negative value denotes a deficit.
Many other schemes can be concocted. For example, rather than
altering the switching levels one could, if there was a frequency
deficit, cause a heater that had arrived at Tmin to wait a time
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proportional to the deficit before switching on (with a similar action at
Tmax for a frequency excess). A more significant change would be to
make the switching levels shift in response to past as well as present
values of frequency perturbation. The scheme to be focused on here is
sufficiently interesting, however, to illustrate the basic ideas, and
also to bring out the difficulties associated with the analysis of a)
individual FAPER's, b) large numbers of FAPER's, and c) the effect of
FAPER's on power system behavior. (It has the added feature that it
never allows temperature to go outside the range Tmin to Tmax that
the customer has accepted as tolerable prior to the insertion of the
FAPER logic.)
Before going on to discuss a) to c) above in slightly greater
detail, it is important to recall that there are two basic functions that
one would like an ensemble of FAPER-controlled units to carry out. The
first
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is a governor/AGC function, intended to provide responsive behavior to
the small and rapid frequency fluctuations that occur in normal
operation, and the second is a reserve function that is intended to help
in cases of generation loss. It will be necessary to examine any
proposed FAPER scheme on both counts. Even the scheme of Figure .ll
simple as it seems, is not really completely specified from this point of
view until af , the "frequency perturbation," is more completely
specified: do we measure the perturbation from the short-term average
frequency, or from the long-term average, or from 60 Hz, or from some
other frequency determined by time-error corrections in progress, or...?
a) Individual FAPER's. In principle, if one was given the
temperature and state (i.e. on/off) of a given unit at some instant, and
if the ensuing frequency-perturbation trajectory was known, one could (on
using FAPER control logic specified, for example, as in Figure 5.11)
determine completely the ensuing behavior of the unit. This is
illustrated in Figure 5.12, for the case of a unit that is assumed to
have
Frequency
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T
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Dotted lines Time
give the
undisturbed
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Figure 5.12
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linear heating and cooling characteristics. The difficulty with this,
however, is that the thermostat itself is a highly nonlinear device, so
that the response of the unit to one frequency-perturbation trajectory
gives little or no information regarding the response to other
trajectories! Techniques have been developed in the literature on
nonlinear systems for approximate analysis of such so-called "hysteric
two-state" systems, for special classes of input trajectories, and it
remains to be seen whether these methods are useful in the present
context. Two classes of frequency-perturbation trajectories that are of
interest are: i) small and rapid random signals, corresponding to
signals requiring governor/AGC action, and ii) larger, sustained changes
corresponding to loss of generation.
b) Collections of FAPER's. The logic of Figure '5.11 implicitly relies
on there being a large number of FAPER-controlled units, in order that
the desired form of response occurs. To see this, note that a particular
unit may be unaffected by a short-duration frequency perturbation that
occurs when the unit is in the middle of its heating range. Given a
large number of independent units, however, and assuming they are
randomly distributed over their ranges, it is likely that there will be a
considerable number that are near their switching thresholds, and hence
immediately responsive to a frequency perturbation.
As mentioned in the previous section, the general analysis of a
single unit is already rather hard. The analysis of collections of such
units is more involved in some respects, but there are simplifications
that can arise from the fact that the macroscopic characteristics may
not be too dependent on the details of operation of the individual
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units. Furthermore, it now may become possible to make justifiable
assumptions regarding, for example, the random distribution of units over
their working ranges, and to perhaps analyze the collection statistically
rather than deterministically.
An idea of the typical factors one has to contend with may be
brought out as follows. If at some time it is assumed that the units are
uniformly distributed over their ranges, and a sudden drop in frequency
occurs, it may be seen from Figures 5.11 and 5.12 that all units in a certain
neighborhood of the upper limit will turn off at the same time. This
creates a "bunching" of the units, so that they are no longer uniformly
distributed. It is reasonable to expect that the units will eventually
"forget" the original disturbance, as a result of random jitters in their
heating and cooling curves, and will end up (in the absence of further
frequency distrubances) being uniformly distributed once more. It is
evident that one needs to specify more accurately the nature (timescales,
magnitude, etc.) of expected frequency perturbations, to characterize
their macroscopic effects, to understand and model more precisely the
re-randomization process, etc.
c) Effects of FAPER's on the System. The discussion up to now has
actually centered on the "open-loop" behavior of individual FAPER's and
of collections of them, with frequency perturbations taken as some
externally specified function of time. In fact, however, the frequency
perturbations are of course themselves affected by the load perturbations
that result from FAPER operation, so the problem that need ultimately to
be considered is the "closed-loop" configuration of Figure 5.13.
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Figure 5.13
5.5.3 FAPER Economics
The justifications for FAPER installations must lie in a reduction
of overall power system costs. As indicated previously FAPERs can serve
useful functions in the reduction of spinning reserve requirements and in
the reduction of AGC/governor action of central station power plants.
The economic value of reducing spinning reserve requirements can be
estimated in a relatively straight forward fashion for any given system.
The numerical values themselves will vary widely depending on the system
itself and, often, with time of day.
The economic value of reducing the AGC/governor costs required for
the central station power plant is much more difficult to quantify.
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Reference 3 lists such reductions as one of the motivations for
installing new power system control centers which Ref. 4 discusses. The
importance of these costs however neither reference is able to provide
numerically.
5.5.4 Concluding Remarks
Efforts at the time of this writing are directed towards simulation
of the configurations a) to c) above, with a view to obtaining a better
feel for the dynamics of FAPER operation, and thereby being led to
plausible assumptions that will enable some useful analysis to be carried
out. Much hard research remains to be done.
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LARGE SYSTEMS
Power
, Power systems '2000':
hierarchical control strategies
Multilevel controls and home minis will enable utilities to buy and
sell power at 'real time' rates determined by supply and demand
Because more devices for customer generation and
storage of energy will be in operation by the year 2000, the
customer-residential, commercial, or industrial-will be
considered a vital part of the electric power systems of the
fiuture. New types of central-station generation, storage,
tri-rpission, and distribution will be available, and
there will be basic changes in the total energy picture as
well.
Control systems adapt to changing technology and
public n-ds.E. Capital and fuel costs will continue to rise
-apidly, which will justify the expenditure of more and
more money to improve the economics of power system
operation. Other factors that will influence future
changes will include the following:
a New types of central-station generation, storage, and
-nlsmision/ distrbuti cn systems will be installed. En-
vironmental right-of-way/siting concerns will make it
necessary to demand ever-higher degrees of performance
for installd facili.ies. Thus, ftlure control systems will be
called on to handle ever-more-complex problems under
mnreasing., 'tlingen and demanding conditions.
o The future will see the introduction of more customer
Generation and/or energy storage, including solar
heating, cogew!er~iiol, and eventually solar photovoltaic.
Tlhcse local -vice3 will place new demands on control
systems.
a Public attitudes toward power will change in the
future. The energy marketplace that will come into opera-
ti,-n will change the basic nature of future control
strategies.
* D.na.j depends oca weather. Introduction of solar,
wind generation,, wet/dry cooling, etc., will greatly in-
crease weather dependence. Environmental considera-
tions of air and thermal pollution will increase and add
even mre wct:,-r dependence. Very sophisticated
systems for monitoring the weat;icr and environment will
be integrated into future control systems along with
models for forecasting weather and environmental im-
pacts.
* Research on behavior of power plants, loads, etc., will
make it possibl- to have rr.a.hematical models that ap-
proximate actual behavior at least some of the time.
Future control systems will use these mathematical
i.,odels in real-time operation.
* Computing and communication are among the few
things left in our society that are decreasing in cost. Fur-
thermore, data-network communications and mini- and
microcomputer technology are evolving at a rate that
parallels the needs of electric power systems. Future con-
trol systems will exploit this technology extensively.
This writer's prediction of the control systems of 2000
is based on the foregoing predictions of influencing fac-
tors. The implications are that the future will see more
sophisticated control systems involving many sensors and
computers, all interconnected via extensive data net-
works. The need exists, the technology is available, and
the dividends from its use will justify the expense..
Already an electric power system is the largest physical-
ly interconnected system man has invented. The only way
to control such a complex network is to break it down in-
to levels defined by the issues of concern (Fig. ). The
elements at evel 0 are the direct-acting devices for
automatic local control-the relays, governors,
regulators, firing controls, thermostats, etc. For higher
elements (I, II, and III), controls may be viewed as a com-
bination of information-processing and decision-making
systems (Fig. 2).
In brief, the controllers at l.evel 0 receive the actual sen-
sor signals from the vaiious physical devices and use a
control law to determine e signals to be sent to control
actuators. Level III makes no decisions; Level II decides
on goals and targets; Level i decides on such matters as set
points and gains for the control laws; and Level 0 uses
these control laws to generate control signals.
In terms of information flows, Level I receives
measurements from Level 0 and sends models of the Level
I elements to Lcvel i. Level i can also receive models
from Level II about ether nearby Level I elements. Level
II trades models with Lcvei I ::in a similar fashion.
Control hardware/software
Almost all of the Level 0 control logic will be im-
plemented on digital rcrocomputers. In many cases the
sensors themselves will furnish the digital outputs and the
actuating devices will accept digital inputs. This digital
structure will make communication between Level 0 con-
trollers and higher-level controllers easy to implement. In
a given power plant, the same basic microcomputer con-
trol packages ill often be used for both voltage
regulators and boiler-firing controls, even though the con-
trol laws themselves are radically different.
Control functions at Level I will be implemented by
human operators teamed with digital computers.
Prepackaged control rooms with minicomputers and
cathode-ray tubes for display will be used for similar
elements, including fossil plants, nuclear plants, and
substations. Residential customers and small businesses
will be able to choose from a wide spectrum of standard-
ized microcomputer display systems, depending on their
own needs and preferences. (By the year 2000, relative af-
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fluence may be determined as much by the size of a
family's home computer as by the size of their house. In
both size and sophistication, the control rooms of some
large industrial custcmers will rival those of the utilities
themselves.)
Control systems for l.evels II and III will also be based
on computer/human teams. Large wall displays driven by
digital computers will be used in addition to multiple
CRTS. In some Level II installations, parallel computation
will be used. Control rooms foi Levels II and III will be
composed of standardized hardwai, and software
modules tailored to specific needs.
The vast amount of digital communication will be car-
ried out throutgh a variety of channels. depending on the
application, function, and geographic region. In some
power plants and substations, optical fibers will be used.
The power lines tilmselves will provide communication
with most two-way utility customers; other roles will be
played by radio, microwaves, least ? telephone lines, and
possibly even satclitcs. Bec:i'e of the extensive intercom-
puter communication ,cuied and :. e massive amounts
of data involved, the message flow itsclf will require
sophisticated control logic.
Vendors will be connpeting for both uItilitv and con-
sumer markets by offering a variety of hardware/software
packages. To minimize compatibility p!cblenis, basic
hardware and software will be standardized along with
data fornlats and definitions of termns.
Models
There are two kinds of nlodel used ;! controlling elec-
tric power systems. Mathematical ,lodels include
algebraic and diffeerenial equations, cost curves,
stochastic processes, look-up tables, and optimization
logic, all of which describe the relationship between
system variables and the operating controls. They are
used today in the off-line design of controllers. Human
Level IIl
Level II
Level I f
operators also use "nlodels"-though not mathematical
formulas--of how they think the system will behave at
different states of operation.
Today, real-time operation and control are based large-
ly on such "models," but in the future these will be sup-
plemented, to a large extent, by equations, so that each
model's strengths and weaknesses will be complemented
by the other. In fact, the primary purpose of the
information-processing systems is the maintenance of
these models.
Extensive use will be made of mathematical models for
external equivalents-approximations of the rest of the
power system ("the outside world") as seen from a par-
ticular element or group of elements of concern. This will
make possible a high degree of decentralized decision
making.
Control functions
The kind of control employed for the main elements
will depend on two things: the system's operating
state-normal, alert, emergency, in extremis, restorative
(see "Operating under stress and strain," Mar. p. 48);
and the status of the system models-valid. invalid, ac-
curacy measures. Decision-making sstemns tat use on-
line mathematical models obviously will modify their
decisions whenever validity or accuracy is in doubt.
Algorithms to detect and identify changes in the system
and the status of its models vill be in continuous opera-
tion.
Electric utilities will operate many types of power
plants, but fossil and nuclear will predominate, though
Ill Hierarchical decomposition into a multilevel strategy
is esent,ial for pcwer-system control. Lcvel ll tacilitates
the exchange of information and/or models to provide in-
terarea coordination. Level II detnrmines goals and tar-
gets that Level I uses to specify controllaw parameters(gains, time constants, set points). These control laws are
used at Level 0 to provide actuating signals.
National coordination center I
1
To other regions
Regioldiai coo uination center
.
To other pools
Pool operating center
I
To other systems
- Meteorological / environmental monitoring
, Customer generation
) Customer storage
LevelO 0 Relays, governors, regulators, thermostats. etc.
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The energy marketplace
The utility's role in furnishing power, the
customer's attitude toward the use of power, and
the nature of electric power control systems are
closely coupled and interrelated. A major shift in
the relationships that exist among these three will
occur by 2000 with the establishment of the
"energy marketplace."
Today the relationship between customer and
utility is one of master to slave. The customer is the
master who demands power from the utility, his
slave. The slave is expected to provide as much
power as the master wants, any time the master
wants it. The control systems reflect this relation-
ship because they are designed to help the slave do
everything possible to meet the master's demands.
Whed control systems push the slave beyond its
limits. the slave collapses and the master is left on
his own. Unfortunately, in our present society, the
customer has become so dependent on the utility
that the master is not able to function without the
slave.
But by 2000, the relationships between the
customer. the utility. and the control systems will
have changed significantly. By then, the utilities
and customers will be equals who deal with each
other through the energy marketplace.
The utility's generation and storage systems will
offer power for sale to the customers, and
customers will buy most of their power from the
utilities. However, sore customers will generate
their own power and offer any extra for sale. Al of
these transactions will take place via an energy
there will be wide variations in fossil type, methods of
cooling, air-poilutionl controls, and so on. Of course,
ti;ere vill be wind, solar, and hydro plants as well. The
t,'oes of control actions available will depend on the
sp:.cinc v thr e o t e plant and the system to which it is
conr.:cted. tSee "Hardware and software for system pro-
tcction,"' ".ay, p. 40.)
Information piocessing will require up-to-date models
for plant economics, plant dynamics, and equipment
capabilities Fternal-equivalent models for dnanmic
respoi:se -'ill be developed by combining real
measurnr:;-.-c from Levelis 0 and I for information sent
tromn Level :1.
The tccision-making s-em will have many tasks. Dur-
ing normal op:rations, computers will take over plant
startup, shutdown, and control, and optimize fuel con-
sumption. The control lasws for Level 0 will be continually
readjusted by human/computer teams as a function of
changing conditions so they can react in the most ap-
propriate fashion if emergency conditions arise-thus
providing coordinated control for the entire plant.
Generally, the decision-making system will attemp to
achieve goals and targets sent to it from Level II, but it
wvil proceed on its own when no such instructions are pro-
vided.
The el,ctric utilities %ill use a variety of energy-storage
devices such as pumped hydro, compressed gas, thermal,
magnetic field, and batteries, all controlled by procedures
very similar to the ones used for power plants-adapted,
naturally. for the specific device involved. In most cases,
the controllers for storage systems will be simpler than for
power plants.
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marketplace, which will consist of the transmis-
sion'distribution grid that does the "physical"
distribution. and the control systems that enable
the "market transactions" to take place. Thus, in
addition to providing central-station generation and
storage facilities, utilities will also maintain the
energy-marketplace mechanism.
The energy-marketplace economics will operate
both long-term contracts (where the rate is
prespecified for one to two years in advance and
depends on time of day, season of year, energy use,
and peak demand) and spot-price rates (which are
not specified in advance, and depend on actual
market conditions as determined by demand, plant
outages. and weather. on an hour-by-hour basis).
There will be long-term contracts and spot con-
tracts for both buying from and selling to the grid
(marketplace). There will also be the interruptible
versions of both kinds of rates. Interruptible rates
for buying power will be lower because ttMe utility
has bought--by applying lower rates-the right to
disconnect part of the customer's load when it
chooses.
The. ability to build sophisticated control-
communication systems is necessary for the
energy-marketplace concept to work, and the evolu-
tion of that concept will have a major impact on the
control systems. Relative to blackouts, the key
charge is in the ability of the utility to exercise load
control ("soft" load control via the economics of
spont pricing or "hard' load control via the discon-
necting of interruptibles).
The terrm "substation control" refers to relaying,
voltage control, and load-shedding functions b'ut the
nature cf that control varies with the voltage leve!s. (Only
transmission and distribution voltage levels are discussed
here.) Inforr..a;io processing will handle data before seIl-
dine theni to Leve, I!, and will also detect anomalies that
occur eit:cr in substation or Level 0 control loops. The
;nodels us ed for the load's demand and response
characteristics will be updated continuously and supplied
both to I e" ' II and to 'the substation's own decision-
making ,yste', ' h. re they will be used to implement in-
structions that are furnished by Level 11. Distribution
substations will monitor line and customer outages for
Level 11, so that repair crews can be dispatched with
greater efficiency.
Substation decision making wvill be concerned pri.narily
,ith coordinating Level 0 relay logic with the conditions
and needs that exist in the overall network. Level 0 relays
will control circuit breakers, and in some cases reactances
and resistances, for both equipment protection and
dynamic control. Most of the instructions will come from
Level II, though transmission substations ,with ac/dc con-
verters w.ill also have logic for scheduling power flows.
By locating the Level I system remotely, one control
room .ill be able to cover multiple substations and even
storage. These controls may even be located on the same
site as some controls for Level 11.
Customers
In the next 20 years the relationship between the utility
and its customers \,ill change dramatically. The interac-
:ion and cooperation between utilities and their customers
&Meas$reme;,*s Fr'r~ o,.her 0 'rn aL;e
i U ! ee0 c et'er To o!e
desr-. . a;:.rS sse. s ?cr,, ntionpoi:.-'ssn *?,_- 
121 Hhcr-!avel controllers perform two separate func.
tions. Information processing converts all available inf or-
rraion (measurement and models from other sources) in-
io a form that deision making uses to specify goals and
,ontrol laws.
will be extensive, with both sides buying and s',ling
energy (see the box on facing page).
The extreme diversity among types of customers makes
it impractical to try to cover the hole spectrumn of
customer control functions. Instead, a single-family
residential customer is used a, an example. This family is
arbitrarily assumed to have photovoltaic solar cells, a heat
pump with thermal storage for space conditioning, and
the usual collection f cooking. cleaning, and recreational
electric devices. The family is also assumed to have chosen
to buy a microcomputer control system and to have
signed a spot-price contract with interruptible rights with
the utility.
Control will be handled by members of the family and
the microcomputer. The information-processing system
in the microcomputer wvill maintain mathematical models
of the family's energy-usage patterns, energy storage, etc.
The decision-making system in the microcomputer will
determine a strategy for the best energy use by considering
issues such as whether to buy or sell power from the grid,
whether to store energy, and whether to run certain basic
appliances.
These decisions will be based on the family's own
energy-use model, the spot price of electricity, and the
predicted weather. Under normal conditions, the family
members themselves are the decision-makers for such
devices as lights and television. Some families may choose
to have a continuous display showing how much their use
of electricity is costing them.
The utility's Level 11 system will control the family's
energy use in different ways when there are problems of
an imbalance between supply and demand. Variations in
spot price will provide "soft" load control. However,
when necessary for blackout prevention, the utility's
Level II will command the family microcomputer to re-
adjust load-dropping logic (underfrequency, etc.) and/or
Anatomy of a blackout: 2001
It is a Friday in July 2001. A medium-sized Mid-
western city has two utility-owned fossil-fuel plants
and energy-storage units within its boundaries and
is further fed by five transmission lines.
8:00 a.m. The weather forecast is good. Using
dispatch strategy of minimum cost, the utility
defihvers most of the city's power via the transmis-
,ion lines. One fossil plant is partially loaded and
the second turned off. The plan is to use up all
stored energy by the er'd of the day and replace it
on the weekend. For the weather that is forecast,
neither fossil plant can operate over 50 percent of
its capacity because of environmental constraints.
10:00 a.m. Weather forecast changes to possible
storms in afternoon and evening. The utility
decides to stop using energy from storage.
3:00 p.m. Thunderstorms and tornado warnings
are given. The utility starts to increase the amount
of energy it has stored in the city and turns on the
second fossil plant to its environmental limit. The
con, t . !aw of te relays in the switchyards and the
gove;;,ors, exciters. etc., at the power plants are
changed tc adapt to the new pattern of generation
,..j sLorage. Some of the customers hear the storm
warn:'Us: and decide to fill up their own storage,
.cin z urther nc-ease in demand.
4:00 p.m. A major thunderstorm comes through
with mul.'9 lih1trinq strikes on transmission
lines. Most strokes result in routine, automatic
c!oaring and reclosure. Faulty relay action near one
0,am rant causes a delay in fault clearing but fast
valving urevents loss of sy:cilronization. A stuck
breaker n,' t;e other Tossil plant causes it to lose
sync.hrn-o' mn, but it trips to house load ano is resyn-
chronzed within five minutes. The necessary
ernerGy to cover the lost oLtput is obtained from the
transmission gr;d'.
4.15 .m. Te changing weather paltterns have
removed environmental constraints on the fossil
units' output. Both are increased to maximum out-
put.
4:30 p.m. Tornado.s take out two of the five
transmission lines. One of the remaining lines is
overloaerid. Generatiorn patterns outside the city
are rescheduled to rerove the overload within five
minutes.
5:00 p.m. A second line of tornados comes
through and takes out two more transmission lines.
The last line is heavily. overloaded. The spot-price
rates at which the utility buys and sells power from
its customers are et vex, high to increase
customer generation and decrease load. Some
customers do decide to sell. Others continue to fi!l
their own storae systems. The line overload is
removed in 20 minutes.
7:00 p.m. The last transmission line is hit by a
small plane. The cit i now an electrical island.
Frequency decay is stopped by dropping more in-
terruptible loads and by the use of energy from
storage. 
8:00 p.m.; Faulty computer logic allows 
transformer to overload and burn out. This isolates
one of the fossil plants. All interruptible load is
disconnected. Rotat;ng blackout is established
throughout the city. Essential services are still
served 100 percent of the time.
9:00 p.m. Operator error trips out the one remain-
ing fossil plant. The city is blacked out in the
technical sense: The transmission/distribution
system within the city is no longer energized.
However, there is no blackout in a social sense
because essential services-such as street lighting
and elevators-are still covered from auxiliary units
and/or local storage. Many customers still have
power for essentials, either from their own storage
or from auxiliary generation systems.
Schweppe-Poser systems '2000': hierarchical comntrol strategies
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ato shed load directly. The exact logic will depend on the
details of the interruptible-load part of the contract be-
tween the family and the utility. ·
Pool utility operating centers
The pool operating centers and utility operating centers
of Fig. I will play different relative roles in different parts
of the country. Here they will be discussed as a single enti-
ty, the "pool utility operating center." Miany utilities will
also maintain separate operating centers for transmission
and/or distribution. These may also be viewed as part of
the pool utility operating center. Thus, the pool functions
discussed here usually will not all be in one physical loca-
tion.
The information-processing system will maintain up-to-
date mathematical models of almost all the types sum-
marized in Table I. The Level 11 versions of plant
dynamics, equipment protection, and customer load
models will be simplified equivalents (or aggregations) of
the more detailed models that are maintained at Level I.
Other models, including system economics, system
dynamics, and transmission/distribution, will exist only
at Level II. These models swill provide information to help
Level 1 elements develop external-equivalent models. The
information-processing system of Level II will also main-
rain external-equivalent models of the outside world as
seen from Level II.
Most pool utility operating centers will have some out-
side organization maintain and run the weath-
er/meteorological model. Outputs from the weather
model will serve as inputs to many other models, such as
solar generation, demand, environmental impact, and
security. Different meteorological variables will be used
for the various applications. Weather forecasts will also
be made available to those customers who want to use
such information in determining their own energy-use
strategy.
Figure implies that the environmental monitoring will
feed directly into the Level II information-processing
system. Actually, in some parts of the country, such
monitoring and the associated environmental impact
modeling will be done at Level I.
The decision making at Level ii will be responsible for
smooth operation of the energy marketplace. It will deter-
mine the targets/goals for utility power plants and storage
devices to minimize operating costs subject to constraints.
Many of the economic decision-making functions will be
conceptually similar to those of today (see "System
security: the computer's role," Jn;ac, p. 43). Howe er,
the constraints, cost models, etc., will be much more
sophisticated and complex, involving weather-dependent
demand, generation, environmental impact. and security
constraints. Security constraints will include system
dynamics explicitly, via appropriate mnathematical
models.
In addition, a new phen.omenon, one that has no
analogue in existing systems, will also occur-the feed-
back effect on demand that spot prices will hiave. The op-
timization will be done in the context of probabilistic
(stochastic) mathematics to represent more accurately the
many uncertainties involved.
The "antiblackout" aspect of Level II decision making
will depend on the state of the system. Level I's role for
fast transients.(faults, transient stability) will be to help
the Level I decision-making system set the control laws of
the Level 0 automatic coniro!!ers before the transient
Some controversial issues
Agreement on all aspects of the fu;ia of power
system control does not exist. The relative roles of
human operators and computers is a controversial
topic. Arguments in favor of increased use ot com-
puters to replace human operators can be based
on:
* The inability of human operators t ,'rnmorehend
the complexity of power systems fast ernJoh to be
effective
* The fallibility of humans (operators make
mistakes)
* The availability and low cost of computer hard-
ware
Arguments in favor of an increased importance
of the human operator can be based on
* A computer's ability to reduce information to a
form that human operators can comprehend
* The fallibility of humans (computer program-
mers and designers make mistakes)
* The fallibility of computers
* The value of human insightintuition
* The value of extensive simulator training
This writer thinks the second set of arguments
will prevail and that the role of human operators will
increase in importance. Extensive traininglsimula-
tion facilities will be routinely used.
Everyone agrees with the need for some hier-
archical control structure. It is impractical to be
completely centralized (all control at Level 111) or
completely decentralized (no control above Level 0
or I). However, the relative amount and type of cen-
tralization are controversial. Arguments in favor of
centralization can be based on such issues as
* Reduced fuel costs because of more coor-
dinated operation
· Improved dynamic control and security because
more of the overall systemrr is oeirg contro!!ed from
one point
* The availability of com,,'r-:-cation-'-omputer
hardware for centralized control (efcept for some
fast actions such as fault clearinrio
Arguments in favor of as much decentraiizat-'n
as possible can be based on su h issues as
· Insignificance of economic-dynaric im-
provements obtainable from centralization
* Fear of major catastrophe due to f:lure f ccn-
tralized control
* Belief that centralized controllers lose contact
with local needs and problems
· Existing institutional constraints (different
utilities in different states, etc.)
The writer thinks the decentralized philosophy
will prevail.
A third controversial issue centers on the types
of computers to be used. Two major competitions
are
* Digital vs. hybrid
* Many small digital vs. a few large digital
Hybrid computers can solve particular problems
of power system dynamics very efficiently and
rapidly.
Digital computers are more versatile. Using many
small digital computers enables distributed com-
putation, parallei processing, and greater reliabili-
ty.' Big digital computers are more versatile, easier
to program. and don't waste time talking to each
other. The writer thinks that the "many small digital j
computers" approach will prevail.
__
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begins. For long-term dynamics and dynamic-stability
transients, the decision-making system will operate during
the transient. The ability of the Level I decision-making
system to drop interruptibie load ill change the
philosophy underlying the choice of control laws.
Level II's ability to deal with system restoration follow-
ing outages will be greatly increased (relative to today),
especially at the distribution-systern level. 'The dispatch of
repair crews will be based on detailed models, including
weather conditions and outage patterns of the dCtribution
lines of the customers.
The digital computers of a Level II pool utility
operating center will talk directly with the various Level I
digital computers. The amount of communication and
Level II1 computing that will be done will re massive com-
pared with the amount ,one by today's systems. As
discussed previously, the human operators will be respon-
sible for the development and maintennnce of many
diverse mathematical nmodeb;. O)urirng normal ccolditio,.s,
digital computers will use there mpthemati,:l models to
make decisions that will usua'!y be impiemcnted
automatically, with the operators proiing supervision
and making risk-tradeoff decisions. When th. system is in
real trouble, the operators will make many crucial deci-
sions from lists of alternate possible actions and thPir in -
plications, as provided by computers.
Coordination centers
Regional coordination ccrters w:ill o ;n: i ,.iisni;i nak-
ing. Their primary information-processing role will be
that of facilitating information exchange bet veen Level 11
control systems.
A regional coordination center will act as an infcrma-
tion clearinghouse. It w ill gather mnodels on both present
and future costs from Level II and share this information
so the Level II systems can decide whether to buy or sell
power, how to coordinate reserve allocation, etc. The
regional coordination centers will have the responsibility
of determining "wheeling costs" (the costs associated
1. Mathematical models
* Power plantslstorage devices
Cost, efficiency, loss models
Electrical, magnetic dynamic models
Thermal, chemical, mechanical dynamic models
* Equipment protection
Mechanical stress models
Thermal rating models (weather dependent)
Electrical overvoltage models
· Customer
Energy-use-pattern models (weather dependent)
Energy-storage models
* System economics
Cost models
Constraint models
Shadow prices, incremental-change models
Weather-dependent-generation models
* Transmission/distribution models
* System dynamics
Transient-stability models
Dynamic-stability models
Long-term dynamic models
* Weather/meteorological models
* Environmental-impact models (weather dependent)
* Load characteristics
Demand models (weather dependent)
Voltage, frequency-change-response models
* System-security-index models (weather dependent)
with transmitting power from one region to another when
portions of the power go through a third region).
For dynamic control and security issues, regional coor-
dination centers will gather mathematical models for the
portion of the entire interconnected system outside of the
particular Level II system. A regional coordination center
will also have the responsibility for regional security
monitoring to provide an independent check on system
security to supplement checks made at Level II.
Computers at the center will talk directly with the com-
puters of the various Level II control systems. Super-
visory operation of the system will be the prime respon-
sibility of the human operators.
A national coordination center will coordinate the
various regional coordination centers. Conceptually, the
relationship between the national centci and the regional
centers will be similar to the one between the regional
centers and he various Level 11 control systems--infor-
mation exchange only. This will be accomplished prinari-
ly by committee meetings and telephone calls.
Blackouts in 2000?
Even though sophisticated control systems are aheady
in operation on electric power systems, blackouts ocnur
(iee "Anatomy of a blackout," Feb., p. 38, and "W.'hys
and wherefores of power system blackouts," Apr., p. 36).
Assuming that the control systems used in 2000 will he
even more sophisticated, a key question is, "Wii tnere
s,ii be blackouts?" The answer depends on vhich c;cfini-
tion of the term blackout is used. The technical definiti n
is that a blackout has occurred when power is not
available from portions of the transmission/dis.:rib';tion
grid. The societil definition is that a blackout exists. when
a lack of power incapacitates critical functions and results
in major social disruptions.
Blackouts will continue to exist, if the technical defini-
tion is used. There is simply no way to build a system that
is 100 percent reliable. Eventually something will always
h ,ppen to make it necessary to deenergize some portion
of the grid temporarily.
If the societal definition is used, blackouts will not exist
in the year 2000. By then the public will have accepted the
fact that total blackouts (technical definition) can occur
.ad, thtiv;ore, will have provided supplemental energy
soLrces for critical functions. When there is a total
blackout (technical definition), enough of these backup
sources will work so that major societal interruptions and
disturbances will not occur. There is a good chance that
by te year 2000 the term blackout (societal definition)
will be considered to be a term out of the Dark Ages. +
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5.7 Discussion
The major question focusing the discussion of quality of supply
pricing and system control was what control mechanisms are available as
and/or when system capacity is approached. While spot pricing may assist
in reducing demand at such times, it is clear that such pricing systems
cannot deal fully with the problem, particularly should it occur in an
extremely short time frame. Quality of supply pricing (QOSP) and system
control as presented during the discussion are designed to meet the needs
of the utility for control of its load at times when system capacity is
being approached. Given this central question the key issues around
which the discussion focused were:
o the need for quality of supply pricing
o the need for customer participation in frequency and voltage
control, and
o the operational feasibility of the system.
Quality of supply pricing was a concept developed to complement spot
pricing as discussed earlier. Conceptually it allows the price of
electricity to rise more rapidly that economic spot pricing given
anticipated higher costs associated with the feasibility of system
failure. As such the discussion focused around the complexity of, and
the requirement for a QOSP component within Homeostatic Control. It was
agreed that a number of mechanisms should be available to the utility
system operators under Homeostatic Control, one of which might be the
availability of an additional price signal but that at the same time
there was reason to have an additional set of options more physical than
price which could be applied as well.
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The second major set of issues raised during the discussion focused
upon the desirability of having the customer participate in decisions
concerning frequency and voltage control. Here the discussion centered
around the use and advantages of both the Frequency Adaptive Power Energy
Rescheduler (FAPER) and upon its theoretical counterpart, the VAPER
(Voltage). The discussants concluded that there was considerable
advantage in having the customer participate in voltage and frequency
control particularly in those applications where this could be done both
automatically and in a manner so as not to be seen by the customer
himself, as is suggested in the operation of the FAPER.
While there is a desirability in having the customer participate in
frequency control, a set of questions were raised concerning the need for
a FAPER given that similar devices and interfaces currently exist on the
system. The utility systems now have available to them load shedding
system which is activated by declines in frequency. One portion of the
discussion in answer to this question was that the FAPER allows both an
automatic drop in load and a drop in load at the preference of the
customer where the cost of load loss would, by definition, be minimized.
The consensus was that the FAPER would in fact add to overall system
control and could, given relatively large levels of penetration within
the system decrease the requirements for spinning reserves.
An additional set of questions and discussion centered around the
source of final control for the utility system given the availability of
both FAPER type devices and any type of micro-shedding or other
scheduling systems that might become available. The consensus of those
present was that the utility control room, or a highly centralized point
would in the final instance retain control though it was generally felt
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that the availability of both microshedding devices and devices such as
the FAPER would decrease the need for such action.
The third set of issues discussed centered on the question of
operational feasibility of the control devices proposed under Homeostatic
Control. These included:
o errors emanating from the system or introduced by the customer
o system costs
o microshedding or end-of-line decisions
There will be probably problems concerning monitoring the system as
well as following up on any complaints about errors on this system.
There will be also problems with built-in error conditions and
erroneous data recovery. These problems are evident in most every new
technology. However, one can be sure that new types of complaints that
have never been dealt with before will have to be overcome as the system
evolves.
System costs were not clearly identified in the presentation. Thus,
many participants anticipate the costs of implementing the Homeostatic
Control system could be large. On the other hand, since Distribution
Automation and Control (DAC) system, two-way communication links, and
load control devices such as FAPERs are in place at specific points in
today's utility environment, implanting extensions of these systems in a
Homeostatic Control environment would have a minimal additional cost
associated with it. However, the maintenance costs of dispersed MICs
which relay the price to the customer and other communication links could
be high.
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A component of the Homeostatic control system which was not fully
developed with the presentation was that of micro-shedding and other
mechanisms which could be available to the utility operator who has
reached the end of the line in terms of additional available capacity.
Micro-shedding has been suggested by a number of others and therefore
cannot be claimed by the developers of Homeostatic Control as being
original yet in concept it fits well with the proposed system in that
within any industrial facility equipped with a device such as a MIC it
wuld be possible to set shedding levels within the processes themselves
such that at the control of the utility specific lower priority
operations could be shut down in emergency situations to prevent full
system failure. Micro-shedding thus becomes a mechanism by which the
utility, through in house control devices such as the MIC is able to shed
load that has been preselected by the industry thus being highly
selective in its impact and on total system efficiency both physical and
economic.
SUMMARY
The discussion of Quality of Supply Pricing and Systems control
brought out a general consensus concerning the Homeostatic Control
concept and that was that the concept itself is a collection of ideas
that have been in the minds of others and on the drawing boards and bread
boards of other developers. The uniqueness of the system is the fact
that they have been brought together in a rationalized system in which
the utility and the customer cooperate as they operate against a common
objective function, overall system efficiency and cost minimization.
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Chapter 6: PROCEEDINGS OF CRITICAL ISSUES PANEL
6.1 Pricing/Economics*
Everyone here appears to be fairly comfortable with the concept of
spot pricing. It appears that it would optimize the formula system.
Clearly it is not a system that would work for everyone; it probably
wouldn't work for most homeowners, at least not in the short term. It
would not even work for most industry, but it would work for some.
Therefore, we are saying that this would be an elective optional system
for those that can take advantage of it. The economist would be
particularly comfortable with this approach; it is conceptually the same
idea as transfer pricing - an interfirm or intrafirm environment where we
are trying to set up a price that maximizes the mutual advantage. It has
been well established that in order to implement transfer pricing you
have to know the economics of the two entities between which the goods or
services are flowing This is what, in essence, is being discussed with
Homeostatic Control and spot pricing there has to be communication. If
firm B knows firm A's economics, and if he knows his own economics, there
should be a way of optimizing the mutual benefits.
The discussion looked at price in terms of what we're going to
price, if it's going to be cost related, and if so, what cost should be
used.
The discussion shifted to the question of whether to use short term
or long term marginal cost. At least for the energy component, the long
range replacement cost need to be the relevant number. For the capital,
I would think, conventional theory suggests that whether you use short
*Summarized by Theodore Eck.
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term or long term, replacement costs depends upon the duration of the
transfer relationship.
I am interested in the potential for broadening the theorical
consideration of Homeostatic Control and spot pricing which appears to be
a micro theoretical development to date. If this market or cost
rationalization approach makes sense at a micro level, it should also
make sense at a macro level. One of the more serious questions that we
have in the general economy is the fact that many fuels are not presently
priced at replacement cost, and probably electricity is the greatest
offender. With some of the progress that we are making in natural gas
(if you really believe that natural gas will be decontrolled in 1985)
hopefully natural gas will rise to replacement cost. Oil, as we all
know, is going up daily. Certainly we are not as far from replacement
cost in oil as we were a year ago it may not take very long, at the rate
we're going, to get the price of oil up to replacement cost. With those
two basic fuels at replacement cost, the failure of electricity to do
likewise presumably would introduce even more serious implications.
Focusing on the market for electricity, if Homeostatic Control and
Spot pricing can optimize the relationship between the distributor and
the consumer, we can use the same concept to rationalize the
relationships of sales between distributors. There is a real
misallocation at the present time; why should we not have the same
rationale in wheeling price as we have going from distributor to
distributor? Why shouldn't we have a wholesale market in which
distributors and large industrial buyers all participate. You can
envision that discussion we had on the purchase price of self-generated
power and one of the things that should relate to also is the selling
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price of incremental buying with power. You can envision the possibility
of a nonregulated market for power, where we have a market-determined
price for wholesale power, where the prices are determined and set by its
economic use or value. The theoretical discussion carried on during
these sessions represents the basic raw material for structuring a
non-regulated market. I suggest that we try to progress always in the
evolution of a theory, to go from specific to general. I think we have
potential for construction of a general equilibrium theory, an
optimization theory of energy markets.
I would like to mention several points from the user's view point.
Many users are going to want, and maybe even need, fixed prices and
readily predictable prices for their equipment and location decisions.
Many firms are going to be very uncomfortable and unable to cope with
this level of uncertainties. There is a need to accommodate those
consumers.
Another group that's going to be nervous includes us, the continuous
process industry, refineries, and chemical plants, and so on, that
operate pretty much at a fixed rate, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. We
really don't have any significant potential for optimizing under the
conditions that have been discussed here, but I guess we would worry that
there would be an inclination to set rate schedules that would
overcompensate those sectors that need to economize, while we would end
up paying 125% or 150% of relevant cost. You might argue that it would
be possible to self-generate. But, I caution us not to take
self-generation all that seriously, as it is not a viable option for most
companies. There are very, very serious questions about reliability,
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cost and other considerations. We would much prefer to buy steam from
power companies rather than go to large industrial cogeneration.
6.2 Customer Response System *
By way of introduction to talking about the customer response issues
that were discussed, I think that a mistake was made yesterday when
somebody referred to this concept as an "engineer's dream." It is
obviously a "microeconomist's dream." Many of us share the notion that
having instantaneous spot-prices, always reflecting costs and willingness
to pay simultaneously, is something that is conceptually ideal. What we
also have seen is a lack of hard data, and a lack of a firm indication of
just what are the costs and benefits of Homeostatic Control. The most
significant point of discussion on consumer response centered around the
determinants of that response. It's not enough to say that electricity
costs are rising rapidly and therefore, anything that enables firms and
even other consumers to save, is going to be immediately adopted. It is
true, that rewards in going to systems of 10-15 years from now, which
would be homeostatics (presumably, at least) will be proportional to the
cost of electricity. Because electricity is becoming more expensive does
not mean that the costs of gaining benefits from a Homeostatic scheme are
irrelevant.
The first point that came up in the opening presentation on the
customer response panel was, not that electricity costs were rising, but
that the costs of computers and chips were decreasing. One important
point that came out in response was that dials and switches of ordinary
*Summarized by Lawrence Linden.
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plastic and metal is still important and that the chips may become a
negligible part of the total system costs.
While there was some discussion of problems and opportunities in the
residential sector with reference to water consumption experience.
Residences would not be expected to be the first sector, and probably not
ultimately the most important sector, to use the Homeostatic system.
Residential consumers are much less able to absorb potentially massive
amount of information that would be utilized, and be made available on a
system such as Homeostatic Control. Another comment that is central is
that we just don't have much experience, or real data on what kind of
responses, firms, or residences, would have to such a pricing system.
There is very little experience that is directly relevant in this case.
While you might think of other analogs like water, or maybe even more
distantly, other markets where prices are fluctuating we have too little
experience to predict the outcome. We can all sit here and discuss how
effective such a system would be, but the level of effectiveness depends
on how much the customer's behavior is actually changed.
The most important data set discussed on customer response was that
presented by Schweppe for NEES. You need to see how many processes could
actually be switched. One significant point from this discussion was the
fact that you had to look hard to find a firm that had a lot of
reschedulable processes, and power consumption. It appeared from the
description that all of the parameters needed to be correct for there to
be real incentives for process shifting. Are we really talking about
something that in the aggregate can be important? There is considerable
homework to be done in extrapolating from this data set. On the other
hand, there is another way to look at the question, and that is not to
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keep the consultants and energy laboratory staff employed, but rather to
begin to experiment in an industrial/utility environment. Studies are
important but what we really need are experiments with the concept. It
is hard to imagine Homeostatic Control being adapted all at once.
Nevertheless, it has the opportunity that most new technologies face,
which is that someone will find it attractive. We may not know who right
now, but there are always a few individuals that are imaginative, either
utility chairmen, or imaginative regulators. We already know for
instance, that there are a number of industrial firms that are doing
impressive things in conservation. We know industrial conservation has
been extremely effective in the last six years. Some firms will see such
rate systems to their advantage and be prepared to try them. One of the
things that needs serious consideration is the possibility of finding
some innovative firms, a progressive public utility commission and moving
forward.
Another point that was raised out of the San Diego experience was
that first, such efforts provide additional data, and second, they become
points for comparsion. As with any new system like this, it would be a
mistake just to compare it with what we're doing now; it should also be
compared with other alternatives now also in the conceptual or
experimental stages.
A final point that requires comment is the remarkable degree of
aggreement on the merits of Homeostatic Control and the lack of
discussion on reactions that this concept might arouse if examined by a
larger segment of society than represented by this conference. A
response one might anticipate is a reaction against the "bad guys" who
run these utilities--they could make out like a bandit in a power
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shortage with the rationing scheme proposed during the discussion. In
fact, we have regulatory commissions in part to prevent this type of
long-run undercapacity. The participants here do not seem to distrust
the utility executives the way you know a lot of the rest of the world
out there does. One concern, therefore, is that there are very different
ways of looking at Homeostatic Control and that alternative consumer
perceptions need to be addressed as a portion of any further thinking if
the system is to survive its potential critics. Particularly if such a
concept becomes acceptable in the residential sector.
6.3 Regulatory Environment*
The reactions to the discussions of the regulatory environment may
be summarized by responding to four questions which reflect the
discussion of the last two days. The first is, can homeostatic control
be introduced with the existing regulatory framework? The second is,
will PURPA help? The third is, are regulators and utility executives
able and willing to make the changes? The fourth is, how can the change
best be introduced?
Addressing the first question, can homeostatic control be introduced
with the existing regulatory framework for a class of customers, or
ultimately for more customers? The answer that has been the general
consensus of this group would be yes. The legal and conceptual barriers
can all be overcome. The first type of barrier, both legal and
conceptual, might deal with rates being functional rather than fixed.
There is sufficient precedent for functional rates, thus no problem in
*Summarized by Richard Bower.
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meeting fair and reasonable standards as conceived by either commissions
or courts. A functional rate system, where rates are a function of
kilowatt (KW) usage at a moment of time, could be ascceptable as well as
a fixed rate system. This is not as significant barrier. The barrier is
not with the rate structure per se, but with the revenue requirements
associated with it. The problem exists at two extremes. At one extreme
there is the problem of a guarantee of income to the utility that might
be associated with the rates. One interpretation of this proposal was
that the sum of prices times quantity over a year would equal the total
cost of the utility company a guaranteed revenue proposal. Were this the
case, it would not be acceptable. But as long as Homeostatic Control is
a system in which the sum of price times quantity is not equal to the
utility's annual cost of the year which would be the case if you used
system lambda's, for example, and worked with lambda's or if you had any
kind of a functional formula, that would not be an issue. If there are
coefficients in a function and the coefficients are themselves subject to
regulatory review, you will not have any problem with the utility
commission with regard to a revenue guarantee. One of the problems that
will exist in satisfying both the legal and conceptual questions, is that
once you go beyond lambda's in building a formula you are going to have
to derive a set of operating coefficients. The system lambda's do lend
themselves to this pricing concept.
There is a need at this point to discuss the impact of a spot
pricing system on regulatory lags. A system like this would eliminate
the bad regulatory lags. Regulatory lag as a spur to efficiency is
highly desirable, and it is virtually the only spur that the system has
to inspire efficiency on the part of the company. You do not want
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regulatory lag with regard to providing pricing signals that reflect
changing conditions. There a lag is unproductive because it does not
serve you well. This proposal is virtuous in preserving the correct lags
and getting rid of the bad ones.
There is also the opposite extreme of the revenue requirement issue
and that is the uncertainty or instability issue. In one sense, the
proposed system is the same as any change in the pricing structure. It
creates uncertainty as to what the revenues will be. That occurs when
the change is in the level of prices as well as structure. It is
possible that systematic risk of the utility will increase. Here, the
record is clear and as was suggested, you do not know whether in point of
fact the income effect will be one of smoothing or of increasing the
oscillations of a system like this. It depends on a great many things.
My first question, can this be instituted within the existing
regulatory framework, I think it can, no problem with fair and reasonable
rates and problems with revenue requirements, can be resolved.
My second question: Will PURPA help? I think the answer to that,
too, is yes. It will provide a forum for the next few years, it will be
a forum for discussing a concept such as Homeostatic Control because the
commissions across the country are going to be forced to consider the
rate standards listed. It will also help in the sense that PURPA will
require data and the data that will be filed, there are data that are
explicitly being filed to help intervenors, these will help anybody who
is external to the system to try to work with it. And finally PURPA will
help in that it provides a problem--cogeneration--to which this suggested
methodology seems to be well suited. As a result PURPA should help move
this idea forward in at least three ways, but it is very important to
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recognize, as we in New York feel, that PURPA is primarily procedural and
not substantive. The PUC's are not required to institute rates under
PURPA; they need only examine their appropriateness. While you have a
forum and you have the data and you have the problem, you do not have the
force behind you to assure that rates of this type or those similar will
be introduced.
The third question: are regulators and executives able and willing
to be involved in a change of this sort? My answer would be yes to that,
too, but I would not suggest that they would be enthusiastic. The views
on the responsiveness of the commissions and the executives differ
substantially at this conference: some more positive than others. One
is frequently somewhat amazed that the state regulatory system and the
utilities have been as responsive to changes in pricing structure, or
changes in methodology of pricing as they have been in the past 7 or 8
years. These responses can be seen benefiting many areas, and many
jursidictions besides those discussed like New York, California, and
Wisconsin. The system has also been responsive in many of the PUC's
which have so far been silent. Make no mistake, there are problems in
the system's responding. Two problems were mentioned in the discussion:
one is the distribution problem across classes of customers and
individual customers and the other is the problem of revenue requirements
for the utility. Changing the distribution of the burdens across
customers is very difficult. There will be a contest for any change in
methodology, however appropriate, that involves changing the customer
class distribution. It will be necessary to be very conscientious to try
to work out a scheme whereby one institutes spot prices and at the same
time does not disturb the distribution between customer classes. The
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companies are very jealous of their revenue requirements and their
predictability. Any time you offer any kind of a change that puts that
in jeopardy, you have a problem and it will be necessary to answer these
issues satisfactorily in order to win their support.
The last question posed was: How do you do it? How do you get a
Homeostatic Control system started? I would echo the comments of the
last speaker, find a special contract. Get a simple, specific rate; get
a way to put the technology in place; get a customer and a utility, both
of whom can agree that there's something in this concept. If you can do
that, exactly as was said before, the problem of distribution does not
exist, the problem of revenue requirement does not exist, the utility has
accepted it; and the Public Utility Commission simply has to check on one
thing: Is anybody else damaged? If no one else appears to be damaged,
and that's relatively easy thing to do, at least in the inception of the
contract, then you can make a concept like this work. Do not study this
concept to death; they are clear. You have a philosophic base; there is
a technology that is understood in putting this into practice. Get
started. Put it into operation. And I think there are many specific
places to do exactly that.
One other point needs to be added in getting this concept moving
forward; it is not necessary to push Homeostatic Control as a substitute
for time-of-day pricing schemes; it is a complement to it. It will
salvage some of the benefits that time-of-day can not. To the extent
that it can be presented as a compliment to PUC commissions, it will be a
benefit. If you're an academic, you want to present your ideas as being
distinct, different, and totally ahead of anybody else's. You want to
differentiate yourself to a maximum degree possible. If you're dealing
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with a commission the one thing you want to say repeatedly is, nothing is
new, this is just what they've been doing forever, just a little change.
6.4 System Control and uality of Supply*
There are two principal issues associated with quality of supply,
continuity and constancy. Continuity deals with the idea that when the
customer flips the light switch, the light goes on. Constancy relates to
the fact that the frequency of the system hovers around 60 hertz,
drifting by less than 1%. If it drifts too far from this level specific
users such as the television networks become disturbed and others who
count on the timing nature of the system also are affected. Few
customers realize the full extent of the damage caused by a deviation
from the standard system frequency given that their primary concern is
continuity rather than constancy. For those for whom constancy is a
requirement they are willing to pay a high price for that characteristic
while we know that for others even continuity is not a requirement as
individuals and firms opt for contracts that allow the utility to
interrupt their power flow. The analysis of the overall value and cost
of a device such as a FAPER must be weighed against the cost to the
system of having specific deviations in frequency. It is necessary to
evaluate whether there would be more or less variation and whether this
has a value (or a cost) to those customers who are buying constancy over
continuity.
An example that might prove useful for consideration in analyzing an
additional potential for Homeostatic Control would be a system in which
*Summarized by Paul Dandeno.
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there is at present a 5000 megawatt load, and 20% reserve margin given
6000 megawatts of installed capacity. Give a 2 to 4% annual growth rate
without a plan for capacity expansion, the questions of continuity and
constancy become extremely significant to the customer. The Homeostatic
Control could eliminate some of the problems that would be encountered by
this example.
The concept of the FAPER and VAPER should be considered seriously
given our historical experience with both distribution and transmission
systems and the manner in which these affect the customer. The FAPER and
VAPER may be of additional use both in increasing the reliability of the
system with regard to area control, the power flowing across tie-lines,
and with regard to overall system operations working in conjunction with
automatic generation control devices.
Returning to the question of response of consumers, the quality of
supply concept allows customers to respond to what they believe that it
is worth for them to have power for any specific need such as air
conditioning or the operation of a specific process within a plant. This
essentially allows the customer to make a choice between air conditioning
which, it might be argued, they would choose to turn down and lights
which they would, in all likelihood not choose to be without. In the
past our only means of dealing with times at which the system was near
its true capacity was to go on radio and television and request
conservation on the part of industry and the public. The general feeling
today is that this would not be as effective as it was 8 or 9 years ago.
The homeostatic control concepts would replace this type of appeal to the
public while allowing for actions on the part of specific consumers to
reduce their consumption in response to overall system quality.
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Appendix A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS: ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS
Many terms have different meanings depending on who uses them and in
what context. This can cause communication problems especially when
individuals of different backgrounds are discussing topics which cover a
wide range of interests. The following list provides a set of
definitions related to electric power systems. Many are vague,
arbitrary, or compromise definitions. However, they are self-consistent
and provide a framework for discussion.
The following definitions apply to electric power systems:
o Electric Power System: Utility generation, transmission, and
distribution. Customer load and possibly generation.
Basic physical quantities are:
o Power: Instantaneous power. Measured in kilowatts (KW) or
megawatts (MW).
o Energy: Integral of power over time. Measured in kilowatt
hours (KWH) or megawatt hours (MWH).
o Frequency: Frequency of AC voltage and current in region of
concern, nominally close to 60 Hertz (Hz).
o Voltage: Magnitude of AC voltage (volts).
The definitions are grouped into the following general categories
1. Costs
2. Pricing
3. Rates
4. Regulation
5. Generation
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6. Transmission Distribution
7. Load
8. Elasticity
9. Load Management
10. Vulnerability/Reliability/Security
11. Reserves
12. Control
13. Scheduling
14. Planning
15. Homeostatic Control.
1. Costs
Cost refers to the dollars needed to provide electric power to the
customer usage devices. Other types of costs such as land use or
pollution are not discussed here except as they are reflected into
dollars expended for control (e.g., scrubbers).
o Fuel Cost: Cost of fuel used to generate electricity
o Capacity Cost: Cost of generation, transmission, distribution,
etc.
o Operating and Maintenance Cost: Cost of operating and
maintaining power plants, transmission systems, etc.
o Cost of Capital: Cost of raising money through bonds or stocks
to build, operate, and maintain power system.
o Time Averaged Cost: Total expenditures over a time interval
divided by time interval's length.
o Plant Averaged Cost: Costs averaged over units such as power
plants.
A-2
o Incremental Cost: Cost of the next increment of power; not
associated with any particular pricing philosophy.
o System Lambda ( ): Incremental fuel costs for the utility per
unit of power delivered to the load centers. Recomputed every
5 minutes by Economic Dispatch.
o Embedded Capital Cost: A philosophy of costing capital based
on the principle that the utility should recover the actual
money invested in capital equipment plus a reasonable rate of
return.
o Marginal Capital Cost: A philosophy of capital costing which
says that the capital costs are based on the replacement cost
rather than the embedded cost.
o Marginal Fuel Cost: A philosophy of costing fuel based on
"replacement cost" of fuel rather than purchase price.
2. Pricing
A pricing philosophy determines the basic principles on which rates
are established.
o Embedded Cost Pricing: A pricing philosophy based on embedded
costing principles for determining cost of capital and annual
average costs of fuel and operation and maintenance.
o Marginal Cost Pricing: A pricing philosophy based on marginal
capital and marginal fuel costing principles.
3. Rates
Rate making methods established by regulatory commissions using
various pricing philosophies determine the pricing structure under which
customers pay the utility for electric power (or vice versa).
A-3
o Declining Block Rates: Charges per KWH decrease with total
energy consumption.
o Demand Charge: Charge related to the electricity demand of a
customer during a particular period. Usually related to the
customer's peak electricity demand; often modified by effect of
a ratchet clause.
o Energy Charge: Charge related to the energy a customer uses
during a particular period.
o Connect Charge: Fixed charge for being connected to
distribution system.
o Power Factor Charge" Charge related to the amount of power the
utility is willing to furnish as backup; often independent of
whether or not it is used.
o Time of Use (TOU) Rates: Rates whereby the demand and energy
charges vary depending on the time of day, day of week, and
season of year in a prespecified, published rate schedule.
o Interruptible Rates: Special rates for customers who give the
utility direct control of their load under prespecified
situations and conditions.
o Buy-Back Rates: Rate at which utility buys power from customer
generation.
4. Regulation
o Rate Base Regulation: Most commonly used method of determining
the maximum number of dollars a utility is allowed to collect
from its customers. Under rate base regulation, annual allowed
revenues are equal to a rate of return on the company;s test
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year rate base, plus a one-for-one compensation for the
company's test year operating expenses.
o Rate Base: Net utility plant in service, plus or minus other
adjustments, i.e., capitalized expenses.
o Net Utility Plant: Original cost of a utility's generating
transmission and distribution equipment minus accumulated
depreciation.
o Capitalize: To finance an expense and amortize it over its
useful life, generally using a combination of long-term debt
and equity financing.
o Test Year: Time period chosen by a utility and/or a regulatory
agency on which operating expenses, rate base, and revenue
requirement are based.
o Revenue Requirement: Utility's allowed revenues, as determined
by the regulatory agency.
o Operating Expenses: Uncapitalized day-to-day business expenses
of a utility (e.g., O&M, depreciation, taxes).
o Allowed Rate of Return: Maximum return on rate base to a
utility permitted by a regulatory agency. Generally a
composite of the company's cost of capital (debt and equity),
as claculated by the regulatory agency.
o Earned Rate of Return: Actual return earned by a utility in a
given period.
o Historic Test Year: Test year based on a past period's
financial figures.
o Future Test Year: Test year based on a projected period's
financial figures.
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o Regulatory Lag: Time delay between test year and when rates
are altered to reflect cost changes.
5. Generation
A generating plant converts oil, gas, nuclear power, water, wind,
sun, tides, etc. into electricity.
o Utility Generation: All generating plants owned and operated
by the utility.
o Customer Generation: Any generating plant owned and operated
by a customer.
o Name Plate Rating: Normal maximum power output of plant
(emergency rating may be higher).
o Firm Capacity: The power output level that a generator can be
reasonably expected to produce under normal operating
conditions over a specified period of time.
o Capacity Credit: Amount of firm capacity a plant such as
hydro, solar, and wind can be assigned.
o Installed Capacity: Sum of all installed utility generation.
Can vary widely depending on whether name plate or firm
capacity values are used.
6. Transmission Distribution (T-D)
The transmission and distribution network provides the electrical
links that enable power transfers between generation and loads.
o Transmission Network: High-voltage network (138 kV and above)
used to interconnect utility generators and load centers.
o Distribution Network: Low-voltage network which distributes
power taken from transmission network to customers.
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o Voltage Profile: Magnitude of voltage at different points
(busses) in the network.
o Waveform Quality: Measure of the amount of distortion
introduced into the network by generators or loads.
7. Load
Load is a general term covering many aspects of the demand for
electric power and energy.
o Demand for Electricity: Customer's desire for services
(lights, heat, etc.) which can be fulfilled by use of electric
power.
o Electricity Demand: Integral of power used by customers over a
time interval divided by the length of the time interval:
i.e., average power. Typical time interval 15 minutes to 1
hour (MW).
o Interruptible Load: Electricity demand which the utility can
directly turn off or on depending on the utility's needs, time
of day, etc. Prior arrangements made between customers and
utilities.
o Skyline Curve: Plot of electrical demand versus time.
o Load Duration Curve: "Time collapsed" skyline curve giving the
percentage of the the electricity demand is at a particular
level.
o Load Factor: Measure of peak to total energy for a specified
time interval.
o Load Model: A mathematical structure and associated parameter
values which can be used to determine how the demand will
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behave in the future depending on hypothesized inputs on
weather, prices, etc.
o Load Forecast: A particular forecast of future demand for
specified weather and price scenarios.
8. Elasticity
Elasticity is a concept devised to indicate the degree of
responsiveness of quality (Q) demanded to changes in the market price
(P). It depends primarily upon percentage changes and is independent of
the units used to measure Q and P." (Samuelson Economics)
o Instantaneous Elasticity: Elasticity of a consumer to price
changes in short time periods such as implied in homeostatic
spot pricing intervals (periods of minutes or hours).
o Short-term Elasticity: Response of consumers to changes in
price for electricity in time periods in which the capital
stock of the consumer is fixed (periods of less than 1 year).
o Long-term Elasticity: Responses of consumers to changes in
price for electricity in time periods in which the capital
stocks may be modified (periods greater than 1 year).
o Long-term Equilibrium: State of balance between supply and
demand which occurs when the capital stocks have adjusted on
both the supply and the demand side.
o Energy Elastic Demand: Demand which is sensitive to price, but
which will tend not to be rescheduled to a later time.
o Power Elastic Demand: Demand which is sensitive to price, but
which is energy inelastic so that the power not used at a given
time due to a price will tend to be rescheduled at a later time.
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9. Load Management
Load Management is a term referring to the wide variety of
techniques being proposed today to change the timing and magnitude of the
demand for power so as to match better the costs of providing power. No
single consensus on the scope of the term load management has evolved.
The term is used in many ways in many different contexts. It is often
applied to time-of-use pricing and direct utility control of customer
electricity use. In some contexts it is applied to cogeneration,
providing economic incentives to install storage, solar, etc.
10. Vulnerability/Reliability/Security
Various terms are used to refer to different aspects of an electric
power system's ability to supply enough electric power energy to meet the
demand for electricity.
o Vulnerability: Power system's ability to control/reduce social
economic impacts resulting from major disrupting effects such
as oil embargos, coal strikes, or nuclear plant curtailment.
o Reliability: Ability of a planned power system to supply
customer demand taking into account probabilities of demand
variation and forced outages. "Loss of load probability" is
commonly used as a measure of reliability in generation
expansion planning. Reliability increases as operating reserve
increases.
o Security: Ability of an existing power system to supply
customer demand taking into account existing generation,
transmission and distribution contingencies.
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11. Reserves
The reliability/security of a power system is dependent on the
generation reserves available.
o Spinning Reserve: Amount of extra capacity on power plants
already in operation that is available within 5 to 10 minutes
to meet unexpected plant outages or loss of tie-line support.
o Fast Start Reserve: Reserve such as gas turbines which can be
operational in the 5- to 20-minute time span.
o Operating Reserve: Difference between the installed capacity
available for a time period and the peak demand expected during
that time period.
o Planned Operating Reserve: Operating reserve associated with
system expansion plans.
12. Control
Power system control refers to the control of power system
dynamics--swings in the time range of 0 to 10 minutes.
o System Inertia: Total physical inertia associated with the
generators in the region of concern.
o System Damping: Natural damping of the system transient
response due to changes in frequency.
o Boiler Turbine Dynamics: Response characteristic of the
various steam boilers and steam, gas, hydro turbines in the
region of concern.
o Governor Action: Effect of individual governors on power
plants to vary boiler turbine outputs to maintain frequency
within a desired range.
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o Tie-Line Support: Effect of power transfers to and from the
interconnected system outside the region of concern over the
tie lines.
o AGC: Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is a centralized
control system which sends correction signals to various power
plants every few seconds to maintain system frequency and
tie-line schedules close to their desired levels.
o Voltage Control: Control of voltage magnitudes of different
nodes (busses).
o Load Shedding Under Frequency Relays: An automatic method of
dropping load when frequency well below 60 Hz indicates an
unacceptable input-output power balance on the system.
13. Scheduling
Power system scheduling refers to the scheduling of generators,
storage, TD, and usage in the time range of 5 minutes to one year. The
functional facilities are assumed to be fixed.
o Economic Dispatch: Computation of the optimum generation
schedule of committed plants to minimize fuel costs taking into
consideration transmission losses. Computation typically
repeated every 5 minutes.
o Unit Commitment: Determination of the optimum commitment
(scheduling) of plants hour by hour for the next week. Based
on forecasted demands, plant capabilities, fuel cost, storage
capabilities, etc. Repeated once a day or more often when
unexpected events occur.
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o Maintenance Scheduling: Determination of optimum plant
maintenance and nuclear refueling schedules week by week for
the next year. Done seasonally or more often when unexpected
outages occur.
o Security Assessment: Determination of whether the power system
can be expected to survive events; generally associated with a
list of phyothesized contingents. Provides constraints to
economic dispatch, unit commitment, and maintenance scheduling.
o Load Shedding via Voltage Reduction: Attempt to reduce
electric demand to be met by utility generation by reducing
magnitude of voltage at which power is provided to customers.
14. Planning
Power system planning refers to the determination of facility
additions and modifications in the time range of 1 to 40 years.
o Generation Expansion Planning: Planning new generation
facilities
o Transmission Distribution Planning: Planning new TD facilities.
15. Homeostatic Control
Homeostatic control is an especially coined phrase which refers to a
new philosophy for control, scheduling, operation, and pricing for
electric power systems.
o Energy Marketplace: A concept of time-varying prices for
electricity where prices depend on "instantneous" supply-demand
relationships/costs.
o Marketing System: Portion of utility that enables Energy
Marketplace to function. Consists of T and D system and
necessary computation, communicaton, and control systems.
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o Spot Price Buy: Price at which the customer can buy power from
Marketing System.
o Spot Price Buy-Back: Price at which Marketing System is
willing to buy power from the customer.
o Spot Price Interruptible: Discount price at which the customer
can buy power from Marketing System with understanding power
can be interrupted if needed.
o Spot Pricing Philosophy: Spot prices are obtained primarily
using economic principles such as embedded cost pricing or
marginal cost pricing. When power system is approaching
capacity limits (generation and/or TD), Operational Needs
Pricing principles affect spot prices.
o Operational Needs Pricing: A procedure whereby economically
based spot price is modified depending on the operational needs
of the electric power system.
o Power Type Dmeand: Demand coming from usage devices which need
power at a specific time. Examples include lights, computers,
TV and many motors.
o Energy Type Demand: Demand coming from usage devices which
must be maintained in an average condition. Such devices are
indifferent as to the exact time at which the energy is
furnished. Examples include heating and cooling.
o Frequency Adaptive Power Energy Rescheduler (FAPER): A local
control device installed on customers' energy type usage device
to help control the system frequency-power balance. Does not
interfere with customer needs. Uses only locally
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available frequency measurements and is not under direct
utility control.
o Building Data Link (BDL): Digital data communications medium
located within the boundaries of individual customer
environment to interconnect DRIDM, ERAC, and customer power
consumption devices and monitors.
o Energy Resource Allocation Controller (ERAC): Dedicated
microprocessor-based computer, belonging to the customer and
connected to BDL to control switchable power consumption
devices according to pricing information and customer defined
priority.
o Dynamic Rate Integrating Demand Monitor (DRIDM):
Microprocessor-based customer energy usage monitor intended to
replace present electromechanical watt-hour meters. It records
customer charge in accordance with a time-varying rate
structure and performs interfacing and protocol support
functions between the MCCL and the BDL.
o Marketing Interface to Customer (MIC): Includes the utility
company data source, the MCCL, and the DRIDM to provide the
customer with information pertaining to distribution system
status and instantaneous pricing.
o Marketing Interface to Customer Communications Link (MCCL):
Communications medium, protocol, and syntax used to transfer
data between the power company and the customer.
o Distributed Shedding: A load shedding structure characterized
by the location of breaker relays at the customer end of the
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transmission network instead of at intermediate nodes.
Breakers are activated by DRIDM in accordance with instructions
received via MCCL.
o Microshedding: Microprocessor-based distributed computer
network capable of controlling customer devices in a load
shedding situation.
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APPENDIX B:
INDUSTRIAL COGENERATION AND HOMEOSTATIC CONTROL
This appendix provides background information on the potential
impact of homeostatic control upon industrial cogeneration. Issues
explored in this material are:
o What are the opportunities and problems posed by industrial
cogeneration and its interaction with the power system?
o How effectively can the current approaches for exploiting the
advantages and alleviating the problems of cogeneration achieve
their goals?
o Does Homeostatic Control improve upon the current approaches?
o How soon could it be feasible to implement it?
The following material is provided as an example of Homeostatic
Control's effect on this combined conservation and generation technology,
one which has raised many issues related to the operation of and rate
making for electric power systems. This appendix is divided into three
sections:
B 1 Cogeneration: An Introduction
B.2 Rates for Industrial Cogenerators
B3 Homeostatic Control and Cogeneration
The introduction (B.1) briefly defines cogeneration and discusses
ownership and control options. "Rates ..." (B.2) surveys the types of
pricing structures being designed for industrial firms that are involved
with different cogeneration ownership and control arrangements.
"Homeostatic Control and Cogeneration" (B.3) speculates on the problems
that Homeostatic Control can and cannot alleviate.
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B.1 COGENERATION: AN INTRODUCTION
For the purposes of the discussion here, industrial cogeneration
means the simultaneous production of:
1. electricity and
2. steam or heat for industrial process needs.
Cogeneration considerably improves upon the energy efficiencies
attainable in the separated generation of electricity and process steam
or heat. The key operating and design difficulty involves balancing
process heat needs with electrical needs. Unless the cogeneration plant
is linked with the power system, extra generation capacity must usually
added at the site to ensure electricity supply reliability for the
electrically isolated plant.
The amount of electric energy supplied by cogeneration has increased
fourfold since the 1930's. Its share of total U.S. electricity supply,
however, has diminished from 18% in 1941 to 4.3% in 1975. This decline
has been attributed to both institutional factors and the changes in
energy prices and technologies during the 1950's and 1960's [1]. Since
energy prices have now risen sharply and since industrial steam and heat
used 28% of the U.S. fuel consumption in 1968 while electricity
generation consumed 21%, numerous studies have concluded that
cogeneration is "an energy technology whose time has returned" [1, 2, 3,
4, 5 and 6].
A variety of ownership and management alternatives exist for
cogeneration facilities. For the purposes of the discussion here, the
key organizational classes are limited to cogeneration units producing
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steam for industrial processes and operating in parallel with the power
system:
1. Customer owned and controlled cogeneration with no excess
power: the cogeneration plant electrical output does not
exceed the customer's internal electricity usage, thus a net
flow of power from the customer to the power system rarely
occurs.
2. Customer owned and controlled cogeneration with excess power:
the cogeneration plant's electrical output usually exceeds the
customer's internal consumption, so a sale of electricity to
the power system is desirable under a buy-back arrangement.
3. Shared cogeneration plant ownership and operation: under a
variety of plant ownership and control alternatives, the
customer and the utility share the plant's output along with
its operating and capital costs while the utility usually
assumes responsibility for the economic dispatching of the
facility (when the plant is not operating, the industrial steam
needs are met from a back-up boiler).
4. Utility owned with steam sales: the utility owns and
economically dispatches the cogeneration plant with the steam
sales to the industry taking place at negotiated rates.
For simiplicity, this background paper will concentrate on classes 1, 2,
and 4.
Two themes underlie many of the approaches for these institutional
arrangements and their associated steam and power rate structures.
First, the cogeneration plants should be encouraged to run as if they
were economically dispatched by the power system operators whether or not
they are directly controlled in this way. Second, the rates paid or
received by the industrial cogenerator should reflect the unit's effect
upon the power system's costs of service. The interconnection of a
cogeneration plant should impose no burden on the utility's other
customers. Likewise, the cogenerators should be fairly compensated for
any special benefits that their electricity production confers upon the
power system. A number of studies have noted the importance of utility rates
in the economics of cogeneration [3, 4, 5, and 6].
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8.2 EXISTING OR CURRENTLY PLANNED RATES FOR INDUSTRIAL COGENERATORS
The dual goals of economic operating incentives and cost-of-service
pricing are embodied in the types of rates that a cogenerator faces.
These rates are billed on a monthly basis and are fixed in advance, often
under a long-term contract between the customer and the utility. The
exact menu of rates depends upon the cogenerator's class.
Class 1 cogenerators, who have no net flows to the power system,
first face an industrial tariff for their electric energy consumption
during the billing period plus a demand charge for their peak usage.
Since the cogeneration plant is inside the industrial firm's premises,
the energy and demand viewed by the utility is after the cogeneration
unit's contribution. Second, the firm will pay a stand-by charge for the
opportunity to receive additional power if the cogeneration unit fails or
is undergoing maintenance; the firm's purchases reflect all its usage if
the cogeneration unit is not operating. Depending on the particular
utility, the energy and demand charges may be different than the tariff
for non-cogenerating customers.
Class 2 cogenerators, who have planned electricity flows into the
power system, face the energy and demand components of the industrial
tariff for any electricity purchases that they have made in excess of
their cogeneration or when the unit was not operating. For their sales
to the power system , they will receive payment according to the electric
energy buy-back rates and capacity credits if the energy was delivered
within the terms of a contract fixing a minimum operating schedule and
reliability. Finally, the firm pays a stand-by charge for the
opportunity to receive power if the cogeneration unit fails or is
undergoing scheduled maintenance.
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Class 4 customers, who buy both steam and power from the utility,
pay standard industrial tariffs for their electricity and, usually, an
individually negotiated steam tariff for their steam purchases from the
cogeneration facility. The utility receives all the cogeneration unit's
electrical output directly. The individual contract between the parties
must set whether or not the utility provides the industrial firm with
steam during periods when the cogeneration unit is not producing
electricity for economic reasons or because of maintenance or
unanticipated outages. The fundemental issue associated with setting
steam tariffs is the rate of return on revenues associated with the
utility-owned cogeneration unit: should they be allowed a rate higher
than the regular regulated rate of return for a cogeneration unit because
of higher systematic risks associated with the steam revenues from this
single industrial customer?
The electric industrial purchase tariffs, stand-by charges, buy-back
rates, capacity credits, and steam tariffs may include clauses for
seasonal, weekly, and daily time-of-use components and utility fuel cost
adjustments. Although the multitude of rates for cogenerators contain
numerous provisions for encouraging plant operations and compensation in
accordance with power system conditions and costs of service, they do not
reflect the power system or cogeneration unit conditions as they actually
develop because the rates reflect the expected rather than the realized
conditions. For example, stand-by charges are intended to pay for the
additional capacity that the utility must provide to serve the
Class 1 or 2 customer when its plant is out of service; unless the
industrial firm's plant outage occurs during power system peak
conditions, the industrial firm has only the miniscule impact associated
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with the operation of the next generation increment in the power system's
economic dispatch order. The stand-by charge is usually designed to
reflect the probability of the simultaneous occurence of the system peak
and a cogeneration unit outage combined with the cost effect of this
event--but these costs do not really occur unless the cogenerator's
outage happens at the peak time. Unless the stand-by charge accurately
reflects expected costs, the charge forces the industrial firm to add
back-up generation to avoid the charges; this service could usually be
more economically accomplished by the power system with its greater
diversity of generation and electric loads. Energy buy-back rates
reflect the average value of the cogenerator's energy sales to the power
system assuming typical load conditions and performance by the other
generation units--if the load at a specific time is unexpectedly low, it
would be better if the cogeneration plant was not operating because the
utility is paying more for its production than it would have to pay for
electric energy from other units. No Class 1 or 2 cogenerator has any
incentive to participate in power system frequency or quality of supply
control.
B.3 HOMEOSTATIC CONTROL AND COGENERATION
The information transfers imbedded in homeostatic control clearly
demonstrate their value in the incentives they offer to cogenerators.
The spot buy and buy-back prices can reflect system conditions very
closely, thus providing contemporaneous incentives for cogeneration unit
operation and just and reasonable payments reflecting current costs of
service. Actions of devices like the FAPER can provide means for the
customer as well as the utility to participate in actions to maitain
stable system frequency and quality of supply. The cost of spot price
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communication and metering to serve the MIC function is small compared to
the advantages offered at even the present time.
Impact of the Energy Marketplace
With spot pricing for energy purchases and buy-back, the mire of
special rates and conditions for cogenerators disappears. Every
industrial customer operating its own cogeneration unit (Class 1 and 2)
faces the current spot buy price when its usage is more than the unit
output and the current buy-back spot price when the unit output exceeds
usage. Since the buy-back price reflects the power system's needs for
additional generation on a five minute basis, the industrial firm then
has the same economic generation incentive as if it were directly
controlled by the utility's economic dispatching. Since the spot buy and
buy-back prices can be designed to reflect the chosen definitions of
"cost of service," the industrial firm pays or receives payment directly
according to its impact on current system costs. This approach, as noted
in section 4.4.3, is in direct consonance with the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act section 210, offering even more flexibility than
was envisioned by Congress.
Take as a simple example a firm that uses no electricity but
requires steam in its processing operations. It has built a cogeneration
unit to provide its steam needs and sell all the electric energy output
to the local utility. When the cogeneration plant is not operating, the
plant can obtain steam from an oil-fired package boiler, which has a low
capital cost but burns expensive low sulfur oil. Since the firm never
uses electricity in excess of the cogeneration plant output, it always
sells to the utility at the spot buy-back price. If the spot buy-back
rate falls below a certain minimal value, rbb,mih the firm can
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produce steam more cheaply from the package boiler. The "per unit excess
of revenues less alternative costs" for the cogeneration unit is the
difference between the current energy spot buy-back price and the minimum
price for the economic operation of the cogeneration plant: this is the
operating benefit to the industrial firm for the output of a given mix of
steam and power from the cogeneration unit. Since the utility receives
this energy and avoids placing more expensive sources of generation into
service, it: also receives a benefit in terms of a reduction in its
operation and fuel expenses; this is directly passed on to the other
consumers through reduced power system operating costs. Figure B.1
illustrates an incremental fuel cost curve for the utility at different
load levels under an assumed utility generation unit availability; this
is the type of information that would be available during the short spot
pricing intervals but is not available when rate schedules are set far in
advance. The vertical line, Xcb , represents the current system load
assuming there are no sources of generation other than the utility's.
Further assume that the utility sets the buy-back spot price at its
Systems Lambda, rbb, which is the current incremental fuel cost from
its plants. Figure B.2 shows the conditions if the industrial cogener-
ation unit is producing an electrical output of ( x cb - x 
The System Lambda and utility generation are both reduced to rbb and
xug , respectively, resulting in the costs savings to the utility
given by the dotted area. The utility's operating costs for serving the
customers' loads are now the total utility generation fuel costs plus the
revenue paid to the industrial cogenerator, which is shown in the single
and double cross-hatched area. The industrial firm receives benefits
(double cross-hatched area) above the direct incremental costs of running
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the unit (single cross-hatched area). The incremental operating costs
for the cogeneration plant do not include any capital charges for the
cogeneration plant because that is a "sunk cost"; this capital must be
recovered out of the operating benefits--if the firm did not anticipate
sufficient operating benefits over the life of the unit to recover these
capital costs, the cogeneration unit should not have been built.
The above discussion has presumed that the cogeneration unit's
output is all available at one incremental cost at a given steam
consumption rate. Actual cogeneration plant designs embody more
complicated operating economics: the incremental costs depend on both
the steam and electric output. The industrial firm could further gain by
scheduling its steam needs for when electric output from the unit could
yield the maximum profits from the combined primary industrial product
processing and the cogeneration electricity sales.
The situation becomes slightly more complicated for a firm using
electricity in addition to steam. When the spot buy-back price is above
the minimum to cover incremental cogeneration costs, the unit runs at
full output. If the spot buy-back price drops below this minimum
incremental cogeneration cost but the spot buy price is still above that
cost, the unit should produce just enough power to cover the firm's
internal electricity needs. When the spot buy price falls below the
incremental cogeneration costs, the firm should fall back on the package
boiler for steam and purchase electricity from the power system. The
differential between the buy and buy-back spot prices introduces a small
incentive problem since the cogenerating plant is operating at times when
the power system can generate more cheaply but the customer sees its own
generation as less expensive--this demonstrates the balance that must be
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struck between the problems of obtaining a good cost-of-service measure
and the problem of incentives for globally economic efficient operation.
Nevertheless, spot pricing clearly alleviates many of the difficulties
with conventional approaches to rate-making for industrial cogenerators.
In cases where the utility owns the cogeneration unit (Class 4), the
steam rates could be based on spot pricing just as the electricity
rates. Because of the economies of joint production embodied in
cogeneration, the steam rates would normally drop when the electrical
output fra the unit is most valuable, i.e. when the electric spot prices
are highest. During low power system load conditions, when the
cogeneration unit's electric output is unneeded, the steam spot price
would rise to the cost of producing steam in the back-up boiler.
The costs of implementing homeostatic control for even a single
cogenerator are small compared to the apparent benefits. The comm-
unication of the spot prices can be made on leased telephone lines. This
information can be used by the process control operator through the
energy control computers already installed in many industrial plants.
The recording of electricity buy and buy-back flows can be made on the
magnetic tape recorders already available for special time of use rates.
The industrial firm must endure larger short-term uncertainties in
its buy and buy-back rates. On the other hand, the firm gains through
its opportunities for more flexible operation to take advantage of
profitable situations while simultaneously aiding power system
operation. The regular fluctuations in the spot prices will be very
predictable; any long-term shifts in the spot prices would have
eventually been reflected in shifts in the existing classes of rates
anyway.
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Impact of FAPERs and Cogenerator Participation in System Control
The two most straight-forward opportunities for customer cogenerator
participation in system control are governor actions by the cogeneration
plant and FAPER actions on the customer's electrical loads. Governor
actions or decentralized generation control to restore system frequency
to the standard 60 Hz can increase the cogeneration unit's output when
system frequency drops. Likewise, FAPER actions, on average, will reduce
the firm's electric loads in such a situation. These two effects combine
to increase the firm's net sales to the power system in response to
system control needs based on frequency changes before any actions are
taken for economic reasons at the subsequent spot price updates.
More subtle opportunities arise because of the economies of joint
production in cogeneration. Electrical output from the cogeneration
plant can be increased more economically when it is associated with an
increase in useful steam output. This suggests that some steam uses in
the industrial plant should be made sensitive to power system frequency
so they increase during a decrease in frequency. This allows a more
economical expansion in electrical output. This frequency adaptive steam
energy rescheduling, however, does not involve loads with the diversity
that FAPERs have within the whole power system, so investments for the
economic short-term storage of steam energy (e.g.,steam accumulator
tanks) may be needed to realize any advantages associated with the
frequency-related control of steam load.
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Concluding Comments
Homeostatic Control better meets the two cogeneration ate design
themes better than existing or planned rate structures. First, the
cogenerators, motivated by profit incentives, behave more nearly as if
they were directly controlled by the power systemil economic dispatching.
Second, they pay or receive compensation that is directly related to
realized costs-of-service. They have to respond to current costs, not to
costs that were anticipated but not realized or realized but not
anticipated. Furthermore, industrial cogenerators would be forced to
become more responsive to power system economics and control needs.
Since the costs associated with implementing Homeostatic ontrol are only
slightly higher than those for metering these customers under many of the
other new rate structures, it presents an opportunity that should be
taken advantage of in the near future.
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